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This project investigates the significance of fainting men in late-Victorian novels. While 
fainting is supposedly a female phenomenon related to women’s fragility and emotional 
vulnerability, a large number of men swoon in Victorian novels. Fainting's form in these 
novels at the end of the century, I argue, reflects the emergence of materialist ideas about 
the brain and the nervous system’s importance to human consciousness and subjectivity. 
Fainting is a physiologically affective response, one that reveals the nonconscious, 
automatist, and animal part of every human—including men. 
Swooning in novels creates what I am calling narrative syncope. As a term, syncope is 
used across multiple discourses. In medicine, it refers to a loss of consciousness, and in 
grammar and music, it defines a gap, bridge, elision, or dysrhythmia. Through narrative 
syncope, late-Victorian novels engage not just the representation of fainting but also its 
novel form. That is, fainting’s affective and nonhuman character mirrors what we might 
call the affect of narrative form, including temporal disjunctions, shifting narrative 
perspectives, and gaps in linguistic meaning.  
While fainting men appear across Victorian literary genres and beyond, my focus in this 
dissertation is on three late-century novels: Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray 
(1890), H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895), and Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897). 
Each of the fainting men (and sometimes women) in these novels is struggling with the 
(im)possibilities of self-representation, as novelistic form turns from realist narration and 
towards an alienated and fragmented literary style. These men are, as Jacques Derrida 
would call them, autobiographical animals, whose nonhuman bodies and narratives both 
subvert and create the conditions for their subjectivity. Furthermore, as the nineteenth 
century struggled with the moral implications of materialism and Darwinism, these late-
century novels offer a way to understand ethics as an embodied imperative. That is, 
affectively nonhuman bodies and narratives challenge the moral status of humans, while 
at the same time suggesting a greater ethical demand that emerges from the uncertain 
species status of the body. In exploring affective ethics in these novels, I follow Derrida’s 
conception of ethics as an impossible demand.  
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In 1890, wildly popular author Marie Corelli published the Gothic romance 
Wormwood, a novel about the frightening effects of absinthe addiction.1 The protagonist, 
Gaston Beauvais, falls in love with young Pauline de Charmilles, and the two are 
engaged to be married. Pauline, however, is enamoured with and seduced by the 
otherwise saintly Silvion Guidèl. When Pauline reveals her desire for Silvion and begs 
Gaston to break off the engagement, her fiancé is incensed at this rejection. He falls 
quickly into the grip of an absinthe addiction, leaving Pauline in disgrace at the altar and, 
eventually, killing Silvion. Gaston and Pauline meet one night and when Gaston tells her 
what he has done, Pauline runs from him, throws herself off a bridge, and drowns. In the 
wake of her death, Gaston is physically and emotionally overcome as he is haunted by the 
face of Pauline’s beloved:  
The wind filled my ears with a dull roaring noise,—something black and 
cloudy seemed to rise palpably out of the river and sway towards me,—the 
pale, stern face of Silvion came between me and the murky skies,—and with 
a faint groan, and a savour as of blood in my mouth, I lost my hold on 
thought and action, and reeled down into utter darkness, insensible. (330) 
Gaston’s self-narration before he swoons is largely limited to a description of his body—
the wind in his ears, the sight of Silvion, the involuntary groan, the taste of blood—
without any self-conscious explanation of his feelings. That is, Gaston does not narrate 
his feelings of guilt, exhaustion, or fear of his own desire, although those are all valid 
interpretations of his fainting fit. Instead, his narration of the moment, including the 
revelation of his inner state, is reduced to his body. 
Gaston is not the only nineteenth-century literary man to faint. The pages of 
Victorian novels were home to many swooning men of different classes, characters, and 
sexual appetites, and those men lose consciousness for a variety of reasons. For example, 
the young doctor Hope in Harriet Martineau’s Deerbrook (1839) faints in distress at his 
                                               
1 For Corelli’s popularity as a late-Victorian author, see Kirsten MacLeod’s comprehensive introduction to 
the Broadview edition of Wormwood. 
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wife’s behaviour (249), and the prospector George Talboys swoons in Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon’s Lady Audley’s Secret (1862) when he reads of his wife’s death (37). When the 
American man-of-leisure from Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s The Coming Race (1871) is 
knocked on the head by a falling piece of rock, he is “stunned” before he “recovered [his] 
senses” (21), a loss of consciousness that prefigures the hypnotic sleep he experiences at 
the hands of an underground civilization. The adventurous colonial settler Higgs in 
Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872) faints as he reaches the outskirts of the fictional country 
and mistakes statues for threatening giants (66); other imperialist adventurers, Horace and 
Leo in H. Rider Haggard’s She (1886), faint during a violent encounter with the 
Amahagger of Africa (112). The passionate but exhausted doctor Ovid faints in Wilkie 
Collins’ Heart and Science (1883) as a result of overexertion (109). In Hall Caine’s 
Shadow of a Crime (1885), poor tailor Simeon faints under the burden of a secret (28) 
while dalesman Robbie faints from illness (210). Svengali, an impoverished musician in 
George du Maurier’s Trilby (1894), swoons at the sight of his own blood (358), while in 
the same novel, Little Billee suffers from a “fit” of unconsciousness that the narrator calls 
a “kind of epileptic seizure” (197).  
The fainting men who form the focus of the chapters of this dissertation all appear 
in novels from the last decade of the nineteenth century. They include the upper-class, 
decadent, and possibly queer Dorian from Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray 
(1890), who swoons at the sight of a vengeful stalker (190); the well-to-do and 
industrious scientist called only the Time Traveller in H. G. Wells’ The Time Machine 
(1895), who is overwhelmed by the effects of time travelling and loses consciousness 
three times (76-78, 118, 149); and the pseudo-cosmopolitan, middle-class solicitor 
Jonathan Harker from Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), who is fairly sure he has fainted 
after an encounter with the vampire, but is not entirely certain why (44). The novels in 
which these fainting men appear all belong to the Gothic genre, broadly defined as a form 
that represents human subjectivity as “both fragmented and permeable,” and incorporates 
and negotiates the increasing “general anxiety about the nature of human identity 
permeating late-Victorian and Edwardian culture, an anxiety generated by scientific 
discourses, biological and sociomedical, which served to dismantle conventional notions 
of ‘the human’ as radically as did the Gothic which arose in response to them” (Hurley 3, 
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6). While the above examples demonstrate that fainting was hardly limited to the fin-de-
siècle, fainting men in these late-Victorian novels reveal how the feeling body is at the 
heart of, and presents a challenge to, human subjectivity. 
My claims in this dissertation meet Stoker’s young solicitor exactly where he is in 
uncertainty and self-doubt over his loss of consciousness; in the three late-Victorian 
novels I read here, I argue that fainting is an expression of the body’s encounter with an 
unknown world and represents the unknown otherness of the self. Fainting, I contend, is 
an affective response, meaning that it is a behaviour of the feeling body that circumvents 
subjectivity, self-consciousness, or agency. Throughout this dissertation, I use the term 
affect to refer to the feeling body broadly rather than to a specific emotion like fear or 
anxiety, drawing on those theorists who use the term to designate a nonconscious 
responsiveness of the body. Moments of fainting reveal the nonsubjective, nonhuman, 
and non-individual part of every man that tries to tell his story within these novels’ 
narratives. While each of the novels I examine here suggests that the nonsubjective, 
nonhuman, and non-individual part of being is frightening (whether through a decaying 
portrait, a vision of animal-like humankind, or a blood-sucking vampire), I argue that the 
affective dimension of fainting opens up nonconscious life to its ethical potential, as it 
challenges the difference between subjective and nonsubjective, human and nonhuman, 
and self and other. I therefore follow Jacques Derrida’s concept of ethics as I read these 
novels, arguing that the inability to decide whether a form of life is human or nonhuman, 
for example, means that there is no moral code available to decide how to behave towards 
those forms of life. For Derrida, when the other demands something from us, we must 
respond unconditionally. At the same time, the impossibility of doing anything 
unconditionally, and the uncertainty of how to respond to another when we are unsure of 
whether they are the same or very different, produces the realm of ethics itself. 
Wormwood’s Gaston, desperate to eschew traditional notions of morality (and in doing 
so, to be free to do what he likes to whomever he likes), claims that “we are mere 
animals—we shall never be angels” (Corelli 77). In reply, this dissertation partially 
echoes Gaston’s own father, when he explains that morality is “a recognition of the 
responsibilities of one’s being” (77). While the conservative patriarch of Corelli’s novel 
likely never meant it this way, I argue that it is exactly one’s being—illustrated in the 
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novels discussed in this dissertation by fainting bodies—where ethics begin. Men who 
faint in Dorian Gray, The Time Machine, and Dracula have affective bodies that are 
animal, machine-like, and other to themselves, and the alterity of these fainting bodies 
disrupts narratives of selfhood and humanness to upend cultural and social rules about 
moral behavior and responsibilities towards others. 
1.1. Syncope 
Fainting is a term that describes a complete loss of consciousness. It therefore 
differs from other altered states of consciousness that emerged or were of heightened 
interest in the nineteenth century. In states of mesmerism, hypnosis, and trance, for 
example, one could have one’s consciousness controlled or transformed, or could gain 
access to another’s consciousness.2 By contrast, fainting is a break with consciousness, an 
inability to access any consciousness. Even when characters in novels do not quite 
succumb but come very near to fainting, these moments emphasize lack, loss, or failure—
an absence of selfhood. The nonconsciousness that occurs during a swoon is also not 
what we would now understand as the Freudian unconscious, the seat of repressed desires 
that become manifest in dreams. Nineteenth-century psychology understood the 
unconscious to be “the large mass of biological, neural inputs that pass without explicit 
notice” (Dames 222), rather than a fantastical part of the mind. While fainting sometimes 
occurs as the result of or concurrently with strong feelings, its beginning and end is in the 
body. For example, in Wormwood, Pauline faints when she and Gaston are discussing 
Silvion, before Gaston knows the truth of his fiancée’s betrayal (Corelli 138-139). This 
faint is meant to have narrative import, indicating the significance of Silvion’s name to 
Pauline. However, her swoon is not the appearance of the repressed desire of the 
unconscious, since Pauline has already given in to her desire. Instead, her faint is the 
                                               
2 As Alison Winter describes in Mesmerized, her detailed social history of mesmerism in Victorian 
England, a practitioner of mesmerism would place his or her subject in a mesmeric trance using the powers 
of animal magnetism. Winter writes that mesmerism took hold in a period when Victorians “monitored 
their own sensibilities, took the measure of the influence they felt from each other, and speculated about the 
sympathies that bound them” in an effort to discover the secrets of the collective Victorian mind and gain 
“a key for better understanding themselves” (12). See also Marlene Tromp’s Altered States for a history of 
the transformative and transgressive social potential of altered forms of consciousness and identity during 
spiritualist séances. 
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result of an intensity of feeling, a concentration of affect so strong that it interrupts 
language, consciousness, and selfhood. When Gaston mentions Pauline’s swoon to 
Silvion, the latter attempts to throw Gaston off the scent of the affair by gesturing to the 
fundamentally biological nature of fainting: “To faint is nothing,—many a school-girl 
faints at early mass, and the teachers think it of very little import” (141). To have a body 
is to be subject to its vicissitudes, to lose control, to be alienated from its meaning, to 
sometimes disappear.  
The fainting men of this dissertation share Gaston’s (and Pauline’s) vulnerability, 
as they are subject to their animal bodies. Moreover, like Gaston, their subjectivity is 
embodied in narrative form as gaps, discontinuities, and non-linear temporalities that 
both break and bridge the tales they attempt to write. Gaston explicitly understands both 
his consciousness and his autobiography to be embodied, claiming the authenticity of his 
self-narration by declaring, “I will hide nothing from you! I will tear out the very fibres 
of my being and lay them on your modern dissecting-table; nay, I will even assist you in 
the proving-work of the mental scalpel” (74). Talia Schaffer notes that Gaston’s 
descriptions of the inner workings of his brain reflect the beliefs of physiological 
psychology (para. 17), a Victorian field investigating the physical basis of feeling, 
thought, and agency.3 His autobiography is therefore necessarily fragmented, as there are 
parts of the embodied self that are simply unknowable and inaccessible. “There are 
certain phases of feeling and passion—are there not? —,” he reminds another character, 
“which storm the soul at times,—we are shaken, but we cannot explain the shock even to 
our innermost consciences!” (Corelli 204). Gaston acknowledges that there are gaps in 
his self-knowledge, and gaps produced by his body, like his faint. One of the ways in 
which the narrative reproduces this gap is through the excessive use of dashes, 
demonstrated well in the quotation above. Or consider Gaston’s description of his 
supposedly “exact and methodical” reasoning on learning of Pauline’s betrayal: “—I 
found I had acquired new force,—new logic,—new views of principle,—and I was able 
to turn over quite quietly in mind Pauline de Charmilles’ dishonour” (175). These dashes 
                                               
3 Schaffer argues for Gaston’s secular, modernist subjectivity, one that finds itself looking backward to 
physiological psychology and forward to Freudian theories of bodily drives. 
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suggest a halting, fragmented ability to think and communicate linguistically, while at the 
same time they join words and phrases together to produce the narrative. I call both the 
embodied and textual form of these breaks and bridges in late-Victorian novels moments 
of narrative syncope. 
The term syncope is most often used today in its medical context to refer to the 
act of fainting, often defined as a transient loss of consciousness, but it has a much more 
complex history. Syncope also appears in grammar and music to describe similar types of 
disruption. In grammar, syncope or syncopation refers to the “contraction of a word by 
omission of one or more syllables or letters in the middle,” while in music, it refers to 
shifting or sustaining accents to produce an atypical rhythm (OED). The Oxford English 
Dictionary notes that prior to the twentieth century, syncope also had a discipline-
agnostic connotation: “a cutting short; abbreviation, contraction; sudden cessation or 
interruption.” While the examples to which I turn in this dissertation are grounded by 
syncope in its physiological sense, I take advantage of the terms relative, albeit obscure, 
flexibility to explore interruptions and dysrhythmias of consciousness and narrative more 
broadly. I follow Catherine Clément’s theory of syncope as a trans-disciplinary pattern of 
shock, loss, and suspension that subverts or supplements the “autonomous and aware” 
Western model of subjectivity, and politicizes the absence of selfhood.4 In Syncope: The 
Philosophy of Rapture, Clément argues that syncope produces a loss of human 
exceptionalism. She emphasizes the potential of syncope to subvert the Western and 
Cartesian attitude toward the world, and particularly toward the natural world, as one of 
individuality, power, and action. Syncope, Clément claims, entails a letting go of mastery 
and accepting one’s place as a part of the world, along with animals and other forms of 
life.5 In claiming the political significance of nonsubjective or non-individuated life, 
                                               
4 As Verena Andermatt Conley describes, Clément “looks for another approach to politics through 
renoncement, strength in weakness, and a decentering of human beings toward living things,” all present in 
the potential of embracing syncope as a loss of self (xiv). 
5 Clément identifies Descartes as instantiating a version of subjectivity that sees itself as “master and 
possessor of nature” that can exercise a “sovereign power of the human race over animal and vegetable 
species” (257). To the contrary, Clément proposes, those who accept the rapture and release of syncope 
refuse this power (242); instead, they accept that “there is no barrier between nature and the subject” (258). 
To lose mastery over oneself is thus to understand how to reject mastery over other creatures. This study 
builds on Clément’s important insight that syncope’s embodied vulnerability can deconstruct the animal-
human hierarchy.   
7 
Clément provides an important framework for the threat and the possibility that 
syncope’s loss of self-control and agency poses to the men in the novels I have chosen. 
However, where she argues that a romanticized loss of self-control can create a positive 
relationship between humans and nature, I argue that an ethics can be found in the 
nonhuman aspects of the nonconscious body.  
Clément is not the only philosopher to explore syncope’s potential to bypass 
conscious awareness, subjectivity, and narrative. In Logodaedalus: The Discourse of the 
Syncope, Jean-Luc Nancy argues that philosophical discourses of consciousness produce 
syncope as an aesthetic form. For Nancy, philosophy is the attempt to rationally describe 
rationality, to self-consciously describe consciousness; literature is produced in the 
fractures of this self-conscious discourse because language is not transcendental enough 
to articulate self-presence to itself. Language itself is too material, too excessive, too 
difficult, too beautiful. However, for Nancy, literature is not the metaphysical 
displacement of the unconscious into language, but rather the physiological 
aestheticization of the unconscious, a rendering of embodied subjective interruption.6 
Nancy points to an important aspect of syncope in the novels in this dissertation—that 
subjectivity may be expressed via language, but it is only made possible by the non-
linguistic gaps in narrative.  
The terms syncope and syncopation are also used by art and theatre scholars 
Barbara Formis and Rebecca Schneider to describe the way narratives or reenactments of 
history fragment, recover, and restore past time. They raise two interconnected points 
relevant to this dissertation. The first is that syncopated time—time that is not linear but 
punctuated, uneven, and recurring—challenges what Schneider calls “tightly stitched 
Enlightenment claims to the forward-driven linearity of temporality, the continuity of 
time” (29). The second is that often what returns, what refuses to stay past or linearly 
“before,” or what appears anew in a recreation of the past, is what has been refused, 
                                               
6 Saul Anton, Nancy’s translator, helpfully describes how literature is the aesthetic form of a philosophy of 
consciousness: “[T]he syncope points to the corporeality…of consciousness in its linguistic expression, the 
dimension and moment…wherein consciousness senses or feels itself ‘in the flesh’ and does so precisely 
because it is there that it blacks out, perhaps in the face of a sudden shock, a powerful emotion, or an 
experience of sublime grandeur” (xvii). 
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forgotten, incomplete, censored, or unacknowledged. Both Formis and Schneider point to 
trauma as a theory of syncopated time, when a past event cannot be properly processed 
and so is repeated in and as the present. What haunts the fainting characters of the novels 
here is not a particular traumatic event but the everyday trauma of their own otherness, 
like Gaston’s hallucination of a “tawny spectral leopard” that follows him through Paris 
(355). The otherness of animality, technicity, materiality, physiology, and nonhumanness 
is revealed in the gaps of narrative syncope. 
In contrast to Formis and Schneider’s focus on trauma, I deconstruct this 
hierarchy via affect to argue that in moments of syncope the slippage between 
nonhuman-human and self-other binaries has an ethics. As I will explain fully in the next 
chapter, this ethics has two aspects, and both follow Jacques Derrida’s model of 
deconstructive ethics. The first is that the fainting body is animal and other, and therefore 
strange and unknowable. This aspect of syncope reflects an ethical respect for the alterity 
of others. In Derrida’s theory, ethical behavior involves acknowledging absolute 
otherness in all its multiplicity of difference, and respecting the boundary of that 
unknowability. Each of the novels I turn to in this dissertation grapples with the question 
of what others are, but, in contrast to theories of sympathetic identification, these novels 
suggest that knowing or understanding others allows us to classify them as expendable. 
Derrida’s ethics of alterity provides a way to read the alternative ethical force of these 
novels—if fainting men do not even know their own bodies, how can they categorize 
other forms of life to be used selfishly or violently? I argue that syncope reveals the 
shared alterity of affective bodies and thus solicits respect for those bodies’s shared 
vulnerability. 
The second aspect of ethics made manifest by syncope is unconditional ethical 
response. The fainting bodies in these novels solicit a response from other characters and 
from readers while simultaneously challenging the traditional notion of response both for 
those who experience syncope and those who respond to it. Characters that are subject to 
non-agential, automatic, and reactive bodies are not subjects with the self-presence and 
free will to choose to respond. Moreover, Derrida insists that to be ethical, any response 
to another must be unconditional—it must have no strings attached and be unlimited and 
9 
infinite, even at the expense of the self. In fact, in proposing that bodies are strangers to 
the self, the novels of this study suggest that those bodies are unselfish, and affective 
response is unconditional. Since nobody (no body) can respond to everyone, completely 
and absolutely, all the time, unconditional ethics is an impossible ideal—yet one that 
nevertheless emerges from, and thereby literally materializes in, the body.  
1.2. Syncope’s Literary History 
Men in late-Victorian novels have predecessors in other literary periods. In a 
recent study, Giulio J. Pertile examines men who faint in Renaissance literature, arguing 
that despite fainting’s inevitable loss of consciousness, literary descriptions of fainting 
actually intensify feeling, suggesting that feeling the self, or autoaffection, is a form of 
consciousness. Pertile connects these literary examples to Descartes’ theory of 
subjectivity, which has best been understood through a dualistic mind-body division. On 
the contrary, Pertile explains, Descartes’ philosophy suggests that the conscious mind is 
only made possible through the sensing body. Referring to Descartes’ concept of 
consciousness, Pertile writes that “the power of self-awareness it describes is first and 
foremost a power of feeling” (9). While Pertile emphasizes that “scenes of swooning in 
this period can thus often be better understood through physiology than through 
metaphysics or theology” (22), the physiological context in which he examines textual 
representations of fainting differs significantly from the nineteenth century. The 
Renaissance period did not yet conceive of consciousness as so fully disconnected from 
the body, or so “fully coterminous with first-personness” (Pertile 5) as the nineteenth 
century does. Binary relationships of mind and body or animal and human fully solidify 
in the cultural imagination after René Descartes’s famous pronouncement of 
Enlightenment philosophy, “I think therefore I am.” These binaries are therefore not fully 
established in Pertile’s historical period, when Cartesian notions of consciousness as 
individuality, agency, and power are only beginning to take hold. While some Victorian 
theories of consciousness, like G. H. Lewes’s for example, propose a theory of extended 
consciousness somewhat similar to Pertile’s, what is significant in the representations I 
turn to here is the responsiveness of an alienated body, one that did not exist until after 
the Enlightenment.   
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Kenneth W. Heaton also turns to the Renaissance, and specifically to Renaissance 
drama, to argue for the “remarkable propensity for Shakespearean characters to die or 
faint, or to speak of these things as likely to happen, as a result of extreme emotion” 
(1337). Heaton records the faints of both male and female characters, and while his 
analysis is very brief, his argument is somewhat opposite to Pertile’s as he argues for the 
damaging effects of metaphysical or conscious emotion on the body. Reading both 
together suggests that fainting was by no means a transparent literary effect in 
Renaissance texts. 
In the eighteenth century, two figures relevant to this study of narrative syncope 
begin to emerge and offer insight into the gendered aspect of fainting. One of these 
figures is the swooning woman, probably the figure most likely to come to mind when 
one thinks of fainting. Popular understanding suggests that fainting is a woman’s 
response, born of a gender-specific emotional capacity; Christiane Zschirnt proposes this 
was the case in eighteenth-century novels, where the “highly sensitive, susceptible 
woman overcome by her emotions” was an important feature (48). Using the eponymous 
protagonist of Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) as a representative example, critics 
have linked literary swooning to the paradoxes of female sexual desire, represented as 
simultaneously erotically knowing and unknowing, available and unavailable, as well as 
to forms of repression that anticipate the Freudian unconscious and objectification of the 
female body that bleeds into pornography. Of particular interest are discussions that focus 
on syncope and narrative production, including narrative resistance to female sexual 
oppression.7 Dana Wight’s treatment of genre and narrative in her analysis of Pamela’s 
syncope as a form of passive agency is especially helpful for understanding developments 
in literary fainting in the nineteenth century novel. As Pamela’s losses of consciousness 
prevent her employer from raping her, Wight argues, they have the power to shift genre, 
                                               
7 For example, Zschirnt argues that literary swooning represents a paradoxical need for women to be 
ignorant of sexual desire while at the same time be sexually available for marriage. She frames these losses 
of consciousness as precursors to the Freudian unconscious, the seat of repressed sexual desire; Ildiko 
Csengei argues similarly that fainting in eighteenth-century literature expresses repressed emotions and 
desire. In contrast, Naomi Booth argues that eighteenth-century literary fainting often offered up the 
prostrate female body as a pornographic object, but Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1811) refuses this 
objectification by insisting on narration in the wake of or in resistance to fainting.   
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turning the narrative “from a gothic plot to the marriage plot” (76). Moreover, Wight 
describes Pamela’s struggle to write herself through letters and a journal in the novel as a 
battle that sustains ever more losses as her fainting fits increase along with her chances of 
marriage. Yet while Pamela loses the subjectivity that we have come to associate with 
language and with the autobiographical “I” of first-person narrative, her body stands in 
for that subjectivity. Wight writes that “it is Pamela’s body, not her words, that signifies 
in the text” (85). While the texts that I read in this dissertation demonstrate a complex 
and often destabilized relationship between the autobiographical “I” and the expressive 
body, narratives like Pamela’s are nonetheless precursors to these late-Victorian first-
person narratives.  
The other significant literary figure to appear during this period is the man of 
feeling, a character of excessive emotional responsiveness exemplified in the pages of 
Laurence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1759-1767), Tobias Smollett’s Humphry Clinker 
(1771), and Henry Mackenzie’s aptly titled The Man of Feeling (1771). As Alex 
Wetmore points out in his study of the eighteenth-century man of feeling, these novels 
draw on medical theories of the nervous system in their articulation of a “new ideal of 
sympathetic masculinity whose benevolent feelings arise out of sensitive nervous 
reactions” (103). While Wetmore does not concentrate on specific instances of fainting in 
these novels (although there are certainly a few), he argues that novels about the man of 
feeling merge a self-consciousness about the textuality of the novel—represented by non-
linguistic disruptions like “intrusions, interruptions, fragmentations and digressions” 
(28)—with the emotional responsiveness of the male body. The Victorian novels in this 
dissertation also express this connection, and Wetmore and I draw many similar 
conclusions, most significantly as we both read expressions of physiological 
responsiveness through discourses of automatism. But the destabilization of the 
difference between men and women, and men and machines that Wetmore observes in 
the eighteenth century persists well beyond and helps account for the inclusion of 
animality and animal-human divide in nineteenth century literature and psychology. If 
these novels privilege emotion while recognizing the interconnection of language and 
culture, their narrative potential lies, according to Wetmore, in a tendency towards virtue 
and liberal public good even as those capacities are grounded in the mechanical body. 
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While nineteenth-century physiologists did locate virtuous responses like sympathy in the 
body and literary authors also engaged with this possibility, the novels I turn to here are 
problematic when it comes to sympathy and virtue. The disruption of the animal-human 
divide that occurs when the animal body interrupts subjectivity creates an uncertainty that 
has an ethical dimension. That is, ethical decisions can only be made in the novels of this 
study when received notions of human exceptionality and superiority are challenged, and 
the difference between humans and other forms of life becomes undecideable.  
Against claims that the culture of sentimentality fell out of favour at the end of the 
eighteenth century and that self-referential style no longer mirrored the feeling bodies in 
literature,8 Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, or The Modern Prometheus stands as a clear 
example that this is not the case. First published in 1818, the novel about a young 
scientist who gives life to a sensitive, literate creature made from the multiple bodies of 
corpses has since kept a tight hold on the public imagination of the porous boundary 
between what is human and natural and what is monstrously not. The novel connects 
narration and its interruptions with the feeling body,9 while its hypertextuality is evident 
in its double-frame structure with three narrators and multiple epistolary interjections. 
Men, women, and monsters in this novel all faint. When Elizabeth—the young love 
interest of Victor Frankenstein—swoons, it is easy to read her emotional response as a 
part of a cultural history depicting women’s embodied emotion and sensitive nervous 
systems (53). But Victor is himself a nervous, sensitive, emotional man, who spends 
much of the novel anxious and ill. Moreover, the creature, too, is just as sensitive as 
                                               
8 Wetmore writes that in the novels of the 1790s, “the connective tissue which had at one time bound 
sensibility together with self-referentiality begins to unravel and pull apart, undermining the coherence and 
unity of strategies of corporeal defamiliarization” (148). 
9 For example, Margaret Linley writes that the automatic movements of the creature’s newly animated body 
mirror the automaticity of Victor Frankenstein’s responses, as the novel demonstrates “that monstrosity, the 
nonhuman, the aberrant or exceptional life form is fundamentally constitutive of, rather than opposed to, 
human nature’’ (261). Moreover, she points out that the “insight of Frankenstein, written during the 
scientifically and culturally sanctioned age of the articulate sensate body, is that the entire sensorium 
communicates. The creature’s tale at the center of the novel, the voice demanding to be heard and 
responded to, the voice that asks ‘how can I move thee?’ (94), is often taken to be the authentic heart of the 
novel. At the same time, however, the text is saturated by touch, not only in the emphasis on the handmade 
status of the creature and thus the handiwork of invention, but in the organic connection between feeling 
and motion” (265-266). 
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Victor and Elizabeth, fainting (or coming close to it) twice in the novel.10 Victor and his 
creature are potent figures for this dissertation’s claims; both are subject to their nervous 
bodies, and together they challenge the notion of superior human agency or free will and 
the prevailing and enduring concept of the human itself.11  
Men of feeling also appear in poetry during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Robert Mitchell has identified suspension as a poetic technique in 
John Keats’s and Percy Bysshe Shelley’s work, meant to pause animation in order to 
open the body up to new experiences. Mitchell argues that not only does this poetic 
suspension reflect a cultural interest in the scientific experiments of suspended animation, 
it reflects concerns over bodies that are either affectively habituated (and therefore 
politically quietest) or “too animated” (73). While Mitchell does not refer to physical 
fainting or swooning in Romantic poetry, and while poetry is not a focus in this 
dissertation, Keats’s and Shelley’s rendering of suspended consciousness through 
aesthetic form—and their concern over the politics of the affective body—is worth 
recognizing as part of the history of narrative syncope. 
Frankenstein precedes this dissertation’s novels in its obsession with humanness, 
physiology, forms of life, and the political and ethical claims that emerge from the porous 
boundaries around each of these concepts. Also like the novels in this dissertation, 
                                               
10 We are introduced to a weak, exhausted, and freezing Victor in the Arctic on the hunt for the creature. He 
is rescued by the explorer Walton, who writes to his sister that he and his men “attempted to carry him 
[Victor] into the cabin, but as soon as he had quitted the fresh air, he fainted” (13). One of the first images 
the reader has of Victor is of his unconscious body, carried to safety and then rubbed to reanimation by 
other men. After he brings the creature to life, Victor describes his feelings in terms of his body, his 
nervous and circulatory systems, and his near-swoon: “Sometimes my pulse beat so quickly and hardly, 
that I felt the palpitation of every artery; at others, I nearly sank to the ground through languor and extreme 
weakness” (40). And when, on their wedding night, Elizabeth dies at the hands of the creature, Victor’s 
shock, horror, fear, and sadness are all expressed as the simple and immediate loss of consciousness; 
though he wishes he were dead, “for a moment only did I lose recollection; I fainted” (165). If the 
creature’s life, began in Victor’s lab, suggests that feeling, thought, and language spring from the body, 
Victor is subject to the animal and the mechanical in no less alarming ways. The creature also mirrors 
Victor in his own fainting spells, first from the pain of a gunshot wound, and later nearly swooning from 
the emotional intensity of an encounter with a human: “it was an excellent opportunity,” he explains, “yet, 
when I proceeded to execute my plan, my limbs failed me, and I sunk to the ground” (108). 
11 Anne C. McCarthy’s study of suspension in Romantic and Victorian poetry, Awful Parenthesis, cites 
Frankenstein’s creature as embodying the form of suspension that will most concern the late nineteenth 
century—a suspended state between life and death represented by “uncanny figures of suspended 
animation” (113-114).  
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Shelley’s tale has been classified as Gothic fiction or as early speculative or science 
fiction. Novels with fainting men such as The Coming Race, Erewhon, and She also fit 
into the category of speculative fiction. However, fainting knows no genre—or gender—
in the nineteenth century. Fainting women, and occasionally men, appear in realist 
novels, like the aforementioned Dr. Hope (along with other women) in Deerbrook, the 
child Oliver in Charles Dicken’s Oliver Twist (1837-1839), Lady Dedlock and Esther 
Summerson in Dicken’s Bleak House (1852-1853), Lucy Snow in Charlotte Brontë’s 
Villette (1853), Margaret Hale in Elizabeth Gaskell’s North and South (1854), Rosamond 
Vincy (and very nearly, Nicholas Bulstrode) in George Eliot’s Middlemarch (1871-
1872), Eustacia Vye in Thomas Hardy’s Return of the Native (1878), and Tess 
Durbeyfield (and again, very nearly, Angel Clare) in Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles 
(1891). Towards the end of the century, Arthur Conan Doyle frequently employs the 
trope in his detective fiction, using “the act of fainting to represent acute emotional 
distress and heighten an already dramatic event” (Rodin and Key 228). Fainting 
characters also appear in prose poems like Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh 
(1856) and short stories like Vernon Lee’s “Prince Alberic and the Snake Lady” (1896). 
Unsurprisingly, they also show up reliably in sensation fiction, a genre categorized by its 
melodramatic content and its language of the nervous system—as they do in Lady 
Audley’s Secret and Heart and Science. In another sensation novel, Eliza Lynn Linton’s 
The Rebel of the Family (1880), the titular rebel, Perdita, justifies not telling people about 
her own swoon and thereby raising questions about its (romantic) consequence, by citing 
its very commonness: “How many people faint! What was the use of making a fuss about 
such an ordinary accident? it would be silly and missy, said Perdita; and she hated being 
silly and missy” (159-160).  
Despite this ubiquity, there are no studies of Victorian literature that are 
exclusively devoted to fainting men. Of the studies that focus on fainting at all, Douglas 
Thorpe’s invokes common misunderstandings about the gender of fainting. For example, 
Thorpe claims that “the motif of the fainting woman” was “once one of the 
commonplaces of literature,” but was, “in the nineteenth century, slowly disappearing” 
(104). While it may be true that Victorian women swoon less in nineteenth-century 
novels than they did in centuries past, they were hardly an uncommon figure. Moreover, 
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Thorpe argues that it was male authors who made use of this trope in order to undermine 
female agency (104), a difficult claim to challenge since the scholarly canon of Victorian 
literature has been weighted towards male authors. However, not only did female authors 
depict fainting women, male authors regularly depicted fainting men, too. Nonetheless, I 
agree with Thorpe’s larger claim that female fainting was too unstable a sign to draw 
conclusions about the women who succumbed to it. As Thorpe writes, nineteenth century 
authors were interested in swooning not for the “apparent reduction or marginalization of 
female action, but for its narrative suspension, for the way in which it provides an 
opportunity for the scrutiny of signs” (108).12  
For Thorpe, fainting is a plot device and swoons have narrative significance 
because “characters in fiction rarely faint for physiological reasons” (105). However, 
recent scholarship challenges his position. For example, Anne Kniggendorf’s online 
exhibit, “Fainting in Victorian Novels and Victorian Life,” emphasizes the possible 
physical causes of Victorian literary fainting, like corseting or arsenic fumes in fabrics 
and paints, suggesting that physiology is precisely the reason characters in fiction lose 
consciousness.13 Jill Matus and Elisha Cohn also emphasize the physiology of fainting, 
albeit through psychology, in their studies of literary shock and suspension. For Matus, 
literary fainting is representative of Victorian notions of shock, instances of mental 
trauma that include unconsciousness, trance, automatic behaviour, dissociation, and 
multiple selves. As I do, Matus turns to the emerging field of physiological psychology to 
argue that these losses of consciousness and agency destabilize the unity of identity itself. 
Broadly, for Matus, this trouble with selfhood, self-control, and self-knowledge crosses 
gender lines, as in her analysis of North and South, a novel where men “seem even more 
prone than women to excessive and destabilizing emotionality” (64). More specifically, 
                                               
12 See Victoria Bates for a thorough analysis of the complex meanings of fainting when women take the 
stand in the courtroom to testify to sexual assault and rape. In Bates’s reading, fainting serves a positive 
purpose in securing and preserving feminine ideals of knowledge and behaviour. 
13 See also Leigh Summers’ Bound to Please: A History of the Victorian Corset for the cultural significance 
of fainting attributed to corsetry. Summers writes that in the nineteenth century, “fainting was the physical 
manifestation of cultural imperatives and values that determined passivity—to the point of 
unconsciousness—as the epitome of an ideal femininity. […] Men did not faint into women’s arms. 
Women fainted into the arms of men” (137). While this is a questionable summation of fainting’s cultural 
meaning, it is certainly not adequate to describe fainting’s cultural or literary gender. 
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Matus includes men in her study who are shocked into fainting; for example, Matus turns 
to the shock and collapse of The Mystery of Edwin Drood’s male protagonist, John 
Jasper, as though in a direct counterpoint to Thorpe’s argument that the same novel 
portrays feminine passivity through Rosa Bud’s swoon.  
For her part, Cohn draws on Victorian and modern affect theory, rather than 
medical pathologizations of psychology, to argue that moments of narrative suspension in 
Victorian fiction—when characters have trouble staying conscious, self-aware, and in 
control—disrupt the progress of both the novel form and character development. 
However, Cohn’s study perpetuates the stereotypical bias toward women fainters. Apart 
from her consideration of some trances, collapses, and spasms of a handful of male 
characters in George Meredith’s writings, Cohn’s swooners are largely women.14 Finally, 
it is worth noting that Anne C. McCarthy turns to embodied forms of suspension in Awful 
Parenthesis, claiming suspension broadly as a Romantic and Victorian poetic form that 
represents a sublime estrangement between subjectivity and the world. McCarthy’s study 
demonstrates that poetic forms of suspension occur for both genders; however, her 
examples of suspension are broad and the gendered significance of swooning is not 
clarified. Nonetheless, McCarthy’s argument that Romantic and Victorian poets used 
suspension in both form and theme to negotiate an “ontological crisis of contingency and 
discontinuity” in the nineteenth century is an important counterpart to my argument that 
narrative syncope represents narrative’s inability to express subjectivity. 
As this historical overview demonstrates, despite concentrated critical interest in 
the syncopated consciousness of women, there is a large population of fainting characters 
of both genders in nineteenth-century literature. By focusing on male characters in select 
late-nineteenth-century literature, my study demonstrates that fainting challenges human 
agency and narrative, not just female agency and narrative. Fainting represents a 
fundamental part of the affective bodies of all humans—a part of the self that is other, 
and that challenges the boundaries between humans and nonhuman forms of life. 
                                               
14 While Cohn turns to Thomas Hardy’s characters in The Return of the Native and Tess of the 
d’Urbervilles to explore lyrical pauses of self-agency, she omits references to Eustacia Vye’s or Tess 
Durbeyfield’s swoons. 
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Syncope’s disruption of narrative and subjectivity and its challenge to human 
exceptionalism has an ethical dimension. While Matus and Cohn agree that nonconscious 
states prompted by nervous or affective responses alter traditional, Cartesian notions of 
ethical behaviour, awareness, and sympathy, neither extends these possibilities to claim, 
as I do, that troubling the boundary between men and animal or other nonhuman life 
might provide the basis for an ethics in Victorian novels. Like many Victorian scholars, 
Cohn and Matus root ethics in humanism through the idea of moral agency, which 
requires an individual, agential, self-aware subject with the power to make decisions 
about and towards others.15 I take a different approach, arguing that the inability to 
clearly distinguish between what is animal and human, self and other, subject or machine, 
defines the possibility of ethics in novels that feature fainting men. As I will show 
through the novels in the next chapters, there is no possibility of ethical human action 
unless it emerges out of the impossibility of demarcating the human from its others. 
Moments of narrative syncope express this impossibility. 
1.3. 1890-1900: The End of the Century, The Ends of Man  
While I turn to three novels published in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
the myriad instances of literary fainting I have mentioned in this chapter suggest that 
through nonconscious bodies and forms, textuality bears witness to the nonhuman, to the 
animal, and to the automatic, technical, or machinic. However, just because the 
nonhuman is an element of the nonconscious aspects of textuality does not mean that it 
signifies the same things in each case. I have chosen these three novels because they 
grapple with new, impossible, strange, frightening, compelling, and pleasurable worlds of 
possibility that upend human selfhood: the ageless body of Dorian Gray, the evolved life 
forms of The Time Machine, and the vampiric bodies of Dracula. Moreover, while 
fainting bodies in nineteenth-century novels always call for the ethical response I mention 
                                               
15 Cohn does note briefly that George Meredith’s The Ordeal of Richard Feverel “emphasizes the 
inhumanity within human experience that is not fully registered consciously” and “values ‘sensations’ 
linked to unselfconsciousness, to eroticism, and…to animal being” (120). 
18 
above, these ageless, evolved, and vampiric bodies represent the ethical struggle between 
absolute alterity and the demand for unconditional response. 
While nonhuman being is externalized in Dorian’s portrait, the Eloi and 
Morlocks, and Count Dracula, that same nonhumanness is found to be inseparable from 
humanness itself in the affective bodies of men (and women) and in their narratives. Men 
are my primary focus in these novels because they were not seen to be biologically 
predisposed to emotional excess or physical or moral weakness, as women were. Men 
were (and in many ways, still are) understood to embody most fully the attributes of the 
human—self-control, self-possession, will, purpose, productivity, and moral fortitude. 
Certainly, British men were understood to be the exemplary form of the human. Women 
(and non-British or non-European men), by contrast, were already presumed less-than-
human. If men are the exemplary form of the human, then syncope’s challenge to their 
autonomy is a challenge to human autonomy. I do not argue that fainting feminizes the 
male body because doing so would essentialize the fainting body as feminine. Instead, I 
claim that fainting in particular and the affective body in general destabilizes essentialist 
elements of gender. Turning to fainting men, then, can reorient us towards the subjective 
and ethical significance of nonconsciousness in women that challenges the boundaries of 
humanness without reifying female biology as already less human and more open.   
The second chapter of this dissertation lays out the relationship between the 
theoretical histories and fields I use to read these novels and their fainting subjects. I take 
a deconstructive approach towards these texts because narrative syncope reveals how 
impossible it is to separate the humanness that appears in these novels (as consciousness 
and language) from its opposite. In doing so, I bring together contemporary affect theory 
and nineteenth-century physiological psychology to explore how, more than a century 
apart, these two fields have remarkably similar ideas and concerns about the 
nonconscious body and its responses. I then frame two significant aspects that emerge in 
deconstructive readings of the affective body: autobiography and ethics. While the novels 
here are not autobiographical in the strict definition of the genre, each of the fainting men 
(and sometimes women) in these texts is struggling with the (im)possibilities of self-
representation, as novelistic form turns from realist narration towards an alienated and 
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fragmented literary style. These men are, as Derrida would call them, autobiographical 
animals (Animal). Forms of nonconsciousness are found in the nonhuman aspects of their 
physiology and disrupt their attempts to write themselves and their stories. At the same 
time, their subjectivities and narratives depend on syncope. As Formis writes, 
“syncopated time defines the way that stories are told, and histories are written” (92).  
I also address the ethics of affective syncopation in my second chapter. The men 
in these novels certainly do not always behave in ways that we would call ethical—
Dorian kills his friend and destroys his body in an acid bath, the Time Traveller enjoys 
breaking Morlock bones, and the so-called Crew of Light violate and destroy the bodies 
of vampires in repeated acts of vigilante violence. Yet, these humans respond in these 
ways because the artworks, animals, machines, and monsters of these texts ask the men in 
them to confront the nonhumanness of their own subjectivity and the limitlessness of 
unconditional ethical demand. In the face of evolutionary theory and physiological 
psychology, the nonhuman bodies of these texts insist that they are necessary both to 
subjectivity and to ethics.  
My third chapter turns to The Picture of Dorian Gray. In Wilde’s novel, Dorian is 
gifted a painting of himself; while he remains eternally young, the portrait ages in his 
place. Beautiful, desired, and hungry for sensual experience, Dorian pursues pleasure and 
follows the demands of his animal body. I turn to the late-Victorian field of physiological 
aesthetics and the concept of bare life to argue that the portrait marks Dorian’s affective 
life and shows him not the so-called sins he has committed, but the demands placed on 
him by others whom he has touched. Dorian struggles with the impossible ethics of 
responsibility as he responds to his own animality and nonconscious desires, while at the 
same time he is unable to escape the portrait’s insistence that he has affected others and 
therefore may be responsible for them. When he faints towards the end of the novel, he 
experiences only a brief understanding of what it might mean to be responsible for what 
we touch and what touches us, whether human, animal, or object.  
Chapter Four looks to The Time Machine, in which the Time Traveller journeys 
almost a million years into the future to discover that the human race has evolved into 
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two distressingly inhuman species. The Traveller has trouble holding onto consciousness, 
both when he is moving through time on the machine and during his encounters with the 
future Eloi and Morlock humans. The time machine extends and mirrors the Traveller’s 
conscious and nonconscious self, and shows him his own similarity to the tool-using 
Morlocks and vulnerable animal-like Eloi of the future. I therefore read the Traveller’s 
nonconscious responses alongside theories of automatism that held that humans are the 
same kind of sensitive automata that animals are, along with contemporary theories of 
posthumanism that suggest that humans are forms of life that slip ontologically between 
the categories of human, animal, and machine. This chapter engages most deeply with an 
ethics of uncertainty, as the narrative takes an impossible temporal form and reveals that 
although the Traveller and the beings of the future are different, it is impossible to tell 
how. This uncertainty between forms of life suggests that there is no moral decision-
making possible about whose life counts more, whose is expendable, and on what 
grounds.  
In Chapter Five, on Stoker’s Dracula, I argue that the vampire mirrors the 
affective form of human subjectivity. The first faint belongs to Jonathan, and reveals the 
mysterious workings of the circulatory and nervous systems. In this chapter, I turn to 
Victorian theories of physiological psychology that suggest how closely related fainting 
is with the circulatory system, and how uncertain fainting is as a sign. I also follow 
Catherine Malabou’s work on heteroaffection, the idea that subjectivity depends on the 
body’s affective otherness and the otherness of the external world. The circulatory system 
and the vampire make up these two forms of otherness—they are both strange and they 
both initiate the Crew of Light’s alienation from themselves. As many male and female 
characters in this novel faint, the very idea of gender, like the difference between self and 
other, becomes uncertain. And as the characters in the novel need to be affected by 
otherness in order to be subjects, they also nonconsciously and automatically respond 
generously to others. As human bodies respond and give each other and the vampire what 
they need, they enact Derrida’s claim that generosity is only ethical when it is 
unconditional, and therefore when it becomes impossible to give.  
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Finally, my conclusion turns briefly to the example of Little Billee in George Du 
Maurier’s Trilby (1894). While scholars have identified Trilby herself as an automaton, 
little attention has been paid to the men in the text. Not only does Svengali faint, but little 
Billee has an epileptic fit that temporarily changes his brain and his behaviour. As Billee 
becomes less loving and self-interested, he becomes more universally sympathetic. Billee 
begins to fulfill the impossible demand of ethical attention and care to many others, but 
only via affective loss. Little Billee’s narrative includes a seemingly minor representation 
of narrative syncope that nonetheless helps us to see how syncope can expand, texture, 
and challenge our readings of the gendered and racialized body in Victorian culture, and 
its relationship to sympathy and ethics. The widespread forms that the phenomenon of 
syncope take in the late-Victorian period shows us how integral the nonconscious, 
animal, automatic body was to the idea of humanness, and to politics and ethics. This 
body remains important today, as we struggle to live ethically with different forms of life, 
as our nonconscious, affective bodies are ever more closely tracked and managed, and as 
developing social technologies both threaten and affirm our own humanity. 
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 Affect Theory, Deconstruction, and the 
Ethics of Narrative Syncope 
Bulstrode, after a moment’s hesitation, took his hat from the floor and 
slowly rose, but he grasped the corner of the chair so totteringly that 
Lydgate felt sure there was not strength enough in him to walk away 
without support. What could he do? He could not see a man sink close to 
him for want of help. He rose and gave his arm to Bulstrode, and in that 
way led him out of the room; yet this act, which might have been one of 
gentle duty and pure compassion, was at this moment unspeakably bitter 
to him.      — George Eliot, Middlemarch 
We need look no further than George Eliot’s realist classic Middlemarch for 
confirmation of the pervasiveness of fainting as a literary trope in the Victorian period. 
But fascination with syncopated consciousness went well beyond literary contexts. 
Information and advice about the phenomenon could be found in popular, inexpensive 
magazines as well as medical texts. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, both The 
London Journal and The London Reader published articles on fainting. Turning to their 
descriptions of why it occurred, how to help victims of swooning, and what gender they 
would likely be gives us a glimpse of how fainting was understood in popular culture.  
In an 1886 article titled “In Case of Fainting,” The London Reader describes the 
experience of swooning by its immediacy, disorientation, and gap in consciousness: 
There is a feeling of sinking and weakness, objects appear to spin about, 
there is sometimes a ringing in the ears, a sense of confusion, and the next 
thing the person is conscious of is a gradual recovery, after a blank, the 
existence of which he can only infer. (297) 
This passage contains similarities to Gaston Beauvais’s narration in Wormwood, when he 
haltingly describes his vision of Silvion Guidèl before “reel[ing] down” in a faint (330). 
It also, like Wormwood, figures the fainting subject as a man. By contrast, the London 
Journal article, “Fainting,” appears in its Ladies’ Supplement, and therefore 
unsurprisingly refers to the fainter by the pronoun “her” (6). However, in another London 
Journal article from 1896 called “Queer Complaints,” a correspondent writes that while 
“the gentler sex is, by many people, supposed to hold the monopoly of such fainting-fits 
as are not due to disease, but to nervous affections,” an “eminent doctor” assured the 
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writer this was not the case (416). Taken together, these articles posit that the gender of 
fainting bodies was in question at the end of the century. They also point to another 
aspect of fainting that is relevant to this dissertation—the connection between fainting 
and circulatory system. “Queer Complaints” goes on to tell the doctor’s anecdotes about 
nervous men, who faint at the sight of underdone meat and blood, or its colour in a blood 
orange, among other things (416). Concerned with blood in another sense, “In Case of 
Fainting” notes that the circulatory system may need to be stimulated to revive the 
victim, suggesting this could be done with smelling salts (as noted above), as well as 
splashing the face with cold water, rubbing the arms, and providing a sip of brandy (297). 
The London Journal was a cheap and relatively popular magazine, with a 
readership of over half a million per week in the 1850s, suggesting that the causes and 
effects of fainting were items of interest for the general public (Dictionary 374).16 Other 
articles suggest that this public was also concerned with the inability to differentiate 
fainting from other states of unconsciousness. An earlier Reader article from 1870, titled 
“Sleep, Fainting, Apoplexy,” reflects a desire to find markers of distinction between these 
losses of consciousness, while again emphasizing the circulatory system by describing 
fainting as the cessation of heartbeat and respiration, when “the heart missed a beat, 
failed for an instant, failed for only once to send the proper amount of blood to the brain” 
(532). The London Reader again refers to a male fainter, rather than a female, and his 
bloodless face.  
These articles focus on three significant aspects of fainting relevant to my 
argument. The first is that popular notions about the gender of fainting were being 
challenged in the late-Victorian period. Secondly, they reflect the fact that science was 
theorizing a medical basis for fainting in the organ of the heart and the circulatory system 
of the body. Finally, they propose that physical boundaries between forms of 
                                               
16 While the Journal’s readership ebbed through the latter half of the nineteenth century, it remained 
relatively popular (Dictionary 374). Periodicals such as Macmillan’s Magazine and The Nineteenth Century 
described the Journal as popular in 1880/1881 and 1886, respectively (Palmegiano 472, 382), and the 
Encyclopedia Britannica noted the Journal was “still thriving” in 1895 (538). Little is known about the 
London Reader, but it was founded by the same proprietor as the Journal, although it was not as successful 
(Dictionary 602).  
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nonconsciousness were blurry, and therefore a source of anxiety. As these articles 
suggest, fainting was a contested concept and an uncertain physiological state for 
Victorians, despite, or perhaps because of, increasing scientific interest. People could not 
necessarily tell the difference between fainting and sleep or stroke; and, even more 
frighteningly, between fainting and death, which itself was an uncertain state. People’s 
inability to know what exactly “life” was, and how to know when it was extinguished, 
caused fear and anxiety (as novels like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein [1818] aptly 
demonstrate).  
Moreover, even doctors could not be sure whether a fainting man was dead or just 
unconscious. Forensic medical texts of the period use the term syncope to describe death 
caused by the cessation of the heart, as well as to describe transient losses of 
consciousness. Charles Meymott Tidy’s Legal Medicine (1882), for example, calls 
syncope the medical term for both “death beginning at the heart” (284) and the non-fatal 
“insensibility and the loss of power to move” (38-39). In Principles of Forensic Medicine 
(1888), David Ferrier and William Guy also identify syncope as related to the heart, a 
“sudden failure of circulation” that could result in either fainting or death (232). Ferrier 
and Guy acknowledge that if a loss of consciousness like syncope is mistaken for death, 
the inanimate body might not be revived in time or could even be buried alive (although 
the latter is more likely in Catholic France and not, they promise, in Anglican England) 
(213). Syncope was therefore both physiologically and semantically confusing for the 
late-Victorians. George K. Behlmer, who also notes the pervasive Victorian fear of 
premature burial, points out that all this confusion over the physical state of syncope is 
reflected in the instability of the category. The material struggle to distinguish between 
states of nonconsciousness mirrors a linguistic fluidity and ambiguity of terms. He writes 
that the period  
employed an opulent if unstable vocabulary to designate bodily conditions 
that hovered between the fully animate and the irrecoverably dead. Trance, 
coma, syncope, catalepsy, insensibility, suspended animation, human 
hibernation, and anesthesia were only the most common labels for what 
appeared to be corporal frontiers. (208) 
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In other words, these “liminal categories” were “far from fixed,” both physiologically and 
linguistically (208). 
Literary depictions of nonconsciousness are similarly vague, in the sense that the 
text often refuses to clarify what exactly has happened during a faint or into what 
pathological category it might fall. Instances where characters become insensible, tumble 
to the floor or collapse into a chair, or suddenly “come to” or return to consciousness, 
may represent what we typically understand as syncope—a brief drop in blood pressure 
leading to a loss of consciousness—as much as they may also represent almost any of the 
other categories to which Behlmer refers above. The medical profession also often 
associated syncope with shock, which affected the nervous system; Tidy asserts that 
death from shock is likely caused by syncope (286), and Ferrier and Guy observe that 
both shock and syncope result in a lack of circulation, and they can occur together (232-
233). In his 1879 paper on suspended animation, Benjamin Richardson comments that 
attempts to strictly classify syncope from asphyxia become pointless at times, because 
“as one progresses in research, the terms become cumbersome and even meaningless” 
(488). That is, Richardson, too, acknowledges the porous boundaries between forms of 
unconsciousness.  
While late-Victorian authors were aware of and writing about the material basis of 
consciousness, emotion, and behaviour, I argue that classifying their depictions of 
nonconsciousness by strictly medical terms is unnecessary. Whether a fit, a spell, a 
swoon, a faint, a near-faint, or an insensibility, what I am calling narrative syncope is 
defined by the absence of consciousness and represents a condition of affective being. 
That is, fainting is an intensified exemplary form of affect itself, and represents a primacy 
of the body over will and agency that characterizes affective being. In this chapter, I 
bring Victorian and modern affect theorists together to illuminate the ways fainting is 
emblematic of affect: as nonconscious and nonsubjective, reactive and responsive, animal 
and automatic. Moreover, as I mention in the Introduction, narrative syncope is also 
expressed in the narrative structure of the novel. I thus turn to the genre of autobiography 
to show how syncope both disrupts and creates the possibilities for subjectivity and its 
narrative form, as the affective body represents a completely other and therefore 
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unknowable part of self. Further, affect also deconstructs animal-human and self-other 
binaries. It creates a form of identification between all selves and others that has an 
ethical function. In the last section of this chapter, I argue that Jacques Derrida’s ethical 
theories can help us to think through how the affective body presents an (impossible) 
ethical ideal. 
2.1. Physiological Psychology and Nonconscious Affect in the 
Late-Victorian Period 
Twenty-first century affect theorists often overlook the nineteenth century despite 
its intense and diverse fascination with embodied feeling. Affect then as now refers to the 
receptions, rhythms, and intensities of the feeling body broadly. The emerging field of 
Victorian physiological psychology investigated those bodily fluctuations, reflexes, and 
responses that we now find in contemporary affect theory, and, like contemporary affect 
theory, located those aspects of humanness associated with subjectivity—like emotion, 
consciousness, thought, and free will—in the brain and the nervous system. For 
Victorians, feeling was an amorphous and highly consequential category that could 
encompass sensation, reflex, habit, passion, affection, or desire, and was closely 
entangled with questions about volition, free will, and moral agency (Dixon 140). 
Moreover, physiological psychologists often used fainting as an emotional or affective 
expression that signalled the animalism or mechanism of the body—what Brenda Ayres, 
Cyndy Hendershot, and Carrie Rohman refer to as the animal within.  
Physiological psychology is therefore a highly relevant field for contemporary 
affect theory, which looks to many of the same physiological processes and grapples with 
the same implications for subjectivity. Contemporary affect theory occasionally 
acknowledges its debt to the nineteenth century, but those theorists tend to reduce 
nineteenth-century ideas about affect to a single discourse. They also do not fully account 
for the significance of the animal-human divide, an unfortunate omission considering 
how significant this binary is to any account of the body.17 The animal-human divide is 
                                               
17 While Charles Darwin remains a significant figure in modern emotion theory, Victorian psychology is 
also acknowledged in Brian Massumi’s claim that affect is autonomous from subjectivity, Teresa 
27 
also a key aspect of narrative syncope in late nineteenth century. The Victorian era was 
the age of evolution and extinction, when science revealed humanity’s (often distressing) 
biological similarity to animals, simultaneously “connecting us to all other living 
creatures” even while it “defamiliarized even the most ordinary form of life” (G. Levine 
6).18 For the Victorians, animals were both self and other.  
Along with evolutionary theory, and often explicitly in conversation with it, 
physiological psychology changed the way Victorians understood the relationship 
between self and other, human and animal. These two sciences challenged human 
exceptionalism, including the ability to exercise moral agency and the right to exert 
mastery over the land and its creatures. Evolutionary theory did so by locating the origin 
of the human in animals, challenging human superiority by upending the belief that 
humans were created by a god in his image. If humans were the same as animals, what 
gave them the right to do with animals what they would? Physiological psychology 
challenged human exceptionalism by founding the human self on an animalistic and 
mechanistic body and thereby doing away with the human soul, the center of free will 
and moral agency. Physiological psychology’s theory of affect contributed to this 
upheaval, because “if man’s very emotions could be reduced to mere physiological 
reflexes, or to inherited animal survival mechanisms, then he truly would have been 
removed from his unique position as the pinnacle of creation” (Dixon 136). Our 
contemporary period continues to grapple with similar questions of kinship and power, as 
late-capitalism’s scorched earth policy vies with growing liberal and radical politics that 
attend to the affective strangeness of creaturely life and attempt to discover ecological 
                                               
Brennan’s argument that affect is transmitted materially like hormones between bodies, and Patricia 
Clough’s theory that media changes the affective body. 
18 See Ivan Kreilkamp’s “Pitying the Sheep in Far From the Madding Crowd” for an example of this 
connection and estrangement in his analysis of the inclusion of animals (in this case, sheep) into forms of 
community, care, and governance in Thomas Hardy’s late-Victorian novel Far From the Madding Crowd 
(1874). Kreilkamp argues that Hardy bases caretaking in the novel on the vulnerability of “the organic 
body, human or animal…always at risk and susceptible to injury” (475). More broadly, Kreilkamp connects 
Hardy’s novel to the fact that for farmers, particularly with the 1865 cattle plague, “the animal body 
emerged as newly interesting and dangerous, a potential source of disease and other meanings—dangerous 
because of its intimacy with and similarity to the human” (478). Moreoever, Kreilkamp underlines Hardy’s 
suggestion through the novel that shepherding itself points up an unresolvable tension between the 
elevation of the nonhuman to subjectivity and the demotion of all life to nonindividual and nonsubjective 
meat.  
28 
modes of living. We can therefore both illuminate the relationship between self and other 
in nineteenth-century literary instances of fainting, and fill a significant gap in 
contemporary theories of the affective body, by turning to syncope’s place in discussions 
of the animal-human divide in physiological psychology.  
Charles Darwin is the most famous of the Victorian physiological psychologists, 
and one of the few whose work is acknowledged in histories of affect theory.19 Scholars 
also regularly recognize that Darwin’s theories of natural and sexual selection influenced 
Victorian writers.20 His theory of affect in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animal (1872) also provides an important backdrop for Victorian literature and culture. 
In this follow up to The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin theorizes that humans’s and 
animals’s shared physiology and evolutionary progress is evidenced by their similar 
involuntary expressions of emotions. He casts his net wide with respect to emotion, 
referring often to “states of mind.” Darwin divides the expressions of mental states into 
three indistinct categories in his theory: habitual behaviors (usually with a history of 
evolutionary purpose), opposite behaviors (less useful), and nervous reactions (largely 
uncontrollable, whether useful or not). Fainting falls into this final category, an 
expression of what he refers to (after Herbert Spencer) as nerve-force.  
Darwin describes fainting as a trans-species phenomenon, explaining how a man 
may faint from “prolonged agony” (70) and how a horse, a canary and a robin each 
succumb to fainting from terror (77). His examples suggest that fainting, whether animal 
or human, is an involuntary nervous response to an indeterminate emotional state; that is, 
the excessive and/or uncontrollable sensitivity of the nervous system causes the faint, 
                                               
19 See, for example Sara Ahmed’s chapter on disgust in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, or Paul Ekman’s 
considerable body of work on emotional expression. Ekman calls Darwin’s work “the book that began the 
science of psychology” (3449). Many scholars would disagree with him; Kurt Danziger notes that scholars 
often credit the Ancient Greeks with the creation of psychology, while he argues that modern psychology 
began in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, Darwin’s work remains undeniably significant to scholars of 
subjectivity and emotion, particularly for those working at the nexus of psychology and science. For other 
recent affirmations of Darwin’s continued importance to the science of emotion, see Daniel M. Gross; 
Ursula Hess and Pascal Thibault; and Robert P. Spunt, Emily Ellsworth, and Ralph Adolphs. 
20 For a sample of Darwinian readings of Victorian literature, see Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s Plots, Gowan 
Dawson’s Darwin, Literature and Victorian Respectability, and John Glendening’s The Evolutionary 
Imagination in Late-Victorian Novels.  
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whether swooning itself is associated emotionally with either pain or fear. Trembling and 
quickened heartbeat, two other expressions of the nervous system, are likewise uncertain 
signs of emotion in Darwin’s work. He notes that trembling can be caused by fear, anger, 
or joy (67), or even fine music (68), and a quickened heartbeat might be the result of pain 
(73), rage (74-75), joy (76), fear (77), or love (78).21 Darwin uses fainting to represent 
feeling that crosses the human-animal divide, both familiarizing and defamiliarizing the 
swoon as an expression of human and animal affective physiology. Further, fainting is 
also physiologically other in that it is uncertain what particular emotion, if any, it may be 
expressing.  
While Darwin’s insistence that humans and animals express the same emotions 
underlines the otherness or alterity of emotional expression, he tends to domesticate the 
animal-feeling body through an anecdotal sensibility (and even friendly intimacy). By 
contrast, his evolutionist colleague, Thomas Huxley, offers no such comfort when he 
highlights the strangeness or otherness of the human animal. Two years after Darwin 
published The Expression, Huxley delivered an incendiary lecture (also published) called 
“On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata.” In it, Huxley offers a much more 
alienated view of the animal source of human behaviour in his argument that both animal 
and human bodies behave like machines, and that consciousness is a by-product of the 
body’s automatic workings like the steam whistle on a locomotive engine (575). He calls 
animals and humans “conscious automata,” and, like Darwin, sees differences between 
the two as matters of degree.  
While Huxley does not take emotion as his central topic, he is nevertheless an 
important, if overlooked, figure in the history of affect. In agreeing with Darwin that 
animals have feelings, Huxley pushes physiological psychology to the limit by declaring 
not only that the brain is the source of emotions (as well as thoughts), but that free will is 
illusory:  
                                               
21 In her foundational work on the animal in Victorian culture, Harriet Ritvo writes that the lack of human 
exceptionality is an illusion—even if Darwin removes God from the question of human exceptionality, he 
finds that “the source of human preeminence lay within” (40).  
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We are conscious automata, endowed with free will in the only intelligible 
sense of that much-abused term—inasmuch as in many respects we are able 
to do as we like—but none the less parts of the great series of causes and 
effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, 
and shall be–the sum of existence” (xx). 
In theorizing that the body is the source of feeling, and that it is separate from and has 
primacy over the mind, Huxley grapples with many of the same questions that affect 
theorists do today. While fainting does not make a major appearance in Huxley’s 
discussion of automatism, it provides an example of animal-human continuity in 
demonstrating that the evolutionary dawning of consciousness on more and more 
complex forms of life is the same as the coming-to-consciousness of humans after a 
swoon (574). Because we see consciousness grow “from a dim glimmer to its full light,” 
when a person comes to after a faint, we can therefore surmise that, evolutionarily, 
animals have a consciousness closer to the fainting end of the spectrum, a consciousness 
with less “intensity” but “which, more or less distinctly, foreshadows our own” (574). In 
other words, fainting for Huxley represents the zero sum of both human and animal 
consciousness, with animal consciousness simply existing closer to the state of syncope 
than human consciousness does. Like Darwin, Huxley posits the animal body as the same 
as the human body. For Huxley, both are mechanical and both produce similar forms of 
consciousness. At the same time, this very similitude is radically other, a version of 
human consciousness that is alienated from the traditional idea of the individual, self-
directing, agential human. 
The impact of the conscious automaton theory was widespread and significant 
when it was published, as Suzy Anger points out (Review), but Huxley’s lecture is not 
given much sustained attention by modern-day literary critics.22 Many literary critics 
tracing the intertwined history of Victorian physiological science and literature tend to be 
more interested in Huxley’s contemporaries, like the scientist and literary critic G. H. 
Lewes, who was also George Eliot’s partner. Lewes, like Huxley and Darwin, believes in 
the continuity of animal-human psychology and the physiological tenet that the body is 
                                               
22 This may be because, as Gowan Dawson explains, Huxley and other Darwinists “maintained an 
unwavering, and vociferously proclaimed, opposition to all manifestations of aestheticism” in order to 
avoid being charged with a similar moral and spiritual degeneracy (193). 
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the cause of subjectivity. However, he disagrees with Huxley’s dualist proposal that 
consciousness is an output of the body, and he rejects the notion that either mind or body 
is strictly mechanical.23 In his 1877 volume The Physical Basis of Mind, Lewes explains 
that the body and mind are the objective and subjective perspectives on the same thing—
Feeling (with a capital F)—and that either embodied feelings or conscious feelings 
trigger responses.24 Fainting appears in Lewes’s section on “Animal Automatism” in The 
Physical Basis of Mind as an example of how the difference between voluntary and 
involuntary states is in fact a specious division. He tells a story that also appears in 
William Guy and David Ferrier’s Principles of Forensic Medicine, in which a Colonel 
Townshend is able to “suspend the beating of his pulse and always fainted when he did 
so” (Lewes 420).25 This unusual case supports Lewes’s theory that some involuntary 
processes can be controlled, while other processes which are usually voluntary sometimes 
happen involuntarily; therefore, he claims that “both are reflexes” (420). In troubling the 
meanings of voluntary behavior and reflex, Lewes points up fainting’s alterity and 
uncertainty (as Darwin did). However, Lewes’s theory is less suited to think through the 
narrative phenomenon of fainting because fainting entails a full absence of 
consciousness. Where Lewes’s presents the mind and body as either side of the same 
coin, fainting privileges the body. 
Like Darwin, William James is an important figure in the history of affect and in 
literary scholarship.26 Like Lewes, James also disagrees with Huxley’s thesis, arguing in 
“Are We Automata?” (1879) that consciousness is active and that its function lies in 
selection. However, he problematizes the division between human self and animal other 
by admitting the possibility that the same kind of selective, attentive consciousness exists 
                                               
23 For a thorough reading of Lewes’s theories in the multi-volume Problems of Life and Mind (of which 
The Physical Basis of Mind is the second volume), see Rick Rylance.  
24 The idea that the body is actually conscious follows the same kind of logic that Giulio J. Pertile points 
out is at work in Renaissance texts. I take a slightly different tack because the authors to which I turn in this 
dissertation are more interested, I argue, in the nonconscious aspects of the body. 
25 Lewes does not reference Townshend by name, as Guy and Ferrier do, but does refer to Cheyne, a 
physician who writes about Townshend in The English Malady: or, A Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All 
Kinds (1733).  
26 See, for example, the David H. Evans’ recent collection Understanding James, Understanding 
Modernism. 
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for animals (14). In addition, James alienates the body from the mind in “What is an 
Emotion?” (1884), when he famously theorizes that physical response is required to 
produce an emotional state: “the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the 
exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion (189-
190, original emphasis). Many scholars have debated whether James is suggesting that 
bodily expression comes before emotion or bodily expression is the whole emotion (we 
do not cry because we are sad, we are sad because we cry), or whether he is 
deconstructing the relationship between mind and body (crying and sadness cannot be 
disentangled).27 In any case, James argues that there is no emotion without the body. The 
division between self and other breaks down in James’s reading most fully when he 
offers an example of his own syncope, when he faints as a child at the sight of a horse’s 
blood (196). James’s example depicts fainting as a physiological response that lacks any 
conscious reasoning or emotional state, making the body primary over the mind. It 
alienates the mind doubly from the body, first by removing the mind from its seat of 
control over or transcendence from the body, and second by describing the mind as 
completely unaware of the cause or meaning behind the body’s behavior.  
Much of physiological psychology is dangerously gendered, raced, classed, and 
abled, and the theories I have mentioned above are no exception. However, in these 
theories, gender is not an essentialized aspect of fainting. A long philosophical tradition 
theorizes emotions as “not only ‘beneath’ but ‘behind’ the man/human,” as Sara Ahmed 
points out (3), as emotions were (and in many ways still are) seen to be felt more keenly 
by—and more often to overpower—women, children, non-whites, and the neuro-atypical. 
The theorists of physiological psychology mentioned in this dissertation are no exception 
to this prejudice. For example, James essentializes women in his claim that they are 
biologically predisposed to be delighted when they see a baby (191), and Darwin 
suggests that children and non-Europeans are biologically closer to animals by 
consistently comparing their emotional expressions. Despite this, these nineteenth-
                                               
27 Many readers of James interpret this theory to mean that emotions are non-cognitive and nothing but the 
body. Phoebe C. Ellsworth offers a thorough and rigorous reading of James’ work to explain that this both 
was and was not the case for James. Ellsworth points to the importance of cognition as well as the 
significance of certain kinds of bodily primacy in James’s theory.    
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century theorists describe men as exemplary swooners, largely without gendered 
implications.  
However, the discourse of hysteria was also taken up by physiological 
psychology, and, historically, this discourse did gender fainting. Hysteria has long been 
labelled a female affliction; the term hysteric means “belonging to the womb” or 
“suffering from discomfort in the womb” in Greek (OED). While medical hypotheses of 
the cause of hysteria have changed over time, hysterical symptoms have consistently 
included fainting (Showalter 15). However, as both Elaine Showalter and Mark S. Micale 
have described in their rigorous studies, nineteenth-century men suffer the same nervous 
complaints as women. While Micale offers a much longer history of male hysteria than 
Showalter (what he calls the “hidden history of male nervous illness”), both identify the 
nineteenth century as a crucial period in its medicalization. This is due in large part to 
Jean-Martin Charcot’s neuropathological institute at La Salpêtrière in Paris, with its 
“special ward for the treatment of nervous and neurological infirmities” in patients of 
both genders (Micale 119). Moreover, Micale also notes that fainting was pathologized as 
a hysterical symptom for men (195). With his overwrought nerves and his fainting fit, 
Wormwood’s Gaston could make a prime example of a late-Victorian literary male 
hysteric. As Micale writes, it is “the nervous man in the parlour who becomes the 
emblematic personality of this later generation” of nineteenth-century men (208). He 
identifies these fictional hysterics as “white, Christian, middle-class, professional, 
heterosexual,” as well as decadent, degenerate, and aestheticist (208-210). In fact, as I 
note throughout these chapters, some of the fainting men in the pages of this dissertation 
have been called hysterical by scholars who describe them as failing Victorian ideals of 
masculinity or challenging the boundaries of gender and heterosexuality.28  
However significant these readings are, sexuality and gender are only two of the 
ways we can understand the fainting body. Where Sigmund Freud will later theorize that 
                                               
28 See also Claire Kahane, who argues that the narrative voices in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
and first decades of the twentieth belong to hysterical subjects who struggle between masculine and 
feminine identities and desire to reject the feminine. Peter Logan similarly points out the way narratives in 
Victorian literature give voice to the body’s nervous pathologies, like hysteria, that both condition the act 
of speech and undermine it.  
34 
hysteria is caused by the repression of often sexual and traumatic psychic events (Micale 
245-246), Charcot did not emphasize sexuality in his findings on male patients (144). 
Charcot’s work between 1885 and 1888 “became almost synonymous with the 
investigation of traumatic hysteria” (Micale 139), and he sought to prove that “hysteria 
had neurological, not gynecological, origins” (Stiles, Neurology 13). While it is 
historically and culturally significant to recognize the often-obscured narratives of gender 
fluidity or same-sex desire that appear in the same novels as fainting men do—in 
Corelli’s Wormwood, for example, the swooning Gaston is at least as obsessed with his 
fiancée’s lover Silvion as he is with fiancée—, I seek here to turn to other questions 
opened up by the nonconscious lapses of these literary bodies. Hysteria, therefore, 
remains a broader context for my readings where it represents subversive and queer 
forms of expression and intimacy, and where it intersects with aestheticism and 
degeneration (which in some versions includes a devolution towards animality). 
However, scholars that insist on feminizing hysteria represent a contemporary obsession, 
not a Victorian one. The men in The Picture of Dorian Gray, The Time Machine, and 
Dracula do lose attributes associated with masculinity—like self-possession, rationality, 
productivity, and purpose—when they faint. However, the Enlightenment tradition had 
long posited European men as the ideal form of the human, and those attributes 
associated with masculinity were also held up as attributes of the human. Fainting men 
therefore beg the question of humanness itself when they lose awareness, agency, and 
control. They reveal that the affective body is both self and other, human and animal, 
responsive and automatic, strange and vulnerable. 
2.2. Physiology and Nonconsciousness in Modern Affect Theory 
Physiological psychology often used the example of fainting to challenge 
traditional understandings of animal-human difference by associating fainting with the 
animal, automatic, nonconscious, and unknowable affective body. These theories of the 
affective body suggested that consciousness was an automatic process (or even a by-
product of the body) and that free will was illusory. While most of twentieth-century 
psychology was synonymous with Freud and his legacy, the last few decades have seen a 
turn to a broad scholarly interest in the body, in concert with developments in cognitive 
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science and political activism around gendered, sexualized, raced, and disabled bodies. 
Affect theory has been a part of this turn, but, as I mention above, theorists often 
approach the subject a-historically, or draw only on major figures like Darwin and James 
and so reduce the nineteenth-century to one or two lines of thinking. However, the late-
Victorian interest in the affective body both prefigures and textures many twenty-first 
century theories that also grapple with the relationship between the conscious mind and 
the nonconscious body. Affect theory therefore, as Tara MacDonald puts it, “might be 
better understood as a material return” (125).29 Moreover, twenty-first century affect 
theory makes clear that syncope is a part of the conceptual apparatus of affect theory. 
Modern theories posit syncope as the very structure of affect, supporting my argument 
that fainting helps us to know ourselves. In this study, I bring modern and Victorian 
affect theorists together to show how both discourses use fainting to show us the 
condition of our affective being: nonconscious and nonsubjective, reactive and 
responsive, animal and automatic, and, as twenty-first century theorists insist, full of 
potential.   
Affect in the twenty-first century most often refers to the physiological structure 
of bodily feelings, sensation, and perception, and response. However, another significant 
approach to affect analyzes particular emotions and their cultural expressions, 
transmissions, formations, and politics. While there is certainly overlap and further 
distinctions and divisions,30 we might say broadly that there are two ways of approaching 
affect: nonsubjective (the nonconscious affects of the body) and subjective (the structure 
and politics of particular emotions).31 While the former illuminates how affect is 
                                               
29 While not reaching as far back as the Victorian period, Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank have may have 
inaugurated one type of return to materialism when they published Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins 
Reader in 1995, an edition of selected writings on affect by Silvan Tomkins from 1955. Tomkins was a 
psychologist whose materialist theories claimed affect as biological and limited in number, in the vein of 
Darwin’s emotion theory. 
30 See for example Eric Shouse’s article “Feeling, Emotion, Affect” for a definition of feeling, or Jonathan 
Flatley’s monograph Affective Mapping for a definition of mood.  
31 Rei Terada argues against this binary, claiming that theories of emotion are not the subjective half of 
theories of affect. Instead, Terada argues that deconstruction shows that emotions themselves are 
nonsubjective. She explains that the traditional concept of affect-emotion theory is that “emotion requires a 
subject—thus we can see we’re subjects since we have emotions,” which she describes as a sleight of mind 
that creates “the illusion of subjectivity” (11). Terada points out that in Of Grammatology, Derrida explains 
that language expresses the difference between the ideal subject of emotion and its external object, but 
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structured as syncope, it is also important to acknowledge the influence of the latter, 
because affect and emotion bleed into each other. The explosion of modern writing on the 
politics of emotions emerges in response to the dangerous emotional essentialism 
inaugurated by Darwin’s theories, and the insight of these modern theorists can help us 
ensure that we do not make the same mistakes of essentializing feeling through gender, 
race, sexual orientation, or ability. At the same time, modern emotion theory reminds us 
of the danger of going too far the other way and separating nature (the nonconscious 
body) from culture (the ideology of emotion) as a specious form of universality.32 
Emotion studies insists that we account for those political bodies without reducing them, 
or their feelings, to their biology.  
Sara Ahmed’s influential work is a representative example of the field of the 
cultural politics of emotion (also the title of her 2004 book).33 Ahmed argues that 
emotions like love, disgust, fear, shame, and happiness (among others) are not only 
culturally understood and expressed, but that expression is ideologically structured and 
therefore political. Importantly for my argument and for any reading of nineteenth-
century affect, she explains that emotions stick to objects and circulate with those objects 
socially (10-11). That is, even if the body is primary in the expression of emotion, as in 
                                               
emotion itself is not an indicator of subjectivity. Subjectivity is the expression of the idea of the difference 
between the self and other. Emotion is this difference—or we could say, it holds open this difference—but 
it is not expressing itself or being expressed. Because this dissertation is not about emotion as such, I 
acknowledge its importance but believe that, as affect deconstructs subjective expression in my readings of 
these novels, my analyses do not contradict emotion’s potential to deconstruct subjectivity.  
32 See, for example, Lawrence Grossberg’s acknowledgement that emotion “is the articulation of affect and 
ideology,” and that affect has become a catch-all term for “everything that is non-representational or non-
semantic” (316). 
33 Scholars engaged in similar work include Sianne Ngai, whose Ugly Feelings investigates minor affects, a 
set of less active, noble, or passionate feelings than Ahmed’s, including envy, irritation, and anxiety. For 
Ngai, these emotions have cultural structures and sociohistorical significance. Another influential cultural 
critic of affect is Lauren Berlant, who has written on love’s role in both politicizing and depoliticizing 
gendered and racialized bodies in The Female Complaint, as well as late-modernity’s self-destructive 
attachment to the promises of capitalism in Cruel Optimism. Elizabeth Povinelli also turns to love in her 
aptly named The Empire of Love, which looks at the way bonds and taboos of intimacy structure alternate, 
non-Western and non-heteronormative communities. Similarly, David L. Eng turns to the intersections of 
power and intimacy for queer racialized subjects, arguing for kinship’s affective structure and, at times, its 
potential in The Feeling of Kinship. While Povinelli and Eng both take up feeling as a subjective and a 
social form of relating and belonging, Anne Anlin Cheng and José Estaban Muñoz turn to specifically 
racialized forms of negative affects—melancholy and depression, respectively. Both Cheng and Muñoz 
highlight the importance of the racialized body in subject formation, eschewing what Muñoz calls the 
“crypto-universalist…default white subject” of affect theory (675).  
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the example that we are sad because we cry, Ahmed insists that this is because the object 
we have come into contact with makes us cry for a social or cultural reason. Therefore, 
she argues that while “sensation [affect] and emotion are irreducible, they cannot simply 
be separated at the level of lived experience. Sensations are mediated, however 
immediately they seem to impress upon us” (25). Ahmed’s theory is important because 
the texts in this dissertation do suggest that fainting and other nervous responses can be 
interpreted in a determinant way, either by essentializing the fainting body (for example, 
feminized bodies faint and so fainting is a sign of the feminized body) or essentializing 
the objects that create responses (for example, if Count Dracula makes me tremble, it is 
because his body is inherently threatening and my body knows it). James, for example, 
argues that although the body’s responses can shift culturally, they occur because of “the 
connate adaptation of the nervous system to that object” (194). This formula does 
threaten to essentialize the object that produces the embodied response, but nonetheless 
allows for responses to change and develop with context. Ahmed teaches us how to read 
these formulations of emotion carefully and consider the way personal, social, and 
cultural histories of emotion mediate embodied responses. 
However, Ahmed’s theory does not shed light on the structure of fainting. As an 
affective response, fainting is fully nonconscious; when someone faints, there is a 
disconnect between the subject’s body and mind. We might say that during a faint, 
consciousness is absent from the event of the body. When fainting is an expression of an 
emotion, there is a clear distinction between the embodied response and its conscious 
translation into language. Moreover, in late-Victorian novels, swooners do not often 
reflect on their fainting spells themselves or assign them to emotional states. Instead, 
fainting is simply an extreme expression of affect itself—a visceral intensity of nervous 
response, an overabundance of embodied feeling, a reaction of the non-cognitive body.  
Major theorists of affect like Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Brian Massumi 
introduce the intensity of affect itself as a kind of swoon—a suspension of self-
consciousness, time, and a body with recognizable limits and boundaries. In what is now 
a canonical text, Parables for the Virtual, Massumi describes affect as a virtual field of 
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intensities that intersect with the subject through the autonomic system of the body.34 
Although he does not directly mention fainting, his version of affect shares fainting’s 
qualities of nonconsciousness; like fainting, affect is “bodily intensity,” the feeling of a 
change in physical states (15), and a suspension of time and movement (28). Massumi 
separates this non-cognitive affect from emotion, which is associated with language. He 
writes that “an emotion is a subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of 
an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified 
intensity […] It is intensity owned and recognized” (28).  In this theory, the circulation of 
affect precedes and suspends subjectivity, which can only play catch up in deciding how 
to interpret embodied feeling. Massumi’s theory is drawn directly from the work of 
William James and includes multiple references to James’s empiricism and emotion 
theory. Discussing an experiment on autonomic reception, Massumi writes: 
Will and consciousness are subtractive. They are limitative, derived 
functions that reduce a complexity too rich to be functionally expressed. It 
should be noted in particular that during the mysterious half second, what 
we think of as ‘‘free,’’ ‘‘higher’’ functions, such as volition, are apparently 
being performed by autonomic, bodily reactions occurring in the brain but  
outside consciousness, and between brain and finger but prior to action and 
expression. (29) 
This passage echoes some of James’s theory of emotion, which proposes that the body is 
the primary respondent to the world, but it also mirrors Lewes’s argument that the entire 
body is conscious. However, more than either of these, Massumi’s references to 
autonomic, bodily reactions that masquerade as volition sound uncannily like Huxley’s 
theory of automatism.35 
Many Victorians saw the primacy of affect and the reduction of the human subject 
to an automaton as a loss or a failure of both human exceptionalism and the basis for 
                                               
34 Patricia Clough writes that by 2010, Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual had “become a canonical text 
about affect that links it to the philosophical conceptualization of the virtual” (208).  
35 Massumi makes the idea of the cognitive body explicit as he discusses an experiment into the embodied 
reactions of children. In this study, researchers showed the children three versions of a story about a 
melting snowman while measuring their physiological responses. Massumi writes, “Perhaps the snowman 
researchers of our first story couldn’t find cognition because they were looking for it in the wrong place—
in the ‘mind,’ rather than in the body they were monitoring” (29). For Massumi, the cognitive body seems 
to refer to the reactivity of the body and its primacy in emotional and rational response. 
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moral duty. However, Massumi understands non-cognitive affect as potential. In his 
theory, potential refers to change, movement, and the virtual—“the pressing crowd of 
incipiencies and tendencies” that have not yet become emotions, actions, or choices (30). 
For Massumi, the potential of affect is life itself—animacy, process, possibility. As a 
different form of no less euphoric potential, Deleuze and Guattari claim that affect is the 
sublime subjection of the body to other forms of life and being.36 They write that affect 
“is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the 
pack [becoming-animal] that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” (240). They 
identify fainting as a form of subjective disintegration (reading its appearance in a novel 
by Heinrich von Kleist) because it represents an affect that is “too strong for me,” 
repeated until “the Self…is now nothing more than a character whose actions and 
emotions are desubjectified” (356).  
All three of these affect theorists are influenced by the arch-philosopher of 
nonconscious affect, Baruch Spinoza, who also sees potential in affect. Spinoza’s 
seventeenth-century philosophical treatise, Ethics, was a radical departure from 
Enlightenment theories of the mind, free will, agency, and human exceptionalism. 
Contrary to René Descartes’s theories of humanism based on cognition, Spinoza argued 
that God was in nature, that the human mind and body could not be separated, and that 
behaviour was the result of bodily affects and passions.37 One of Spinoza’s most 
important dictums from Ethics is now often quoted in affect theory: “no one has yet 
determined what the body can do” (155). For Deleuze and Guattari, and later Massumi, 
this axiom suggests that the body is constantly in process, being affected by itself and by 
other parts of the world. Deleuze and Guattari’s term “becoming” originates with the 
Spinozan sense of a mutable and always externally-connected body, one that enters into 
relationships with other bodies and objects in the world through affect and becomes no 
longer a singular self or a separate subject. Reading these affect theorists together can 
                                               
36 Massumi’s concept of affect is heavily influenced by the work of Deleuze and Guattari; the first chapter 
of Massumi’s Parables for the Virtual introduces a “long-standing engagement” with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (Massumi 17), which Massumi also translated. 
37 My own understanding of Spinoza has been greatly influenced by my first encounter with him in 
Deleuze’s Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 
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help us see a kind of ecstatic sense of possibility in the non-agential, non-individual, 
responsive and nonconscious body that the Victorians identified with the animal and the 
machine. 
Recently, Catherine Malabou has also argued that affect is characterized by 
syncope. In Self and Emotional Life, Malabou seeks to compare and reconcile the 
philosophical and neuroscientific concepts of autoaffection—the idea that subjectivity is 
produced when the “I” of the self is touched or affected by the self. Malabou argues that 
as neuroscience investigates brain injury, it shows us how the subject can be divided from 
itself, or heteroaffected. To explain this, she turns to Antonio Damasio’s theory of 
consciousness, which proposes that emotions occur automatically for the proto-self, the 
most basic biological level of being (Damasio 153, 280). Prefiguring Massumi’s 
separation of non-cognitive affect from conscious emotion, Damasio theorizes that our 
subjective selves, what he calls our autobiographical selves, only come to know and 
name after the fact the feeling that one has experienced. Malabou writes that Damasio’s 
theory of a proto-self represents a “fundamental biological alterity of the self” because it 
is nonconscious (Malabou 64). For Malabou, this proto-self is a heteroaffected part of the 
self and subjectivity that is completely other and can never be known.38 It is this 
heteroaffected part of the self that is represented in the novels I read in this dissertation, a 
part of the subject that feels, reacts, and is connected to the world, but that is nonetheless 
unknowable, strange, alienated, animal, mechanistic.  
For both Damasio and Malabou, fainting is an exemplary expression of this 
heteroaffected self. In Damasio’s schema, when a subject comes to awareness after a 
fainting spell, consciousness slowly returns and “it takes a while longer for the 
autobiographical self to be reinstated as a process and for the situation to be perfectly 
explained” (94). Malabou turns to Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy of the body to claim 
explicitly that syncope represents heteroaffection because when someone faints, the body 
is un-self-aware, as “an affect touches me but I don’t know what ‘me’ means” (24). Even 
                                               
38 For Malabou, the significance of heteroaffection emerges when the self is changed radically, and stops 
feeling or knowing itself as a subject (as in cases of brain damage)—what she calls “hetero-
heteroaffection” (11). 
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the most basic sense of self is only possible because of the nonconscious, heteroaffected 
self, and therefore, all affects “are also constantly syncoped, interrupted, and 
discontinuous” (Malabou 24). As she brings continental philosophy together with 
neuroscience, Malabou insists that in both fields, syncope underwrites the possibility of 
subjectivity. 
Other scholars have challenged and updated these theories of nonconscious affect 
or offered other biological versions of affect reception and embodied consciousness, 
demonstrating that the form of the affect-subjectivity relationship is as much up for 
debate today as it was in the nineteenth century. For example, Teresa Brennan, like 
Massumi, argues that affect is autonomous, but Brennan claims that affect is transmitted 
as a material substance from one body to another. On the one hand, Brennan claims that 
circulated affect becomes biological, thus constituting subjectivity and creating physical 
similarities and differences regardless of embodied political identities like race (25). On 
the other, she acknowledges that affects have a social context, as they “come via an 
interaction with other people and an environment” (3), and that feelings and their objects 
can shift as subjects with different contexts receive them (6-7). Brennan acknowledges 
earlier historical theories of affective transmission, but laments that in the nineteenth 
century they were mostly romanticized and lost scientific credibility, glossing over the 
vibrant scientific discourse I have partially outlined here (17).39 
Nigel Thrift more thoroughly embraces an affect-subjectivity dualism by 
connecting affect to the concept of bare life through the “half-second delay” between a 
body’s being affected and the subject’s conscious awareness of it (67). Bare life is a term 
for biological life that is understood to be non-political, but that nevertheless is the basis 
upon which any life form becomes political. Thrift argues that affective bare life is 
subject to new forms of what he calls “microbiopolitics,” a disciplinary regime that takes 
the affective body as “available to be worked upon through a whole series of new entities 
                                               
39 See John Protevi and Lisa Blackman for other theories of the unstable division between nonconscious 
affect and conscious subjectivity. Protevi argues that the affective body itself is cognitive, and Blackman 
that there is a dynamic interplay of body and consciousness at the “threshold” of consciousness and 
nonconsciousness (371). Both Protevi and Blackman’s theories acknowledge the importance of a body 
already imbricated by political identity.  
42 
and institutions” (67).40 Thrift demonstrates the stakes of syncope’s dualism by 
reconceptualizing bare life not as a discrete category of political identity, but as the non-
cognitive level of all bodies. By locating bare life in affect, Thrift posits that affective 
bodies—all affective bodies—are both entirely vulnerable and the very basis for 
(political) subjectivity.41 While Thrift is interested in the ways that bodies are disciplined 
through affect, his formulation of the non-cognitive body as open to political potential 
supports my readings of the ways fainting bodies are identified with other forms of bare 
life. 
Many of these theories of nonconscious affect have come under fire for their 
uncritical use of science or their insistence on what Ruth Leys calls the non-intentional 
aspect of affect (including those of Darwin, James, Tomkins, Damasio, Massumi, and 
Thrift). Leys claims that part of the reason these theorists turn to science and reject 
cognition is in order to “overturn the human-nonhuman animal divide” (470). While few 
of the modern affect theorists I have mentioned here directly addresses this divide, Marie-
Luise Angerer is right to point out that many of these theories of nonconscious affect 
formulate it as “an autonomous, a-human zone of the body” (53). For Angerer, a late-
modern concern with posthuman bodies of information and cybernetics (and even of 
cyborg possibilities) sets the stage for this version of affect. However, as we have seen, 
late nineteenth-century theories about the mechanical and animal behaviour of the human 
                                               
40 For an alternate reading of the body’s openness to its environment, see Patricia Clough. Clough extends 
Massumi’s theory by arguing that the affective body demonstrates “matter’s capacity to be informational, 
to give bodily form,” a capacity which is specifically modified by digital media in late-modernity (207). 
41 Giorgio Agamben formulates the dyad of bare life and sovereignty in his influential text Homo Sacer. 
Bare life is any form of life that can be taken without it being considered murder or sacrifice. That is, bare 
life is biological life or life without political or religious significance or consequence. The sovereign is the 
person or apparatus that decides what constitutes bare life. The dyad are mutually constitutive 
concepts: ”the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo 
sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns” (84).  And, again, in relation to devalued 
life: “sovereign is he who decides on the value or non-value of life as such” (142). For Agamben, the 
Holocaust provides a violent modern example of bare life, when Jewish people were classified as vermin 
and killed without legal consequence. Agamben also hints at the possibility that bare life is a part of the 
biological life of all suject in his discussion of suicide. Agamben draws from a German pamphlet on 
euthanasia published in 1920 to note that “in order to explain the unpunishability of suicide,” the authors 
(Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche) must “conceive of suicide as the expression of man’s sovereignty over his 
own existence” (136).  Agamben theorizes that if bare life is “in the biological body of every living being” 
(140), then the individual is sovereign to act outside the law in taking her own life, as well as the possibility 
for the authorization (Agamben’s term) for the taking of other, non-valued lives.  
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mind and body were already challenging the will, individuality, and agency of the human. 
Moreover, the advances in technology during the latter decades of the Victorian period 
offered ever increasing prostheses for what human bodies lacked, suggesting that the 
“complete” human was only possible through the intervention of nonhuman supplements 
(Armstrong Modernism 3). Recently, theorists have used the term posthuman to account 
for the necessity of technology and other nonhuman attributes to the category of the 
human itself. Physiological psychology, evolutionary theory, and technological 
modernity suggest we have always been—or, at least, we were in the late-nineteenth 
century—posthuman. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s work is an outlier to these two major fields of affect 
theory, as her monograph on affect, Touching Feeling, moves capaciously from the 
biology of particular emotions to the politics of affective performance.42 Unlike the other 
theorists I have mentioned above, her affect theory does not propose that syncope is the 
structure of affect. However, the diverse chapters that make up her volume include a brief 
essay called “Interlude, Pedagogic” that offers fainting as its primary form of teaching. 
Sandwiched between the introduction and first chapter, this interlude describes “the most 
dramatic thing that happened to [her] in the summer of 1991” when she fainted at an 
AIDS demonstration (28). The purpose of the demonstration was visibility for queer and 
Black bodies with HIV, but when Sedgwick, a white woman whose body had been 
visibly marked by cancer, faints, her body becomes the centre of the event. She describes 
this embodied event as a gap: 
[The] next thing I knew, the urgent sound of my name and a slowly dawning 
sense of disorientation suggested that I seemed very oddly to be stretched 
out in the dirt—coming to—surfacing violently from the deep pit of another 
world—with a state trooper taking my pulse and an ambulance already on 
the way—the gaping, unbridgeable hole left in my own consciousness felt 
like a mise-en-abîme image of the whole afternoon. (32) 
                                               
42 Sedgwick, along with Adam Frank, recovers the mid-twentieth-century theories of Silvan Tomkins to 
argue for a rethinking of Freudian drives through their integration with affect. Tomkins claims that there 
are a limited number of originary affects and that they are biologically determined, but they can have any 
object or be triggered by any image. For example, in Tomkins theory the sex drive itself is not particularly 
emotional—as hunger is not, for example—but it is particularly finicky and urgent because it is 
interconnected with the affect excitement. 
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Sedgwick’s narration of this gap follows a similar grammatical pattern to 
Gaston’s from Wormwood, with multiple dashes representing the broken subjectivity 
produced by the swoon itself. This gap in Sedgwick’s consciousness and performance is 
one that will not be resolved into a final meaning, but proliferates out into a multiplicity. 
She writes that “the meaning with which that body was so dense, too dense, was indeed 
not a usable one […] in relation to the complexly choreographed performative agendas 
and effects of that demonstration,” and notes that even the gender of her fainting body 
was uncertain, “apparently female” (33, my emphasis). The pedagogical lesson of 
fainting here seems to be that it destabilizes the meanings we have associated with the 
body (like gender), but not that it is meaningless; Sedgwick goes on to list the ways that 
this syncope of performance ends up creating displacements of meaning (a white body 
for Black ones, and cancer for HIV, for example). What is instructive about this episode 
seems to be that the body will perform, but perhaps not “properly,” that it is 
undisciplined, that not every affective gesture can be recuperated or organized into a 
system of meaning. However, these moments where the body intrudes, if supposedly 
illegibly, are also openings towards other ways of being in the world, other bodies, other 
vulnerabilities.  
2.3. Reading Narrative Syncope: Autobiography 
In Sedgwick’s “Interlude,” fainting is both a material event and a form of reading. 
By turning to herself and reading the moment of her own absence from the narrative, 
Sedgwick teaches us about affect and the body, about ways of identifying with other 
bodies, and about ethical response. We might call this “Interlude, Autobiographic.” 
Sedgwick finds instructive displacements of meaning in the gap that fainting creates for 
herself, when she cannot entirely narrate the moment and must describe herself as an 
image or a figure (32), as “that body” (33). The swoon alienates Sedgwick’s body from 
her “self” and makes her body other, non-agential, out of her control, unknowable, and 
vulnerable. Even as it teaches us about the bare, physiological life of all bodies (for 
Sedgwick, “tired and dizzy” [32], but also a vulnerable representative of both the bodies 
of white women with cancer and Black men with AIDS), syncope evades the standard, 
self-reflective, linguistic procedures of knowing ourselves. Sedgwick nonetheless tries to 
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make sense of the event, to bridge the gap of her own disappearance: “There was 
something so absorbing and so radically heterogeneous about this space of protest that 
when, next thing I knew, the urgent sound of my name and a slowly dawning sense of 
disorientation…” (32). Here, her faint has occurred mid-sentence, as the comma between 
“that when” and “next thing I knew.” Furthermore, as I mention above, the halting, 
fragmented form of this passage mimics her slow coming-to-consciousness, and in order 
to narrate this moment, Sedgwick will have to switch registers from autobiographical 
self-reflection to a third person narrator of her strange, nonconscious body (“that body”). 
Syncope disrupts the auto of autobiography. 
 The three novels I have chosen here from the last decade of the nineteenth 
century are all forms of narrative autobiography in which syncope similarly troubles self-
representation. As they attempt to narrate character subjectivity, these novels express the 
structure of affect as syncope, as interruptions of subjectivity and humanness. Moreover, 
as in Sedgwick’s autobiographical interlude and the description of fainting in the London 
Reader, the actual instances of fainting (or near-fainting) in these late-century novels are 
mostly blank. That is, there are no omniscient narrators of these swoons who provide 
representation, context, or meaning. Instead, fainting—and affective syncope of all 
kinds—troubles the very idea of narrating the self. Some scholars would, understandably, 
take issue with my reference to these novels as fictional autobiographies of any kind. 
They do not fit a strict definition of the genre that would require stories of growth or 
transformation—The Picture of Dorian Gray is not even written in the first person. Heidi 
Pennington, whose recent study of Victorian fictional autobiographies argues that identity 
is always a fictional narrative process, would likely classify these texts as autodiegetic 
after Gerard Genette: texts written (mostly, in this case) in the first person with an interest 
in the narrator’s “origins, self-representation, and social recognition” (Pennington 24), or 
where the narrator is “the hero of his narrative” (Genette 245)—but not as 
autobiographies.43 However, this dissertation is not making an argument for shifting 
                                               
43 Perhaps Corelli’s Wormwood can be considered a fictional autobiography, although Gaston’s narrative 
does not produce the “ideal of a fixed and internal core self” that Pennington declares was “valued (and 
indeed, often fetishized) for offering the individual some kind of ontological security in the unstable social, 
political, and economic world of nineteenth-century” (35). Pennington claims that a sense of stability in 
subjectivity appealed to readers who were witnessing a massive change in the meaning of selfhood. 
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generic boundaries or for the inclusion of these texts in the autobiographic genre per se. 
Instead, I use the term autobiography in order to highlight the stakes of subjectivity 
through narrative form, drawing on the term’s sense as writing the self, or self-life-
writing. Laura Marcus claims that autobiography is the “literature of subjectivity” (231); 
Adam Smyth extends this claim by noting that “subjectivity has a history and can mean 
different things at different times” (2). Marcus explains that the genre of autobiography is 
one that, broadly, “unsettles distinctions, including the division between self and other” 
and is therefore a “destabilising form of writing and knowledge” (15). We can understand 
these texts, then, as physiological fictional autobiographies, in which the aesthetics of 
subjectivity are shaped by syncope; or, put another way, in which the aesthetics of 
subjectivity are syncopated by affect.44 
The late-nineteenth century saw a shift in novel genres, as multi-volume realist 
novels which often included narratives of individual growth and progress, like the 
Bildungsroman (sometimes itself in the form of fictional autobiography), gave way to 
shorter narratives and a proliferation of subgenres, like gothic novels, scientific romances 
(what we would now classify as science or speculative fiction), and detective novels. This 
period also saw a shift in narrative strategies, from mediation to syncopation. In “1825-
1880: The Network of Nerves,” Nicholas Dames provides an outline of an earlier 
historical shift in narration. He explains that free indirect style marked narrative in the 
early part of the century, as a mode of self-reflection in which third-person narration and 
                                               
“Indeed,” she writes, “the marked emphasis on an essentialist ideal of identity in Victorian literature mainly 
verifies its absence from lived realities” (35). To the contrary, Gaston insists that the self is, at times, 
unknowable and capricious. 
44 In The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Terry Eagleton reveals the largely obscured origins of the term aesthetic 
in the mid-eighteenth century, which originated with Alexander Baumgarten in Germany, as encompassing 
“nothing less than the whole of our sensate life together—the business of affections and aversions, of how 
the world strikes the body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze and the guts and all 
that arises from our most banal, biological insertion into the world” (13). Eagleton claims that, from the 
eighteenth century on, the bourgeois “law” or social order is reproduced in the aesthetics of the body—its 
“sentiments, affections, and spontaneous bodily habits” (23), and that because of this, the work of art 
produces and reproduces the kind of individual that upholds the bourgeois social order. He clarifies that 
notions of aesthetic objects are inseparable from historical notions of post-Cartesian, rational, individual 
human subjectivity: “Like the work of art as defined by the discourse of aesthetics,” Eagleton writes, “the 
bourgeois subject is autonomous and self-determining” (23). However, he also acknowledges that “the 
aesthetic…provides an unusually powerful challenge and alternative to these dominant ideological forms” 
(3).  
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first-person character merge briefly to share the character’s thoughts and feelings. 
However, with the advance of physiological psychology, self-knowledge was put into 
question; as science discovered that the “springs of action for physiologically grounded 
consciousness are neural combinations and recombinations,” the resulting self-alienation 
was mitigated in novels by “loquacious, chatty, discursive narrative voices” (227).45 
Narrators needed to supply knowledge for their characters, and so “much of the tone and 
leisurely length of Victorian narrative is owed to this new epistemological split between a 
knowing narrator and characters who are constitutively, perhaps even ontologically, 
unaware of their own motives” (227). In the quotation from Middlemarch with which I 
began this chapter, this knowing narrator provides context for Lydgate’s choice and 
explains that his feeling was that of “unspeakable bitterness.” In Middlemarch, then, the 
subjectively unspeakable is supplemented by the narration.  
However, Sedgwick and Wormwood’s Gaston tell their own autobiographies with 
no mediating voice to provide narrative continuity or assign meaning to affective gaps. 
Their autobiographical narratives demonstrate a part of the condition of our affective 
being: it is without language, unspeakable.46 Similarly, The Picture of Dorian Gray, The 
Time Machine, and Dracula are all syncopated autobiographies, narratives in which 
                                               
45 Dames borrows from Damasio to argue that Victorian novels consistently represent their characters 
through their “core consciousness,” or an organism’s sense of its own basic functioning, rather than as 
autobiographical selves represented by a unique set of individually distinct memories and habits 
(“Network” 218-219). In these late-Victorian novels, I update his theory (without relying on Damasio) to 
argue that whatever autobiographical self is produced in these novels, it is dependent on, subject to, and 
interrupted by affective responses that Damasio would attribute to the proto-self and core consciousness. 
For a reading of the romantic subjectification of affect, see Miranda Burgess, who reads anxiety as the 
transmission of objectless affect, and Romantic metaphor as the literary form of subject creation as it turns 
anxiety into a subject and object of emotion. 
46 Scholars who are critical of nonconscious affect theory are commonly (and often justifiably) concerned 
at affect theories’ refusal of language. Affect’s embodiment, nonhumanness, non-cognitive and non-
linguistic nature can make it appear impoverished and of little potential (or of over-promised potential) for 
cultural and literary critics. Ruth Leys offers a representative critique of this lack, as, for these theorists, 
“the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior 
to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs—because they are nonsignifying, autonomic processes that 
take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning. For the theorists in question, affects 
are ‘inhuman,’ ‘pre-subjective,’ ‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments 
but are separate from these” (437). Leys argues that focus on non-ideological affect is misguided, that we 
ought to take culture and ideology into consideration for emotion has complex cultural and ideological 
implications for both humans and nonhumans, and because of this, it is the purview of anthropology, 
literature, and philosophy (471-472).  
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subjectivity—consciousness, language, self-knowledge, and self-reflection—is 
interrupted by the physiological, affective body.47 Rather than narrative mediation, we 
find unstable narrative representations (sometimes including free indirect discourse that 
drifts between characters), non-linear timelines, unreliable narrators, multiple narrators, 
and multiple textual sources. These forms of narration are informed by, and in turn, 
texture, physiological psychology’s theories of affect, while also prefiguring twenty-first 
century affect theories. As we have seen, these discourses posit the affective body as 
nonhuman, as non-volitional, and as full of potential. In both nineteenth- and twenty-
first-century affect theory, subjectivity is undone by, but also depends upon, this 
nonhuman body. Following suit, late-century physiological fictional autobiographies both 
invoke and deny interiority while also not offering any master narrator or narrative to 
supply that knowledge. They offer alternate forms of affective autobiography that 
demonstrate how the non-normative or queer body and nonhuman or animal self exists 
both at the heart of, and in resistance to, the aesthetics of subjectivity. 
This shift to a syncopated, affective, and, therefore, less fully human form of 
narrative subjectivity is not one that happens abruptly. As my Introduction shows, 
fainting occurred in novels throughout the nineteenth century. Further, earlier Victorian 
novels also incorporated suspensions of consciousness and agency. For example, Elisha 
Cohn studies the affective moods that suspended the narratives of realist novels of 
individual progress throughout the Victorian period. One of her key examples includes 
the fictional autobiography Villette from 1853. Lucy Snowe, the narrator and protagonist, 
is subject to suspensions of consciousness as fainting men are at the end of the century. 
Lucy faints, too, describing the moment as the feeling that she has “pitch[ed] headlong 
down an abyss,” before her final sentence ends both the chapter and volume one of the 
                                               
47 Other recent scholarly work on physiological psychology and the body in Victorian literature that 
investigate the nonconscious, neurological body includes Jill Matus’s Shock, Memory, and the Unconscious 
in Victorian Fiction (discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation); Tim Armstrong’s Modernism, 
Technology, and the Body, which argues that literary narratives (among other cultural objects) include 
representations of fragmented, augmented, and regulated bodies in response to the technologies of 
modernity; Anne Stiles’s Popular Fiction and Brain Science in the late Nineteenth Century, which 
proposes that novels are cultural and political responses to the materialism of neurological theories of the 
self. See also Gregory Tate’s The Poet’s Mind: The Psychology of Victorian Poetry, 1830-1870, which 
examines the way poetry participates in or resists psychological analysis of the relation between the mind 
and body. 
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novel: “I remember no more” (164). Lucy’s (or Brontë’s) strategy to aestheticize this 
moment of affective interruption, nonconsciousness, and absence, is to provide a chapter 
and volume break, a technique we will see used again in The Time Machine and Dracula. 
However, when the narrative resumes, Lucy goes on to both claim ignorance about 
“where her soul went during that swoon,” and write an entire paragraph about the 
possibilities (165). Cohn argues this passage “dilates an experience for the reader that 
stands in for Lucy’s blankness” (51-52), but even more salient for my argument is the 
fact that Lucy envisions a soul that might still be sentient or lively even as her body is 
absent and silent. Lucy’s narrative strives for subjectivity, and the swoon’s challenge to 
human selfhood is overwritten by an insistence on the presence of the soul. In contrast to 
Villette, the three novels I turn to in this dissertation admit the animality of their 
protagonists, whether by embracing or resisting it, and reflect a growing belief that the 
soul either did not exist separately from the animal body or did not exist at all.48 
However, as Villette’s chapter break shows, there are continuities between the narrative 
form of fainting in Villette and the narrative form of fainting in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, The Time Machine, and Dracula.  
Nonhuman affect appears in literature through the nonconscious interruption of 
narrative by affect. In The Animal that Therefore I Am, Derrida writes that autobiography 
is the narrative form of autoaffection, a way of declaring ourselves an “I” by narrating “I 
am” (34). Since autoaffection produces human subjectivity (the self touches itself or 
moves itself and becomes self-aware), autobiography is one narrative form that separates 
humans from animals.49 In this lecture, Derrida offers two important aspects of 
autobiography’s relation to the animal that influence my use of the term and my readings 
of these texts. The first is that, in all self-reflection, self-presence, autoaffection, and 
autobiography, humans can only write themselves by distinguishing themselves in 
                                               
48 In Embodied, William Cohen argues that Victorian literature located humanness in the body, partially in 
response to physiological psychology and changing conceptions of the soul as embodied. Cohen claims that 
the body in Victorian novels is a permeable surface, open to a world of objects and feelings (and bodies and 
foods) that create subjectivity and identity. Cohen also recognizes the subject’s embodied position in the 
world—what we might call their political identity—as crucial to this analysis. 
49 Derrida also argues that autobiographies are based in confession, and therefore in shame that is only 
possible to humans. 
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relation to animality (50). The second is that Derrida suggests that autoaffection itself is a 
form of autobiography; that autobiography is a part of animality, “generally defined as 
sensibility, irritability, and auto-motricity, a spontaneity that is capable of movement, of 
organizing itself and affecting itself, marking, tracing, and affecting itself with traces of 
its self” (49). In this essay, Derrida clarifies that his writing on animal-human difference 
never means to efface that difference or argue for animal-human continuity. However, at 
the same time, Derrida works to ensure there is no solid, singular ground on which we 
can base that decision. Who are we to say, his work asks, whether an animal can speak, 
or lie, or respond (32-34)? Derrida’s deconstructive approach towards the animal is a 
process of tracing both multiple differences and continuities.  
When the fainting bodies in this dissertation disrupt autoaffection—or the “I” of 
autobiography—they deconstruct animal-human difference to suggest possible forms of 
continuity that have political and ethical consequences (which I will explain in the next 
section). These forms of animal-human continuity include attributes of affective being 
that we have seen in discourses of affect from the nineteenth and twenty-first century, 
including the lack of language, the unknowable body, and the disruption or suspension of 
temporality. My argument both develops and departs from the work of other scholars 
who have turned to affect in Victorian literature. Many of these scholars argue for the 
ways in which novels create feelings in readers. This is a significant part of Cohn’s 
argument, for example, and provides the framework for Rachel Ablow’s edited collection 
The Feeling of Reading.50 In The Physiology of the Novel, Dames points out that 
Victorian literary criticism itself argued for the value of the physiological, or affective, 
responses of the reader to novel form.51 Other scholars argue that literary representations 
                                               
50 For the transmission of affect from text to reader, see also Adam Frank’s Transferential Poetics, from 
Poe to Warhol and Stephen Ahern’s “Nothing More Than Feelings?: Affect Theory Reads the Age of 
Sensibility.” Ahern both argues for the sense of community engendered in representations of sentimental 
contagion in eighteenth-century literature, as well as an account of the difficulty of moving beyond 
descriptions of affect towards revolutionary action. For alternate and diverse readings of affect, see Ahern’s 
edited collection Affect Theory and Literary Critical Practice: A Feel for the Text, in which essays on a 
wide range of literature from multiple periods use affect theory to analyze “the limits of representation” and 
“identities and assemblages—queer, hybrid, transnational,” as well as reader responses. An earlier version 
of my chapter on Dracula is included in this collection. 
51 This body of work is a part of a larger field, physiological aesthetics, which argued that aesthetic 
objects—like art and music—affected the audience’s nervous system as the source of their value and 
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of affect work to discipline the body. Monographs like Audrey Jaffe’s The Affective Life 
of the Average Man, Gesa Stedman’s Stemming the Torrent, or Ann Cvetkovich’s Mixed 
Feelings attest to the ways that Victorian novels could be understood as “intentional or 
unintentional conduct books” (Stedman 2), naturalizing emotional responses and likely to 
both “challenge and to reinforce ideologies of gender and affect” (Cvetkovich 55). By 
contrast, I argue that the representation of affect in these late-century novels solicits the 
reader in both form and content, a claim I will explain further in the next section. Affect, 
however, is in itself not disciplinary and while the novels I have chosen suggest the 
power in affective control, affect structured as syncope is too non-linguistic, too other, 
and too a-temporal to be fully managed.   
Syncope’s affective disruption of narrative represents an acute problem for 
language, as we have seen in Sedgwick’s and even Lucy Snowe’s autobiographical 
writing. Fainting is the presence of absence, the disappearance of a subject who, because 
of the structure of textuality, never actually disappears from the page because all readerly 
eyes are on them. Fainting invokes the silence of a narrator who will nonetheless pick up 
the narrative again immediately, perhaps referring briefly to the faint or maybe never 
mentioning it again. The structure of narrative syncope is echoed by other forms of 
grammatical gaps and bridges, like the hyphens that break up subjective narrative or like 
the ethical dilemma embedded in the question, “What could he do?” that interrupts the 
passage from Middlemarch at the beginning of this chapter, an idea to which I return in 
the section on ethics below. 
I see these formal aspects of narrative as non-linguistic markers of nonhuman 
affect, a reading that is in keeping with the recent narrative theories of Lee Spinks and 
Ridvan Askin. Spinks, for example, argues that literary style is affective in that it 
constructs and deconstructs subjectivity. Spinks writes that  
                                               
power. Aesthetic appreciation was understood to be biological, and as Dames, Robert Brain, and Benjamin 
Morgan have pointed out, science was an integral means to measure human responses to aesthetics. In 
Dames’ historical analysis, physiological response was not just an indicator of how readers’ minds 
functioned, but had greater social ramifications, as in his second chapter on the way attention and 
distraction to certain novel forms was also a matter of the liberal individuality and freedom. 
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Literature is not the expression or representation of a subject; it is the 
opening and differential production that makes subjectivity, presence and 
truth possible in the ︎first place. Thus literature has a pre-human and 
inhuman force that marks the inauguration of sense before sense can be 
recuperated within the semantic regime of truth. (34) 
Style for Spinks includes white space (as in Derrida’s reading of Le Livre de Mallarmé) 
and free indirect discourse (as in his own reading of Philip Roth’s Sabbath Theater). 
Similarly, I read chapter breaks and shifts in free indirect discourse as examples of 
nonhuman affect that structure the narrative autobiographies of the three texts I have 
chosen. I am therefore reading these texts as though they, too, are subjects of affect as 
well as representations of affective bodies or as producers of readerly feelings. Askin 
similarly argues that narrative itself has an ontology, or a being, and like all other bodies, 
its subjectivity (or what Askin refers to as its epistemology or knowledge) is only created 
out of its virtual being. He draws on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze to claim that affect 
reveals the “nonhuman within the human, the objective within the subjective, the virtual 
within the actual” (26). In this theory, affective narrative techniques include a variety of 
structural and grammatical effects, that “range from the employment of inconsistent 
narrative voices to the mixing of incongruent narrative levels, from the projection of 
impossible perspectives to the interweaving of incompossible storylines” (22), and from 
the “metaphor to the sentence fragment, from ellipsis to congeries” (23), including 
“infinitives, partitives, and indefinite forms” (27). While I focus on alternate types of 
structural and grammatical forms of interruption and fragmentation, Askin’s study 
supports my argument that narrative syncope is a form of textually embodied affect.  
As a form of affect, narrative syncope also represents the unknowable alterity of 
the body. As Sedgwick has already shown us, the fainting body is a problem for 
autobiography, as its meanings are obscured from the subject even as those meanings 
multiply and proliferate outwards. In the nineteenth century, too, fainting presented a 
similar problem. William James, as I have mentioned, uses the example of his own faint 
to describe the absolute otherness of the unknowable fainting body. His description of the 
moment of fainting accords with the others I have quoted in this chapter, when a subject 
describes his quick, bodily descent into nonconsciousness: “Suddenly the world grew 
black before his eyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew no more” (196). Here, James 
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also refers to himself in the third person, alienating the autobiographical subject even 
further from himself, as he goes on to describe his “astonishment” at his own body:  
He had never heard of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, 
and he had so little repugnance to it, and so little apprehension of any other 
sort of danger from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, 
he could not help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of 
crimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable bodily effects. (196) 
Even as James notes in this essay the ever-increasing technical apparatuses that measure 
and therefore make the body knowable (191-192), he demonstrates here that the moment 
of syncope is not only indescribable as a nonconscious event, it is also unspeakably 
other.52 Its meaning is unavailable, even to its own subject. 
Stefan Herbrechter pushes this idea even further, explaining that, in fact, no 
autobiography can perform the narration of the self that it promises. This is because the 
“auto” of the term is based in autoaffection, and (as Malabou has shown) autoaffection is 
only possible because of the other: 
There is thus always an experience of dispossession (or desubjectification) 
at work [in autobiography], which is experienced (or inscribed, registered) 
at a material, bodily level, and which is the necessary precondition for auto-
affection to arise in the first place, but which can never be narrated as such. 
The body who experiences (or is materially inscribed with) the 
autobiography can never be the body who narrates the autobiography. There 
is, in fact, a disjuncture between bodies at work within the autobiographical 
process: material, somatic, phenomenological, narrating and narrated, to 
name but a few. (338-339) 
The body is the impossible ground of autobiography, Herbrechter suggests (along with 
his interlocutor, Judith Butler), because the body has its own history, a history of alterity, 
that is unknowable to the subject. The bodies in and of the novels in this dissertation are 
unruly, automatic, animal, and unknowable. They have a narrative force of their own.  
                                               
52 See Peter Garratt on the desire to know the body in Victorian physiological psychology, and George 
Levine’s Dying to Know for a chapter on the desire to know the self through scientific objectivity in 
Victorian non-fictional autobiographies. 
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Finally, narrative syncope invokes nonhuman affect by disrupting the temporality 
of autobiography. In Amnesiac Selves, Nicholas Dames explains that the aesthetic form of 
fictional autobiography that emerged in the mid-Victorian period was a mostly linear 
narrative of events that were contextualized to give meaning and shape to the events of 
human life. Moreover, he shows that this form mirrored associationist models of 
psychology and memory. That is, mid-century, a similar aesthetics of subjectivity could 
be found in both psychology and literature, characterized by the same formal qualities 
that, post-Enlightenment, have come to represent human subjectivity. By contrast, the 
novels I have chosen from the end of the century are structured—like modern affect 
theory—by syncope. This form sees the time of the body as suspended or even absent (as 
in the faint itself). These physiological fictional autobiographies therefore include 
disordered narrative temporalities.  
The syncopations of temporal shifts in these novels occur partly in response to 
industrial and technological changes in forms of time and in modern experience (for 
example, the speed of rail travel or the immediacy of the telegraph).53 Along with the 
ability to change the body’s experience of time and space, modern technology created a 
host of instruments and experiments to measure the affective responsivity of the body, 
noting reactions that occurred before consciousness could grasp them. Sue Zemka 
describes the way these technologies changed temporal models of subjectivity: “Time, 
once the guarantor of the subject’s unity in a sensory event, is now a series of gaps 
dividing her form her own mental and sensory processes” (26).54 By itself, this is a 
persuasive enough way to understand the narrative gaps and shifts created by affect. In 
fact, Victorian novel critics themselves interpreted the affective structure of novel form in 
just this way. They believed that “the novel, physiologically considered, did what all print 
does, only more so: condition the physiological apparatus of the reader for the temporal 
                                               
53 See, for example, Wolfgang Schivelbush on the changes in subjectivity and consciousness as a result of 
rail travel. See also Sue Zemka and Elissa Marder on modern technology’s temporal disruptions and 
intensifications in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century novels.  
54 Zemka’s work includes a history of the moment in a variety of cultural discourses including psychology 
and capitalism. 
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rhythms of modernity” (Dames 10).55 However, fainting has always been a disruption of 
linear time, and its inclusion in narrative always creates a gap or a form of what Elissa 
Marder calls temporal disorder. I bring these novels from the last decade of the century 
together because they attempt to describe what it feels like to be that affective, 
syncopated subject, divided from his mental and sensory processes, alienated from his 
body, an evolutionary animal and machine that is always other and often out of time.  
2.4. Reading Narrative Syncope: Ethics 
In these physiological fictional autobiographies, narrative syncope deconstructs 
subjectivity and also has an ethical function. In the forms I have mentioned above—the 
lack of language, the unknowable body, and the temporal disruptions—narrative syncope 
challenges the differences between human and animal, and self and other. In suggesting 
continuity between these binaries, narrative syncope creates the possibility of a form of 
identification between the self and other or the human and animal. This identification, 
based on affect, could create sympathy, which Victorians believed underwrote morality.56 
That is, many Victorians agreed that understanding the other would lead to 
compassionate feeling and/or behavior. However, narrative syncope complicates this 
identification through its deconstruction of subjectivity. If the other is affectively like the 
self, that is because the self is other; the self is unknowable and it lacks the volition and 
agency necessary to be a self. Where does this lead us? Two aspects of ethics emerge in 
the tension between sameness and difference in instances of narrative syncope in these 
late-century novels. The first ethical aspect of narrative syncope insists on the 
                                               
55 In Electric Meters: Victorian Physiological Poetics, Jason R. Rudy points out that accounts of 
physiological responses to literature, like Dames’s, often obscure poetry’s significant place in physiological 
aesthetics. Rudy concentrates on the idea of electricity or electric shock as a material “physiological mode 
of poetic transmission” (13).  
56 Certainly, not all scholars identify the social function of feeling as moral. Rachel Ablow points out that 
“much of the work that has been published since the 1970s has been rather more skeptical regarding the 
progressive potential of literary emotion. In particular, critics have emphasized emotion’s association with 
individualistic rather than collective action; its tendency to promote isolated acts of charity rather than 
systemic change; and its ability encourage arbitrariness […] rather than rational approaches to social 
problems (“Victorian” 301). For an account of sympathy that offers an alternate to either altruistic action or 
individualism, see Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy, in which she demonstrates how such scenes are 
“always about the construction of social and cultural identities, about the individual subject’s relation to the 
group” (23). 
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unknowable difference, and therefore boundary, between the self and other. Because 
affective being, represented starkly in instances of fainting, always includes the 
unknowability of the body (as, for example, in James’s discussion of fainting), these 
novels suggest an ethical respect for alterity. The second aspect of ethics, closely related 
to the first, is ontological identification—identification at the level of affective being. In 
this case, because affective being is the same between subjects and other forms of life, a 
kind of sympathetic identification can take place that overturns hierarchies of power and 
violence. In both cases, ethical response is prompted by the vulnerable, fainting body, 
which solicits both characters and readers in ways that circumvent subjectivity and 
willful choice. 
Many mid-century Victorians believed strongly in the power of literature to elicit 
sympathy. This belief finds its origins in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
which posits literature as an aesthetic form that creates socially proper feeling and 
therefore socially proper, or moral, action.57 For many, literary sympathy finds its 
apotheosis in Victorian realist fiction, and particularly George Eliot’s literary corpus, 
which strives to represent both other people and the truth of the human condition as 
faithfully and comprehensively as possible, and therefore create sympathy and 
compassionate or generous feeling towards others.58 Eliot herself expressed this belief on 
more than one occasion, writing for example that “…when Wordsworth sings to us the 
reverie of ‘Poor Susan’…more is done towards linking the higher classes with the lower” 
                                               
57 Daniel M. Gross explains the significance of literature to sympathy and therefore morality in Adam 
Smith by citing Smith’s claim that “Sympathy does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from 
that of the situation which excites it’’ (A. Smith 16). Therefore, Gross explains, we may conclude that “a 
moral society where sympathy predominates will also be a literate society where the dramatist and the 
rhetorician play an important role” (Gross Secret 173). Gross also cites a passage in which Smith turns to 
French tragedy to describe the necessity of interest to sympathy: “The reserve which the laws of society 
impose upon the fair sex, with regard to this weakness [i.e., passionate love], renders it more particularly 
distressful in them, and, upon that very account, more deeply interesting. We are charmed with the love of 
Phaedra, as it is expressed in the French tragedy of that name, notwithstanding all the extravagance and 
guilt which attend it. That very extravagance and guilt may be said, in some measure, to recommend it to 
us. Her fear, her shame, her remorse, her horror, her despair, become thereby more natural and interesting” 
(A. Smith 41; Gross, Secret 173-174). 
58 Rae Greiner emphasizes the importance of Adam Smith’s narrative model of sympathy to nineteenth 
century realism’s creation of “sympathetic protocols best able to serve that fiction’s representational and 
moral purposes” (22). For a thorough discussion of George Eliot’s “Hermeneutics of Sympathy,” see Suzy 
Anger’s Victorian Interpretation. 
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because “[a]rt is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and 
extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot” 
(Natural 186-187).59 As Eliot describes it, realist literature’s moral purpose is to make the 
other legible, knowable, and understandable. While Eliot, and much of realist literature, 
is focused on the human other, some Victorian novelists also wrote about animals, or as 
animals, with similar moral aims to sympathy. For example, Anna Feuerstein argues that 
Victorian novels represented animals as political subjects to initiate their inclusion into 
liberal politics. Ivan Kreilkamp claims that, in fact, “Victorian narrative and 
characterization developed some of their signature techniques and tropes” from novels 
that elicit sympathy for animals (“Petted” 89).60  
Whether realist fiction attempts to depict the particular lot of animals, 
impoverished farmers, oppressed factory labourers, yearning women, racialized outsiders, 
or anyone else, its ultimate purpose is to make the other legible.61 Scholars have recently 
complicated what it means to identify with or know the other, but they maintain realist 
literature’s function in making the other (to a certain degree) knowable. For example, 
while Rae Greiner formulates sympathy as an imaginative process rather than an affective 
one, she claims that the realist novel produces this form of imaginative sympathy (4).62 
George Levine argues that “knowledge is a condition of sympathy, if no guarantee of it, 
and epistemology links immediately to the ethical” (10), even as he explains that the “the 
greatest Victorian fiction reaches beyond its own deep humanity to the recognition of 
other, unknowable realities,” acknowledging and respecting that there are some forms of 
alterity that we will never penetrate (254). Nonetheless, as Rachel Hollander puts it, 
                                               
59 In another case, she declared that if “Art does not enlarge men’s sympathies, it does nothing morally” 
(Eliot Letters 3: 112). 
60 For other essays on Victorian novels’ production of sympathy as animal advocacy, as well as a wide 
range of analyses on animals in Victorian fiction, see Deborah Denenholz Morse and Martin A. Danahay’s 
edited collection Victorian Animal Dreams, Laurence W. Mezzeno and Ronald D. Morrison’s edited 
collection Animals in Victorian Literature and Culture, and Brenda Ayres’s edited collection Victorians 
and their Animals. For non-fictional writing by animal activists, intended to elicit sympathy by describing 
laboratory conditions, see Jed Mayer. For a discussion of narrative strategies in a wide range of animal 
autobiographies (including during the Victorian period), see David Herman. 
61 See Suzanne Keen for a rigorous historical account of the relationship between sympathy or empathy and 
literature, and the idea that either is related to ethical behaviour. 
62 See Audrey Jaffe for an account of Victorian sympathy that relies on visual representation in narrative. 
58 
“Victorian sympathy is based on the value of understanding others. Even if complete 
comprehension of another person’s mind is seen as unattainable, it still functions as an 
ideal, and moral behavior depends upon the attempt to minimize difference and 
emphasize commonality” (3).63 In other words, in order to behave well towards another 
and to give them what they need, we must understand them—their feelings, their desires, 
their social reality—in relation to our own.  
Moreover, this version of ethical behaviour relies on the concept of moral agency, 
which requires individuality and free will, and suggests that moral guidelines and rules 
for good behaviour will lead to good feelings, connected communities, and social 
progress. Even those physiological psychologists who believe that sympathy is innately 
biological believe in its capacity for socially-oriented moral behaviour.64 Following 
Adam Smith but contra George Eliot, Darwin argues that sympathy is instinctual, and 
that its development in humans is beneficial because it “compels us to act for the 
community good” (White 112).65 And even those who emphasize the primacy of the 
affective body insist on the will necessary for moral agency. In his response to Huxley’s 
automaton hypothesis, William James emphasizes the importance of conscious, agential 
choice: “An act has no ethical quality whatever unless it be chosen out of several all 
equally possible” (“Automata” 13). Even Huxley eventually shifted under the weight of 
the materialist position, arguing for moral agency in Evolution and Ethics (1893). 
Challenging those proponents of an evolutionary moral sense such as Darwin, Huxley 
argues that immoral sentiments are equally evolved and “there is, so far, as much natural 
                                               
63 For an account of embodied sympathy in the modernist period, see Kristy Martin’s Modernism and the 
Rhythms of Sympathy. Martin includes a novel by Vernon Lee from 1884, and briefly references 
physiological psychology’s theories of embodied emotion. Martin’s argument is that feelings are never 
entirely nonconscious, and sympathy is not individualistically or respectfully ethical, but rather entangles 
bodies and feelings together in ways that exceed individuality and offer new (and sometimes distressing) 
versions of compassion or love.  
64 For a thorough account of the responses to physiological psychology’s challenge to moral agency, see 
Thomas Dixon’s chapter “Christian and Theistic Responses to the New Physicalist Emotions Paradigm.”  
65 While Paul White explains that Darwin’s theory of instinctual sympathy was not straight-forward, as it 
sometimes crossed species lines and other times could not, what set it apart and prompted resistance was 
the idea that sympathy was “an emotional impulse” tied to the physiology of the body (123). Tara 
MacDonald follows a similar path on sympathy in the work of Darwin and Alexander Bain (as well as 
Harriet Martineau and Henry George Atkinson), and while she reads affective sympathy and mimicry 
largely as a “drifting of affect” between bodies (125), she also points out that Bain believed that 
physiological sympathy is “the disinterested element of our moral sense” (Bain 179; MacDonald 128). 
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sanction for the one as the other” (31). Therefore, Huxley writes, humans must choose to 
do right through individual action: “Let us understand, once for all that the ethical 
progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running 
away from it, but in combating it” (34). Combat, the attempt to “subdue nature” (34), 
requires will.66 
Narrative syncope, to the contrary, puts all aspects of this version of sympathy 
into question. Not only does it undermine will, volition, agency, and individuality, 
syncope suggests that the self is unknowable because of the body’s affective alterity. By 
extension, how could anyone know anyone else? Instances of narrative syncope also 
challenge the idea that ethical response leads to good feeling or positive sociality. Despite 
Eliot’s central place in readings of Victorian sympathy, the quotation from her novel 
Middlemarch with which I began this chapter provides an example that challenges 
positive social outcomes. When Lydgate, the aspiring young physician, sees Bulstrode 
faint, the narrator asks, “what could he do?” Faced with this ethical dilemma, Lydgate 
appears to have no choice but to help. Yet his actions are based in neither “gentle duty” 
nor “pure compassion” (776).  Nothing good results from Lydgate assisting Bulstrode—
not for Bulstrode, not for Lydgate, not for Lydgate’s wife, and not for the community of 
Middlemarch. Moreover, Lydgate, who “could not see a man sink so close to him for 
want of help” (776), finds his own generosity toward Bulstrode in this moment 
“unspeakably bitter,” a feeling so painful that it cannot even be described in language. 
Lydgate’s charitable actions neither produce a moral lesson nor do they suggest the 
imaginative work of sympathy, nor the empathetic recognition of another’s feeling, nor 
agential decision-making about what to do. Lydgate is compelled, in what we might 
understand as his own moment of narrative syncope, to respond to another.  
Further, Lydgate’s response does not entail knowledge of the other but it does 
include a form of ontological identification—an embodied recognition of a similitude of 
being, solicited by a call to respond that amounts to a demand for responsibility from the 
                                               
66 However, as Roger Smith points out, Huxley still imagines that ethical behaviour— actions to “overcome 
suffering” and “carry out good acts”—originate in feeling, although Huxley does not say “what he thought 
the grounds for ethical judgment were” (123).  
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other. That is, Lydgate does not sympathize with Bulstrode’s feeling or situation, but 
instead answers to the vulnerability of his body, which was so hesitating, grasping, and 
tottering in that moment that “Lydgate felt sure there was not strength enough in him 
[Bulstrode] to walk away without support” (775-776). Fainting, or near-fainting in 
Bulstrode’s case, initiates a demand from the other and an ontological identification 
based in shared vulnerability. However, this identification emerges in the tension 
between sameness and difference, knowing and not-knowing the other. Lydgate’s 
compulsive responsiveness (he has no choice—what could he do?) turns agency into a 
physiological reaction. The otherness of Lydgate’s body, which makes the ethical choice 
for him, mirrors the alterity of Bulstrode’s body, which behaves in its own strange, 
automatic, and unknowable way.  
The novels I have chosen in this dissertation all repeat this brief version of 
embodied response in various ways. That is, just as Bulstrode’s fainting body compels 
Lydgate to respond, the affective bodies of this study solicit a response from other 
characters that circumvents subjectivity, will, and choice. In doing so, they enact an 
ethics of uncertainty in the tension between self and other, knowable and unknowable, 
sameness and difference. Like Sedgwick and Bulstrode, fainting bodies in these novels 
call for or enact a complete “openness towards the other” (Derrida in Kearney 124). This 
openness suggests a space of ethical potential to prioritize the other and respond to the 
other’s call before, and possibly even at the expense of, the self.67 Jacques Derrida’s 
model of deconstructive ethics illuminates the way narrative syncope solicits a response 
through an ontological identification, and shows us how a purely unselfish response to 
the other is the ethical ideal.  
Derrida’s ethical theory is based in the concept of responding to the other (a 
concept that originates with Emmanuel Levinas). In this ethical formula, the other calls 
us or demands something from us just by virtue of being other (although sometimes this 
demand takes the form of an explicit request or command). To be ethical is to respond 
absolutely to the other without being constrained in any way by self-interest. For Derrida, 
                                               
67 I discovered this quotation in Simon Critchley’s The Ethics of Deconstruction; see this text, along with 
Attridge’s Reading and Responsibility, for authoritative readings of Derrida’s ethical theory. 
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there are a few forms that this response can take as an ethical ideal, including 
responsibility, generosity, and hospitality. An ethical form of hospitality, for example, is 
not just the moral guideline that requires us to respond to a request for shelter by opening 
our homes to another. Derrida explains that this rule of moral behaviour comes with a set 
of conditions: that the other identify him- or herself, respect our space, and recognize that 
we own it and our rules apply. In contrast, truly ethical hospitality is unconditional, 
meaning that whenever a stranger arrives, without being named, without telling us where 
they have come from or what they intend, we must let them in to do whatever they want 
in our home, even if they destroy it (Derrida, “Hospitality” 70-71). The same ideal 
applies in moments of responsibility or generosity: not only does ethics mean being 
responsible for others or being generous to others, we must be responsible for caring for 
all others and we must give generously without the expectation of reciprocity.  
 My argument for the appearance of Derridean ethics in late-century novels 
expands on the work of Rachel Hollander, who finds an ethics of hospitality in novels 
from the last decades of the Victorian period. Hollander argues that during the 1870s and 
1880s, the “problem of self and other, known and unknown” began to emerge as a result 
of “colonial conflicts, nationalist anxiety, and the intensification of the woman question” 
(3). Focusing on both cultural and fictional discourses of domesticity, Hollander argues 
that “in the wake of an erosion of confidence in the ability to understand that which is 
unlike the self…a moral code founded on sympathy gives way to an ethics of 
hospitality,” which is found “in both the plot and form of the late Victorian novel, as 
characters and authors open themselves to that which is other, and suggest the value of 
recognizing rather than overcoming the limits of knowledge” (3).68 That is, as a sympathy 
based in knowledge of the other gives way to an ethics of hospitality, realist 
representation gives way to experimental forms of narrative that respect the 
unknowability of the other. 
In agreement with Hollander, I also argue that the late-Victorian period struggled 
with the problem of otherness and that the novels in the last decade of the century 
                                               
68 See also Rebecca Mitchell, who argues that Victorian realist literature teaches its readers the ethical 
importance of respecting the unknowability of others.  
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propose that ethical behaviour includes responding to the other without needing to 
understand them or classify them. However, for the late-Victorians, alterity was not 
always external. As I have shown here, physiological psychology located the other at the 
level of the body and as the source of the self. As such, the other was both unknowable 
and the same. My argument therefore differs from Jill Larson’s, who has asserted that 
late-century anxieties about agency produce a variety of ethical models in late-Victorian 
novels. Larson includes a chapter on the narrative form of ethics that emerges in the 
relationship between self and other and from the demand of the other. However, she 
claims that the novels that best demonstrate this kind of ethics (including The Picture of 
Dorian Gray) come up short, showing the limits of conscience and the solipsism of 
aesthetic form. 
Moreover, in contrast to Hollander’s claim that a new form of ethics emerges in a 
stark break from previous forms, I argue that the fainting body has called out for an 
unconditional ethical response in literature at least since Frankenstein. However, it is true 
that the novels I have chosen represent this ethical demand through generic conventions 
that differ significantly from the realist novel. I argue this is because they choose to 
experiment with the tension between other and self by creating forms of life that 
represent the alterity of the affective body. These forms of life—The Picture of Dorian 
Gray’s portrait, The Time Machine’s Eloi and Morlocks, and Dracula’s vampires—
embody both the ontological difference of all others and their ethical demands, and an 
ontological similitude between themselves and others, animals and humans, that solicits 
an ethical response.  
These novels of the 1890s therefore do suggest that ethics emerges in tandem with 
sympathetic identification, but that form of sympathy is quite different than the usual 
formulation. I argue it is based in ontological identification (a similarity of being) rather 
than epistemological identification (the ability to know or understand the other). Cohn 
argues against this possibility, drawing on Derrida’s philosophy of difference by reading 
Thomas Hardy’s realist Bildungsroman Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891). She claims that 
in this novel, animal alterity is the basis for ethical behaviour (235-236). More broadly, 
she asserts that affect theories that emphasize animal-human continuity (like Massumi’s 
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or Deleuze and Guattari’s) are inappropriate models of ethics.69 However, as much as 
Derrida is concerned with multiplicities of difference and the concept of what he calls the 
“wholly other” (Animal 12), he also deconstructs the idea of a border between animals 
and humans, proposing that it is divided and folded over on itself (31). He also aligns 
ethics with sympathetic identification in pointing to images of animal suffering, 
explaining,  
If these images are “pathetic,” if they evoke sympathy, it is also because 
they “pathetically” open the immense question of pathos and the 
pathological, precisely, that is, of suffering, pity, and compassion; and the 
place that has to be accorded to the interpretation of this compassion, to the 
sharing of this suffering among the living, to the law, ethics, and politics 
that must be brought to bear upon this experience of compassion. (26) 
In this passage, Derrida suggests that ontological identification is the key to ethical 
compassion when he explains that sympathy relies on an idea of shared suffering. This 
identification is not about understanding or knowing the other, but about the similitude 
between vulnerable bodies.  
If fainting bodies solicit us with this similitude or ontological identification, the 
late-century novels I have chosen emphasize how contingent and difficult truly ethical 
behaviour is. This is because truly ethical behaviour is impossible. To be responsible for 
all forms of life is impossible, to be generous or hospitable to the point of endangering 
yourself and others is impossible, to know the ways in which bodies are similar or 
different is impossible, to truly know what the other needs is impossible.70 However, 
Derrida insists that when the demand to behave ethically in openness towards the other—
without any conditions, limits, or self-interest—is impossible, that is the realm of ethics. 
Each of the novels I have chosen here presents these forms of ethical impossibility and 
                                               
69 Cohn turns to Alain Badiou, who challenges the radical possibilities of autonomous affect’s decentering 
of humanism, noting that, inevitably, “bodies are disciplined, corporeality dismantled, becomings-animal 
hounded out” (Still 188). Power, as Cohn describes, “re-consolidates” (188). While this may be true in 
some novels, it is not the whole story in the novels I analyze here.  
70 George Levine argues that while Victorian realist novels strive to know the other, the impossibility of 
this knowledge remains a part of many texts. He refers to Middlemarch’s narrator’s famous invocation of 
the heartbeat of the squirrel: “If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be 
like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the 
other side of silence” (Eliot 203). 
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uncertainty through narrative syncope, which disrupts the binaries of animal and human, 
self and other, conscious and nonconscious. As narrative syncope creates forms of 
ontological identification, these novels all beg some version of the ultimate ethical 
question: my life or theirs?71 As they bring the complete unknowability of the other 
together with ontological identification with the other, these novels point to the body as 
the realm of ethical impossibility and uncertainty—and therefore the realm of 
unconditional ethics.72   
Therefore, the affective body in and of the text represents the ethical aesthetic. 
Because narrative syncope is a matter of both content and form, I argue that narrative 
itself includes the same affective openness and undecidability that characterizes 
unconditional ethics.73 Narrative syncope is the form of affective being that initiates these 
ethics because it solicits the reader through the fainting body and through the form of the 
affective text itself. Bulstrode’s fainting body solicits the reader when the text explicitly 
turns outward to ask, “what could he do?” As Lydgate steps in for the reader, 
Middlemarch models what a true ethical response looks like—unthinking, immediate, 
and automatic, not only without a sense of volition but also at the expense of the self—
and subverts the idea that ethical behaviour comes from individual choice. Eliot also 
challenges the idea that ethical action results in good feeling or social cohesion in the 
unspeakable bitterness of Lydgate’s generous response to Bulstrode. Sedgwick’s reading 
of her own faint is similarly tinged with bitterness. She wishes her swoon was a silent 
collapse into insensibility that could be read as social defiance (33). Instead, her body is 
                                               
71 For the uncertainty of unconditional ethical choice that must precede any decision that is made in 
“madness,” see Derek Attridge, as well as Michael Anker. 
72 The invocation of Spinoza’s insistence that we do not know yet what bodies can do not only implies the 
virtual potential that Massumi writes about, but also relates to the openness towards others and the 
specificity that Derrida claims is required to turn the infinite demands of ethics into political choices. The 
novels in this dissertation enact this uncertainty through their form and content, offering narrative modes of 
interruption and fragmentation and representations of bodies that explore the limits of Spinoza’s question. 
What if the body never changed? What if it evolved 800,000 years into the future? What if it could become 
something else entirely?  
73 As Derrida explains, “political, ethical and juridical responsibility requires a task of infinite close 
reading. I believe this to be the condition of political responsibility: politicians should read. Now, to read 
does not mean to spend nights in the library; to read events, to analyse the situation, to criticize the media, 
to listen to the rhetoric of the demagogues, that’s close reading, and it is required more today than ever. So 
I would urge politicians and citizens to practise close reading in this new sense, and not simply to stay in 
the library” (“Hospitality” 67). 
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simply vulnerable, “supine, black-clad, paper-white, weirdly bald” (32). Sedgwick’s 
fainting body solicits an ethical response from those who urgently call her name, those 
who have called the ambulance, the troopers who check her condition, and the protesters 
who block her body from the gaze of the journalists’s cameras (32). But it also solicits 
the reader through its displacements of meaning and through its affective grammatical 
rhythms, as well as through the body’s vulnerability, its relation to other vulnerable 
bodies, its particular contextual complexity, and also its complete obscurity. As these 
texts demonstrate, and as the novels I have chosen here will also show, syncope calls for 
an ethical response to vulnerable bodies even, or perhaps only, in “intense discomfort” 
(Sedgwick 34).   
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  “The loveliest of little live things”: Aesthetic 
Forms of Life in The Picture of Dorian Gray 
Towards the end of The Picture of Dorian Gray, Dorian hosts a hunting party at 
his estate, Selby Royal. He is thirty-eight years old but, despite living a life of self-
indulgence, he looks as though he has not aged at all. Aging in his place is a portrait of 
himself painted in his youth. A broken engagement from his past now threatens his life, 
as the brother of his jilted fiancée Sibyl Vane pursues him. Initially, Dorian’s unchanged 
appearance protects him, as James Vane is seeking vengeance on an older man. 
Eventually, however, James realizes the truth—that the youthful-looking Dorian is the 
man who broke his sister’s heart and caused her suicide—and follows him to his hunting 
party. When Dorian sees James watching him through a window, he suddenly faints. 
Shaken after this loss of consciousness, Dorian joins a guest on a hunt and experiences 
another emotionally significant episode. As a hare bounds in front of them, Dorian is 
suddenly “strangely charmed” by the animal and cries to his companion, “Don’t shoot it, 
Geoffrey. Let it live” (193). In this chapter, I explore the politics and ethics of affect that 
are revealed in the connection in this episode between Dorian’s faint and his sudden 
compassion for the hare, both of which are moments of heightened affect.  
Dorian’s collapse at the sight of James Vane represents the intense response of his 
body, and while his faint may be connected to fear, it is not defined by any one particular 
emotion. Dorian’s faint is a reaction of his nervous system, and it invites a reading of 
Dorian as hysterical, as overly sensitive and not quite properly masculine (210).74 
However, thinking about Dorian’s embodied responses in terms of affect, particularly in 
the sense that Brian Massumi has outlined—as nonconscious, non-linguistic, and 
autonomous—reveals just how nonsubjective they are and allows us to see how they are 
related to the nonhuman. When Dorian reacts by fainting or crying out, he is neither in 
control of what he is doing nor fully aware of why he does it. The nonsubjectivity of 
these expressions of affect and their proximity to his compassion for the hare can 
                                               
74 Mark S. Micale writes that Wilde challenged current notions of masculinity in ways that might invite 
readings of male hysteria (210). 
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therefore help us to see how Dorian is also like the animal. On the surface, this is perhaps 
an obvious point—he is lovely and he is also hunted (by James Vane), and the idea that 
Dorian sees himself as a similarly beautiful and hunted creature offers a simple 
explanation for his sudden plea to spare the hare’s life. However, Dorian’s affective 
responses suggest he is alike to the hare both circumstantially and ontologically. Dorian’s 
nonconscious reactions reveal that his form of being is alike to an animal and, throughout 
the novel, they make him much more like a “live thing” than a proper subject. That is, 
they reveal the bare life of Dorian’s body.75  
In the Victorian period, science turned to the human body and began to create a 
new politics from and of it. Not only did Victorian science propose that the self was 
partially animal, the result of evolution and the reactivity of the nervous system, but, 
around the time of The Picture of Dorian Gray’s publication, the emerging field of 
sexology was beginning to classify the queer body through medical discourse (Bauer 4).76 
Affective responses are a way to understand the body both through and beyond sexual 
desire. In The Picture of Dorian Gray, one of the key ways in which affective responses 
mirror animal being, or bare life, is by suspending those aspects of subjectivity which 
have come to be most associated with humanness, including consciousness, self-
awareness, language, and temporality. These suspensions—these moments of heightened 
affect and decreased subjectivity—are what I am calling narrative syncope. Gaps in 
                                               
75 As I explain more fully in Chapter Two of this dissertation, bare life is a concept forwarded by Giorgio 
Agamben to describe life that can be taken without being either a sacrifice or murder, life that is not 
protected as a political subject. Bare life’s opposite is the sovereign, who decides on which lives count as 
political and which lives do not. For a reading of Frankenstein in which the creature represents the 
affective bare life that is both separated from and constituent of human life, see Margaret Linley. 
76 In exploring the British translation of Continental sexological theory, Heike Bauer points out the growing 
discursive classification of the queer body, writing that in “late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century 
sexological discourses…sexuality was, at least initially, largely considered a bodily phenomenon that 
sexologists tried to capture and explain on paper” (16). Bauer’s research follows the methodology of 
Michel Foucault, who, in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, points to the construction of individual 
identity based on the classification and discipline of the sexual body. Ivan Crozier examines British 
exposure to and writing about the physiology of sexuality, some which accepted and others which 
challenged the centrality of the body to homosexual desire. While both scholars note the significance of 
Wilde’s trials to the categorization of homosexuality, it is not necessarily the case that Wilde would have 
read this body of work before publishing The Picture of Dorian Gray. Nevertheless, these ideas were 
circulating at the time. Nils Clausson reads the novel as forwarding a hereditary, physiological view of 
homosexuality. See also Valerie Rohy on late-Victorian theories of acquisitive versus innate homosexuality 
represented in The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Bram Dijkstra and Linda Dowling on late-Victorian artistic 
practices that theorized homosexuality’s rejection of “a merely animal sexuality” (Dowling 115). 
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Dorian’s consciousness and self-awareness are mirrored by narrative techniques that 
undermine the subjective quality of the novel form and engage similar forms of 
suspension. I argue that The Picture of Dorian Gray is grappling with the representation 
of nonhuman aspects of the self and their implication in queer sexuality and non-
normative relationships through narrative syncope.  
The texts that I examine in this dissertation are forms of autobiography that 
demonstrate how the non-normative or queer body and nonhuman or animal self exists 
both at the heart of, and in resistance to, that autobiography. The Picture of Dorian Gray 
has been read as Wilde’s own autobiography, the story of a young man discovering his 
desire for other men—which is the way it was used at trial as evidence of his sexuality. 
However, when Georgia Johnston places The Picture of Dorian Gray in a history of 
queer autobiography, she suggests that Dorian’s portrait “evokes the autobiographical 
text,” while invoking and subverting “the idea that a person’s subjectivity can be read on 
the body” through phrenology (272-273). I want to expand this idea through affect’s 
challenge to both anthropocentrism and mimesis. In the novel, both the portrait and the 
text create Dorian’s autobiography by affirming and subverting the humanness of the self 
who narrates.77 Elana Gomel suggests that The Picture of Dorian Gray is 
autobiographical (although she does not use the term) through her focus on the novel’s 
representation of the impossibility of either singular identity or authorship. In agreement 
with Gomel, I turn to the aesthetics of self-representation through the Victorian science of 
physiological psychology in order to examine the nonhuman and nonsubjective aspects in 
the syncopation of Dorian’s autobiography.  
In the novels I explore in this dissertation, narrative syncope represents aesthetic 
subjectivity—autobiography—as embodied and animal, and in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray that syncopation is ultimately charged with the potential to order the world 
differently, as in a world where Dorian (a wealthy, white aristocrat) is not really different 
                                               
77 Johnston describes queer autobiography as a form of “meta-autobiography,” “a self-reflexive critique of 
ideologies that seemingly require heteronormative and masculine subjectivities and scripts as necessary in 
the representation of an autobiographical ‘I’” (269). Although it differs in focus and approach, Johnston’s 
concept of meta-autobiography aligns with the nonhuman aspects of the autobiographical subject that I 
explore, particularly through the subversion of politically normative subjectivity. 
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from a hare, or other animals, or other men, or women, or even a painting. As the novel 
explores the freedom of the nonsubjective body (or bare life), it also explores the tension 
that exists within this potential escape from political control. That is, even if the world 
could be reordered in aesthetic freedom, The Picture of Dorian Gray suggests that the 
body would continue to recognize its responsibilities to the demands of others. As 
Jacques Derrida has theorized, ethical action begins when we respond to the demands of 
others; however, as he also points out, it is impossible to be responsible to every other 
and impossible to reconcile all others’s demands.78 As we have seen with Middlemarch, 
responding to the demands of others may have uncomfortable or dangerous 
consequences, and what one person demands may be fatal to another or to the self. 
However, the impossibility of truly ethical action is what comprises the realm of ethics—
the impossible is what makes any ethical decision-making possible. The Picture of 
Dorian Gray suggests that the field of responsibility is determined by affect; in other 
words, Dorian is responsible to those others he has affected and those who have affected 
him. However, he is also responsible to the demands of his own body, the other within 
himself. Aesthetic representations of the responsive body include the bodies in the text, 
the changing portrait, and the narrative techniques of the novel. While these forms all 
challenge anthropocentric self-representation and reveal the nonhuman other of the 
subject and the body, they also reveal the impossible demands placed on Dorian to decide 
to whom and how he is responsible.  
Each instance of syncope in The Picture of Dorian Gray adds to our 
understanding of the personal, social, political, and ethical significance of bare life in and 
of aesthetic forms, revealing the way in which the aesthetic potential of the body, and the 
embodied potential of aesthetic forms, form the basis for political struggle between 
animal freedom and sovereign power. The first syncope of the novel reflects the way in 
                                               
78 Derrida outlines his ethics of responsibility in, for example, “Whom to Give to (Knowing Not to Know)” 
from The Gift of Death. Derek Attridge offers an exceptionally clear reading of this chapter in “The 
Impossibility of Ethics: Mount Moriah” from Reading and Responsibility. Cynthia Willett has called 
Derrida’s (and others) ethical philosophy “response ethics,” for which “the direct and compelling source of 
obligation is not rational principle, individual preference, or character virtue, but the overpowering draw of 
the vulnerable other” (10). Willett uses response as a ground for interspecies ethical philosophy, echoing 
Kelly Oliver and her use of the portmanteau “response-ability.” 
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which the affective body resists linguistic meaning-making, revealing both the 
responsiveness of the nonsubjective body to aesthetic form and the liveliness, or animacy, 
of the aesthetic form itself. The second syncope turns to the bare life of female and 
racialized bodies, to investigate the body’s freedom from and dependence on identity 
politics. The third example brings bare life into relation with its queer potential via the 
concepts of virtuality and wildness. My final section turns to the political struggle 
between freedom and responsibility, as the fourth example introduces the social and 
political vulnerability of bare life to violence, and my return to Dorian’s fainting spell 
and the hare hunt connect bare and vulnerable life more fully with the concepts of care 
and responsibility. In the conclusion, I turn briefly to the deployment of bare life in 
Wilde’s own life, in relation to his queer body on trial.  
3.1. Affect and the Nonhuman Narrative 
One of the novel’s most significant moments suspends narrative thought and 
action to concentrate instead on the body’s sensations. This scene of suspension, or 
syncope, illustrates the importance of affect, or the animal life of the body, to the 
possibility of subjective representation, or autobiography. This moment occurs after 
Dorian meets Lord Henry and immediately before the strange relationship between 
Dorian and his painting begins. As Dorian poses for Basil Hallward, the portrait’s creator, 
he and Lord Henry discuss the nature of influence on identity, with Lord Henry 
contrasting the baseness of influence with the nobility of self-development (20-21). The 
conversation is too rapid and overwhelming for Dorian, who demands that Lord Henry 
stop talking so that he can “try not to think” (21). Indeed, the ensuing text implies that it 
is not thinking that occurs next:  
For nearly ten minutes he stood there, motionless, with parted lips, and eyes 
strangely bright. He was dimly conscious that entirely fresh influences were 
at work within him. Yet they seemed to have come really from himself. The 
few words that Basil’s friend had said to him—words spoken by chance, no 
doubt, and with willful paradox in them—had touched some secret chord 
that had never been touched before, but that he felt was now vibrating and 
throbbing to curious pulses. (21)  
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Rather than consciously thinking of anything in particular, Dorian seems to have had his 
self-consciousness suspended for these ten minutes. What he is “dimly conscious” of, 
even then, is not ideas but rather the simple fact that he has been affected. 
This scene has often been cited in scholarly debates about the “relative influences 
of nature and nurture in the development of the individual” (Karschay 169), in which 
influence acts as a kind of energy or “almost imperceptible force” (Stern 757) with the 
power to shape Dorian’s queer identity and behaviour.79 In contrast to those scholars who 
have read influence as an agential force, scholars have argued that the concept of 
influence in the novel indicates Wilde’s interest in and interpretation of scientific theories 
of the relationship of the body to the mind or individual character.80 Notably for my 
argument, Hao Li in particular argues that this moment of influence represents Dorian’s 
embodied mind through a self-consciousness that internalizes his own affective responses 
(575). To be sure, the idea of influence shares qualities with contemporary theories of 
affect, as in Sara Ahmed’s model of affect that circulates and sticks to objects, or Teresa 
Brennan’s insistence that affect is transmitted from person to person. Massumi, too, 
writes that affect is autonomous, its own agent “to the degree to which it escapes 
confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is” (35). 
However, influence suggests notions of control, direction, or even replication, while 
affect is far more unpredictable and even chaotic.81 To say that someone has been affected 
                                               
79 For influence as the origin or recognition of Dorian’s queer identity, see Ed Cohen, Pamela Thurschwell, 
Nils Clausson, and Valerie Rohy’s work. For influence in relation to Wilde’s queer identity, see 
Thurschwell and Simon Stern. For the analysis of literary influence in Dorian Gray, see Andrew Elfenbein. 
Although she does not quote this section of the text directly, Audrey Jaffe also writes about the way this 
early scene demonstrates the social or collective nature of identity (171). 
80 Carolyn Lesjak approaches the representation of influence in Dorian Gray through the notions of 
proximity and affinity, joining scholars who have turned towards the discourses of Victorian science and 
psychology in Dorian Gray and Wildean theories of the relationship between the body and the mind. 
Michael Davis, for example, proposes that Wilde challenges materialist science by representing the mind as 
irreducible to the body, while Hao Li notes that the novel partially represents subjectivity through affect, 
embodied feeling that suspends the individual’s agency. Other scientific analyses of the novel include 
Heather Seagrott, who claims that while Wilde engages with the materialism of Victorian psychology in the 
novel, he ultimately rejects its rigidity in favour of the realm of aesthetics; Michael Wainwright, who 
argues that Wildean influence is an evolutionary theory of aesthetic heredity in the novel; and Elisha Cohn 
and Benjamin Morgan, who point out the aestheticization of the brain and the nervous system in the novel 
as both decorative (Cohn “One”) and animating (Morgan 256). 
81 Daniel Pick claims that Dorian Gray (along with Trilby and Dracula) draws from nineteenth century 
concerns over an “attenuated will” that is moved by external forces of “hypnotism and suggestibility” 
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is to use a phrase that may be evacuated of any other meaningful context aside from the 
fact of sensation or response itself. Rather than think of the significance of this moment 
in terms of the movement of influence or affect between bodies, or between the body and 
mind, I argue that influence is affective in that it creates a form of suspension or 
interruption that elevates the body over the mind.82 
Dorian’s response to Lord Henry sounds uncannily like Massumi’s incorporation 
of suspension in his description of affect (referred to here as intensity):  
Intensity would seem to be associated with nonlinear processes: resonation 
and feedback that momentarily suspend the linear progress of the narrative 
present from past to future. Intensity is qualifiable as an emotional state, 
and that state is static – temporal and narrative noise. It is a state of suspense, 
potentially of disruption. It is like a temporal sink, a hole in time, as we 
conceive of it and narrativize it. It is not exactly passivity, because it is filled 
with motion, vibratory motion, resonation. (Massumi 26) 
As though acting out the qualities of Massumi’s theory, Dorian is barely conscious of 
what is happening to him when Lord Henry speaks; we might conjecture that if he could 
describe his emotional state, it would be akin to Massumi’s affective white noise. 
Dorian’s response is also described as a suspension of time, as for a full ten minutes 
Dorian is absolutely still; yet, “still” does not adequately describe his state, as he is 
“vibrating and throbbing” with the pulses of his own body. Moreover, after this 
encounter, Dorian runs out into the garden and, as Lord Henry follows him, Dorian turns 
with “a look of fear in his eyes, such as people have when they are suddenly awakened” 
(23). The term “awakened” here may refer to both Dorian’s realization of his own queer 
desire and the coming to consciousness that ends a syncope or a period of suspension. 
Via syncope, Dorian is awakened to an affective body that is queer in its new desire and 
queer in its new behaviour—non-normative, other and strange, yet intimate and the same. 
                                               
(“Body” 31), while Rohy suggests that queer influence is a form of homosexual reproduction. Thurschwell 
too, addresses the influence of hypnotism in Dorian Gray, Trilby, and Dracula, aligning it with queer 
influence in Wilde’s novel. 
82 Li cites affect theorists Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth to claim that Dorian’s body registers 
“visceral forces” that are neither conscious nor can be described as full emotions, forces that can “suspend 
us” as we are struck by the body’s feelings (Gregg and Seigworth 1). However, she develops this line of 
thinking into a reading of Dorian’s suspension as humanistic self-consciousness that emphasizes self-
reflection. 
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Not just a prefiguration of contemporary affect theory, Dorian’s affective 
response to Lord Henry’s speech reflects aesthetic discourse at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Writers in the field of physiological aesthetics theorized that the purpose of 
aesthetic objects and forms, like painting and poetry, was to produce a response from the 
body of the viewer or reader.83 Moreover, this discourse emphasized nonhuman elements 
in its focus on the responsive body. Grant Allen, for example, takes the “organism” of the 
body as his primary unit of aesthetic analysis in Physiological Aesthetics (1877). Allen 
follows other physiological psychologists in granting that the nervous system is the basis 
for consciousness (2), figuring both human and animal bodies as “complicated and 
delicate machine[s]” (17). Outlining an evolutionary theory of aesthetic preference, Allen 
theorizes that the elements of aesthetic forms work on upper and lower classes of both 
humans and animals. For Allen, art—painting, sculpture, music, and poetry—that rises to 
the category of “aesthetic class” does so in part because it creates the “Maximum of 
Stimulation with the Minimum of Fatigue or Waste” for the senses, and because it can be 
received by the viewer, reader, or listener in disinterestedness (3, 39, 41). Where aesthetic 
appreciation is usually seen as a distinctly human trait, in Allen’s theory it is predicated 
on the not-necessarily-human organism’s pleasurable reception of colours, sounds, tastes, 
materials, and smells. 
Wilde was aware and appreciative of Allen’s body of work, and The Picture of 
Dorian Gray reflects enough of Allen’s theory of aesthetics to be fruitfully read 
alongside it.84 Wilde’s aesthetic theory in The Picture of Dorian Gray has been more 
widely understood to be in dialogue with Walter Pater, whose conclusion to Studies in the 
History of the Renaissance includes his now famous exhortation, “To burn always with 
this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. Failure is to form 
                                               
83 For a thorough account of the experimental practices of physiological aesthetics on the body in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Robert Brain. 
84 See Lindsey Wilhelm for a history of Wilde and Allen’s mutual respect and their engagement with one 
another’s work. For a reading of Allen’s Physiological Aesthetics as reflective of individual consumption 
and sexual desire at the end of the nineteenth century, see Regenia Gagnier (“Production”). For a reading of 
Allen’s participation in the production of authority for the discipline of physiological aesthetics, and 
Wilde’s subversion of disciplinary authority, see Ian Small. 
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habits” (210-211).85 As Heather Seagrott notes, Dorian certainly follows Pater’s demand 
to attend to “the sensuous experience of the object or moment” (752). Like Allen, Pater 
emphasizes the materialism of the body and the world around it in his aesthetic theory, 
tending “to suspend or sideline the human as a unit of analysis, foregrounding instead 
nerves or animals or parts of the body” (Morgan 124). Pater is therefore a relevant 
interlocutor in this chapter’s exploration of physiological aesthetics. However, The 
Picture of Dorian Gray also represents the kinds of sensorial responses that Allen was 
theorizing—perhaps even more so given Allen and Wilde’s mutual interest in the 
affectively receptive animal organism of the human subject.  
In the above scene between Dorian and Lord Henry, for example, the vibration 
that Dorian experiences, as much as it resembles Massumi’s contemporary theory of 
affect, also echoes Allen’s description of the transmission and reception of sound waves, 
which cause some bodies to be “set in motion” and vibrate (101). Referencing advances 
in physiological science, Allen’s is a highly materialist theory of how bodies receive 
sound as they are touched and moved by waves. As he explains this sound wave theory, 
Allen makes little reference to the individual human body, but rather uses the generic 
term “bodies,” which refers variously to a stone on the ground, a fist on a table, a tuning 
fork, a violin string, and, eventually, the inner ear (101-102). Reading Dorian’s “vibration 
and throbbing to curious pulses” in light of Allen’s theory suggests that Lord Henry’s 
words touch Dorian in a material way. Dorian is therefore not a subject realizing his 
identity but a receptive object, alike to the table struck by a fist or the violin string struck 
by a blow. In physiological aesthetics, the reception of beauty is an embodied event; 
Wilde’s novel represents this reception by making the body a part of the aesthetic event, 
as Dorian’s body becomes an object open to being touched by another body (or object or 
word). The aesthetic potential of the body lies both in the animality of its responses and 
in its potential to become equal in relation to other objects, to become an aesthetic object 
itself.  
                                               
85 For a selection of readings of Dorian Gray and Paterian aesthetic theory, see Seagrott, Davis, Cohn 
(“One”), John Paul Riquelme, Nils Clausson, Anna Budziak, and Caroline Levine. 
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As this scene marks Dorian’s introduction to the affects and desires of his body 
and the beginning of the relationship between Dorian and his picture, we can understand 
this moment as significant to Dorian’s autobiography, the writing of himself by both his 
personal narrative and his portrait. Here we see the way in which the animal body is 
implicated in the aesthetics of subjectivity. Autobiography usually connotes a linguistic 
act of composition, involving deliberately chosen and arranged memories. To a certain 
degree, this holds true for The Picture of Dorian Gray, of course, since the text is a 
linguistic construction that tells the story of Dorian himself. However, the moment of 
influence that initiates Dorian’s acknowledgement of his body, his relationship with his 
portrait, and the reader’s glimpse into his subjectivity, is underwritten by non-linguistic 
affect. The autobiographical moment is constituted by both the affective vibrations of 
Dorian’s body and the suspension of narrative time and not by any kind of conscious 
description, narrative progress, or even direct connection to Lord Henry’s words. In other 
words, autobiography here begins with syncope.  
Narrative syncope represents affect and therefore also represents what Massumi 
calls the “virtual” of the body, a concept that denotes the nonconsciousness of affective 
response and the potential of the body to be or react in any and every way. In describing 
the reaction of the affective body before the conscious mind can register it, Massumi 
writes that “[s]omething that happens too quickly to have happened, actually, is virtual” 
(30). He opposes this affective realm to actual lived relations, the possible and concrete 
ways that relations in the world can and do proceed following the affective event (35). As 
Dorian’s autobiography, the novel’s narrative reveals the virtual-actual border of the 
body through formal techniques of syncopation. In other words, the narrative reflects the 
embodied nonconsciousness of affect (virtual) as always occurring at the heart of 
conscious autobiography (actual).86 The virtual aspects of The Picture of Dorian Gray 
include these elements because they are syncopated; that is, they represent a gap, or an 
attempt to bridge a gap, in subjectivity. The form of the novel’s narrative reflects the 
                                               
86 As I mention in Chapter Two, my analysis of narrative techniques that reveal the virtual realm of affect 
draws from Ridvan Askin’s theory that formal aspects of contemporary novels represent openings into the 
virtual of the narrative. Askin’s narrative glimpses of the virtual include techniques that range from 
“inconsistent narrative voices to the mixing of incongruent narrative levels, from the projection of 
impossible perspectives to the interweaving of incompossible storylines (22).” 
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nonsubjective elements that make Dorian’s autobiography possible. Scholars have 
already noted in The Picture of Dorian Gray what Rohy calls “the perversion of 
novelistic form” (283), particularly in its temporality, including John-Paul Riquelme’s 
and Kevin Ohi’s reflections on its lack of linear progress and Caroline Levine’s claim 
that the novel reveals that the realist form is about nothing but temporality itself.87 One 
nonsubjective aspect of syncope is arrhythmic temporality. As Massumi theorizes the 
relationship between affect, narrative, and language, he formulates a possible relationship 
between affect and autobiography by describing the a-temporal gap that affect creates in 
narrative: affect is unrelated to narrative time, so when we narrate affect, we do so as a 
“temporal sink, a hole in time.” In the quotation about affective intensity above, Massumi 
is referring to forms of descriptive narrative, but also, it seems, to self-narration, the 
thinking and articulating of what we feel. In The Picture of Dorian Gray, the syncopated 
narrative represents and reflects these affective, nonsubjective suspensions by writing 
Dorian’s autobiography as gaps in narration: as temporal suspensions and as suspensions 
of meaning.   
As the text depicts Dorian’s affective state in the scene of his suspension, it 
emphasizes the power of language as an aesthetic form rather than as an inherently 
meaningful mode of communication. Following the description of Dorian’s ten-minute 
suspension, the text reflects on other analogously influential moments: 
Music had stirred him like that…But music was not articulate. It was not a 
new world, but rather another chaos, that it created in us. Words! Mere 
Words! How terrible they were! How clear, and vivid, and cruel! One could 
not escape from them. And yet what a subtle magic there was in them! They 
seemed to be able to give a plastic form to formless things, and to have a 
music of their own as sweet as that of viol or of lute. Mere words! Was there 
anything so real as words? (22) 
Here, language both does and does not hold an exceptional relationship to Dorian’s 
subjectivity. While words seem to be special in their ability to create “a new world,” their 
power to move also makes them like music. Even as the text contrasts music to 
                                               
87 Michael Gillespie identifies Dorian Gray as postmodern in his claim that the novel lacks any stable 
ideological framework. 
77 
articulation, there is nothing particularly articulate about Dorian’s nascent understanding 
of himself, of “things in his boyhood” that “he understood…now” (22). Instead, words 
are more like form, and in fact, more like music, than they are like articulation. Ending 
the declaration about the aesthetics of language is the emphatic “Mere words!”, asserting 
the way speech turns away from the subjectivity that language ought to grant. Even as the 
text insists that language does something more than music, it also reduces language to 
words, translates the words as music, and ultimately presents Dorian as lacking linguistic 
agency over what it is that he now understands. Moments later, the narrative reaffirms 
that it is the literal tenor of Lord Henry’s words that moves Dorian, while simultaneously 
recognizing that there is nothing particularly human about language itself: “There was 
something in his low languid voice that was absolutely fascinating. His cool, white, 
flowerlike hands, even, had a curious charm. They moved, as he spoke, like music, and 
seemed to have a language of their own” (23). Lord Henry’s body here is an aesthetic 
object in its power to produce a response, emphasizing that language is simply another 
kind of aesthetic form. 
In The Picture of Dorian Gray, language produces affective responses, thereby 
creating forms of syncope rather than forms of meaning. Language is aestheticized in this 
scene such that it works on the animal or nonhuman level of Dorian’s body, at the level 
of affective responsiveness that is nonsubjective, non-linguistic, and shared with animal 
life. Allen’s physiological aesthetics make poetry and other forms of language arts—what 
he calls narrative poetry—important for the sensory responsiveness they elicit, and he 
admires narrative poetry for a representational function akin to painting. Allen does not 
necessarily privilege mimesis (mimicry or exact representation) or the genre of realism 
over any other narrative form, as realism is not necessary to raise the story to the level of 
the aesthetic class. It does not matter in terms of Allen’s theory whether Dorian behaves 
believably or whether a portrait actually could change its appearance. Rather, the 
importance of language for Allen is that the narrative evokes a pleasurable sensorial 
response. He therefore places a great amount of weight on the ability of language to 
produce particular kinds of feelings, as in, for example, his seeming certainty that a lily of 
the valley would produce a positive, pleasurable response (247-248). Yet, Allen also 
leaves space for uncertainty and the unpredictability of individual affect—or, understood 
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another way, for the slippery différance of language, the possibility that words never refer 
to just one thing: words are “aesthetically gratifying or the opposite in virtue of the 
pleasant or unpleasant sensations, the dignified or undignified emotions, memories of 
which are aroused in connexion with the objects they symbolize” (247-248). Further, 
Allen describes the effect of narrative poetry as “vague” and “massive” (rather than 
“acute”) due to its multiplicity of effects (257). It is the pleasurable response of the body 
that aestheticizes language, and not, for Allen, any particular strategy of organization or 
plot.88  
The beginning of Dorian’s narrative, his autobiography, therefore aligns in many 
ways with Allen’s suggestion in Physiological Aesthetics that subjectivity and narrative 
both rely on affect. As I mention in Chapter Two, fictional autobiographies in the mid-
Victorian period tended to follow a linear sequence of events to create a meaningful life 
story.89 In other words, they rely on representative elements of human subjectivity, like 
memory, self-reflection or self-consciousness, and temporality. Yet, Dorian’s 
autobiography is predicated on his body as an organism, on the nonsubjective aspects of 
his life. This includes not only the assertion of the affective power of “mere words,” but 
also the “chance” or careless manner with which Lord Henry speaks them, and the fact 
that their form—paradox—is a contradiction, an inability to convey transparent meaning. 
It is the body and its affective responses that underwrite the possibility of autobiography. 
Dorian’s embodied autobiography also includes the syncopation of linearity or 
progress. The moment when Dorian’s autobiography begins is not a singular moment, but 
an irrhythmically-paced episode that focuses on Lord Henry’s words and the affective 
response of Dorian’s body. While this includes the representation of syncope via 
Dorian’s body, narrative time, too, is syncopated, moving from Lord Henry’s lengthy 
soliloquys, to the quick bound over uneventful time captured by the “ten minutes” or 
“about a quarter of an hour” during which Basil paints Dorian (26), to a minute focus on 
Dorian’s body. For example, after Lord Henry delivers a long and “strange panegyric on 
                                               
88 For Allen, plot is simply one aspect of narrative poetry, to be added onto sensually pleasurable 
representation (211-213). 
89 See, for example, Nicholas Dames’s Amnesiac Selves. 
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youth” (27), the narrative suddenly shifts its pace to pay attention to the materiality of the 
world in which Dorian’s body exists: 
Dorian Gray listened, open-eyed and wondering. The spray of lilac fell from 
his hand upon the gravel. A furry bee came and buzzed round it for a 
moment. Then it began to scramble all over the oval stellated globe of the 
tiny blossoms. He watched it with that strange interest in trivial things that 
we try to develop when things of high import make us afraid, or when we 
are stirred by some new emotion for which we cannot find expression, or 
when some thought that terrifies us lays sudden siege to the brain and calls 
on us to yield. After a time the bee flew away. He saw it creeping into the 
stained trumpet of a Tyrian convolvulus. The flower seemed to quiver, and 
then swayed gently to and fro. (25) 
An attention to objects supplements the linguistic expression of emotion, as the narrative 
slows in reflection of Dorian’s own besieged consciousness and focuses on the minutiae 
of bee movement and flower sway, concentrating on the sensuous in the furriness of the 
bee, the stellation of the blossoms, the quivering of the flower, and the journey of the 
lilacs from hand to gravel.  
Dorian’s autobiography reflects the nonhuman, animal, or nonsubjective aspects 
of the human by syncopating human time, while also disrupting and challenging 
language’s importance in the narrative. That is, autobiography here does not reveal a 
subjective “who” but rather an embodied “what” and “how,” by echoing Dorian’s 
response to Lord Henry and creating meaning through affective responses rather than 
language. For example, if this is a moment of queer revelation for Dorian, as the young 
man realizes he is attracted to other men and, perhaps, always has been, this revelation is 
only made clear through inference and suggestion, through the quivering, vibrating, 
falling bodies and objects in the text. Before Basil is finished painting, Dorian wonders 
over the possibility of a lengthy friendship with Lord Henry as the older man delivers a 
clever repartee on the meaninglessness of the word “always”: “The only difference 
between a caprice and a life-long passion is that the caprice lasts a little longer” (26). 
When Dorian replies, “In that case, let our friendship be a caprice,” his language opens 
itself to a queer reading through the bodies of the two men, as Dorian immediately 
“flush[es] at his own boldness,” and Lord Henry “flung himself in a large wicker arm-
chair, and watched him” (26). The body is not a guarantor of meaning here, but neither is 
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language. Instead, meaning is inferred from language and the body equally and in 
concert. 
Further, the narrative itself holds a confusing position in relation to Dorian’s 
interiority, as the narrator is at times an objective observer of the scene and at other times 
performs a privileged speech that seems to be Dorian’s (or Lord Henry’s or Basil’s). 
Often, the narrative shifts quickly between biographer and autobiographer within a 
discrete paragraph. Take, for example, Lord Henry’s interest in Dorian’s suspended state 
of dim consciousness: 
With his subtle smile, Lord Henry watched him. He knew the precise 
psychological moment when to say nothing. He felt intensely interested. He 
was amazed at the sudden impression that his words had produced, and, 
remembering a book that he had read when he was sixteen, a book which 
had revealed to him much that he had not known before, he wondered 
whether Dorian Gray was passing through a similar experience. He had 
merely shot an arrow into the air. Had it hit the mark? How fascinating the 
lad was! (22) 
The narrative voice here moves from disembodied, to partially embodied, to fully 
embodied. It first watches and notices Lord Henry’s “subtle smile” and his observant 
behaviour; then exhibits partial knowledge of Lord Henry’s inner state: “He felt intensely 
interested. He was amazed…”; then moves to seemingly reporting Lord Henry’s 
thoughts: “Had it hit the mark? How fascinating the lad was!” Spinks notes that the shift 
from objective narration to representation of a character’s interiority—often called free 
indirect speech or discourse—is “[o]ne of the principle modes in which literary style can 
reproduce…affect” (37).90 For Spinks, free indirect discourse represents affect as a zone 
of intersubjectivity, as it “breaks with the conventional pattern of linguistic representation 
which marks a division between two independent subjects of enunciation, one of which 
contextualizes the other” (37). Free indirect discourse makes narrative subjectivity 
uncertain, suggesting that narrative voice is indeterminately personal or impersonal, 
subjective or objective, self or other. 
                                               
90 See Stephen Arata for a reading of free indirect discourse in Marius the Epicurean as an impersonal 
narrative technique that reveals that the novel’s characters are not persons but “just arrangements of words” 
(141).  
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The same pattern can be observed in the passage above regarding the power of 
words, as the narrative voice shifts from knowing Dorian’s thoughts to seemingly 
speaking them: “Music had stirred him like that…But music was not articulate…Words! 
Mere Words! How terrible they were!” (22). Or as Dorian reflects on what Lord Henry 
has made him understand about himself, in the passage connected to Dorian’s interest in 
Lord Henry’s “languid voice” and his expressive hands, “Dorian Gray frowned and 
turned his head away”: 
He could not help liking the tall, graceful young man who was standing by 
him. His romantic, olive-coloured face and worn expression interested 
him…Why had it been left for a stranger to reveal him to himself?...And, 
yet, what was there to be afraid of? He was not a schoolboy or a girl. It was 
absurd to be frightened. (23) 
There are multiple shifts here in narrative perspective: observer of Dorian’s frown, 
knower of Dorian’s feelings of affection and interest, and then speaker of Dorian’s self-
interrogation. Beyond the multiplicity of this narration, it seems nearly impossible to 
decide who speaks the line, “Why had it been left for a stranger to reveal him to 
himself?” While this could be a partially omniscient narrator who wonders this about 
Dorian, it seems that it is Dorian that poses the following question to himself, “what was 
there to be afraid of?” Moreover, if this is a first-person interjection, if it is a 
representation of Dorian’s subjectivity and an explicit autobiographical reflection, it is 
one that does not know itself, represented by the form of a question in a syncope of self-
consciousness.91  
3.2. Bare Life and Affective Sovereignty 
As the autobiographical text reflects the syncopation of the affected body, so does 
Dorian’s portrait. At first, Basil believes his painting of the beautiful Dorian is his own 
autobiography, a revelation of his feelings and desire. Basil laments, “An artist should 
create beautiful things, but should put nothing of his own life into them. We live in an 
age when men treat art as if it were meant to be a form of autobiography. We have lost 
                                               
91 See Dames’ “1825-1880: The Network of Nerves” for an overview of the way physiological psychology 
was represented in the Victorian novel through characters’ lack of self-knowledge. 
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the abstract sense of beauty” (14). As it turns out, the portrait ends up being Dorian’s 
autobiography as it “held the secret of his life, and told his story” (89). In fact, 
autobiography and biography collapse in the portrait, as they do in the narrative, because 
while Dorian authors the portrait’s change through his behaviour, he is unconscious of it; 
at the same time, the portrait is a kind of author, telling Dorian his story. The portrait, like 
the narrative, marks the relationship between the virtual—or affect—of Dorian’s body 
and the actual events that emerge from affective encounters. Dorian’s relationships with 
others, when he has touched or affected other bodies in the world, appear on his picture 
because they are based on feeling and on those affective encounters that produce 
significant and unpredictable actual events. In other words, the portrait makes visible the 
fact that Dorian’s social relationships (his personal relationships) and his political 
relationships (his place in the hierarchy of rights, freedoms, and protections) are based in 
the body and in what Victorians identified as the animal life of the human. 
The text suggests the possibility that the division between the character and the 
picture of Dorian Gray is one of body and soul, as in the text’s attention to Dorian’s 
embodied beauty and Dorian’s own insistence that the picture “would reveal to him his 
own soul” (103). However, the novel’s body-soul dichotomy has already been 
complicated and challenged by scholars like William Cohen, Anna Budziak, and 
Benjamin Morgan, who point out that the picture represents either the soul’s 
embodiedness (Cohen) or the body’s soulfulness or “enmindedness” (Budziak and 
Morgan).92 Similarly, Amit Rai claims that Dorian’s portrait marks the affective 
processes of bodies, which are ever-changing in relation to time and the technologies they 
encounter every day. For Rai, the picture marks the body’s place in the modern 
biopolitical regime, the form of power that disciplines, values, and legislates on the 
grounds of biological life itself, while the sexualized body represents “the eternal present 
of the sensual animal” (59). Rai’s argument is brief and leads to a call for modern 
criticism to embrace a similar position of becoming. However, his insight deserves more 
rigorous attention with regard to the way in which the affective body and its 
                                               
92 Caroline Levine and Amit Rai both point out that the picture bears the marks not only of Dorian’s 
interiority but also of time itself, an essential element of bodily experience. 
83 
representation through the portrait determine the aesthetic form and ethical potential of 
the novel.  
As it changes, the portrait displays the ways in which the bare life of Dorian’s 
body is implicated in social and political aspects of life: in relations with others, in 
community, and under the law. Rai sees the painted representation of Dorian in many of 
the same ways that I do, as representing animal otherness and potential (virtual) affective 
connection, but where he characterizes this representation as abjectly biopolitical and 
monstrously excessive (59-60), I see ethical potential in the representation of affective 
otherness and the attendant responsibility demanded by those others.93 Roberto Esposito, 
too, has argued that The Picture of Dorian Gray (along with Dracula) allegorizes the 
nineteenth-century threat of degeneration and represents “the autoimmunitary dream of 
man” as the destruction of death itself (125-126).94 The category of the degenerate was 
capacious and included immoral, unnatural, and hysterical behaviour, charges of which 
were leveled at aesthetes broadly and Wilde in particular by degeneration theorist Max 
Nordau in 1895. The degenerate was also seen to be potentially afflicted by a weakness 
of will that made him or her more easily influenced and susceptible to what Christopher 
Forth has called moral contagion. However, despite degeneration’s possible relevance to 
The Picture of Dorian Gray’s attention to influence (and to the novels in this dissertation 
more generally in their deployment of mesmerism, hypnotism, and hysteria), the animal 
or bare life of Dorian’s affective body signals demand and responsibility rather than sin 
and failure.  
As I explain in Chapter Two, Nigel Thrift connects the idea of bare life with 
affect through the “half-second delay” between a body’s being affected and the subject’s 
conscious awareness of it. The delay or gap between the body’s reaction and the subject’s 
                                               
93 Rai sees the portrait as representing the abjectly biopolitical body, the “degraded monster” that is a “body 
satisfying its hunger for sensation without any regard to the future” (59). However, he also believes it 
represents the potential of “new contagious connectivities in excess of the body’s functional presence,” and 
aligns this excessive and monstrous body with “racialized, sexualized, and animalized others” (60).  
94 Scholars like Nils Clausson, Stephen Karschay, and Daniel Pick (Degeneration) have noted the 
connection of Dorian’s changing portrait with behaviours that many Victorians worried indicated a 
devolution of society towards a more animal nature. 
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realization represents the virtual realm of the body (67).95 Thrift argues that affective bare 
life is subject to new forms of what he calls “microbiopolitics” (67), disciplinary 
procedures meant to act on the affective level of the body. The first signs of a biopolitical 
struggle between social and political freedom based in the bare life of the affective body 
appear on Dorian’s portrait when he both virtually and discursively disposes of the bare 
life of Sibyl Vane. As an actress, Sybil is perceived by Dorian as an aesthetic object and 
not as a subject, as her power is that of an aesthetic form that provokes an affective 
response: her beauty moves Dorian to tears, and her voice, full of “tremulous ecstasy,” 
“stirs” him (50-51); in other words, she represents the affective virtual. Sybil does not 
have an actual, unchanging identity in relation to Dorian, but rather a virtual one, with all 
the potential to be anything (and to be anything for Dorian). This virtual identity is tied to 
its embodied forms, as Sibyl might be as aesthetically moving as the Shakespearean 
heroines Rosalind or Imogen, or as a dead body in a tomb or a “pretty boy” in the forest, 
or as the victim of madness or of murder (51). Moreover, as an actress Sybil represents 
affect and aesthetics as syncopated, since during her performances she exists out of time, 
unlike the “ordinary women” who are “limited to their century” (51).  
As Dorian falls in love with Sybil, it becomes clear that he is in love with her as 
an aesthetic object in two ways: firstly, that she is capable of eliciting an affective 
response, and secondly, that she is not a subject. What Dorian loves about Sybil as bare 
life is the way in which she affects him and he is uninterested in considering the reverse. 
Moreover, Dorian is adamant that as bare life, Sybil is not worthy of biography: “The 
Jew wanted to tell me her history,” he complains of the theatre manager, “but I said it did 
not interest me” (53). Dorian’s courtship is characterized by a desire to keep his 
relationship with Sybil suspended between the virtual and the actual. The importance of 
Sybil’s “bareness” or virtuality becomes apparent during an exchange between Lord 
Henry and Dorian, when the former asks the latter what his “actual relations [are] with 
Sibyl Vane” (51). When Dorian replies with a burst of feeling and “flushed cheeks” that 
“Sibyl Vane is sacred!”, Lord Henry insists that “[i]t is only the sacred things that are 
                                               
95 Thrift does not use the term virtual, but he is referring here to the same experiment from which Massumi 
theorizes that affect is virtual and a-temporal, concluding that the subjects are affected before they were 
consciously aware of it. 
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worth touching” (52). Dorian’s love and Lord Henry’s claim lay out the primary political 
and ethical difficulty of the novel, in that they gesture to both the significance of who is 
allowed to be a subject (politics) and how subjects and non-subjects should be treated 
(ethics). We can connect Dorian’s reference to Sybil as sacred with Giorgio Agamben’s 
terminology for those humans who are bare life as “homo sacer.” The definition of sacer, 
or sacred, in Agamben is not the same as religious or spiritual sacredness but rather refers 
to the way in which bare life is unprotected by either human or divine law (Sudlow 42-
43). Sybil is sacred in that she is not a political subject, and because her existence is not-
actual—purely feeling, bare life—that makes her sacred and worth “touching” for the 
aesthete. Yet, as sacredness reduces Sybil to a thing and not a subject, the act of touching 
is depoliticized and therefore does not have to be given as much care or attention (if any 
at all), as it would if it were the act of touching another subject.96  
Dorian and Sybil do get engaged, as Lord Henry predicts they will, but Dorian 
quickly breaks the engagement because when Sibyl leaves the realm of the virtual for the 
actual—from actor-as-affect to wife-as-subject—she ceases to function aesthetically. 
Becoming a bad actor, Sybil “simply produce[s] no effect,” as Dorian puts it (85). When 
he returns home after declaring he no longer loves her, Dorian finds the picture changed 
for the first time, with a new “touch of cruelty in the mouth” (88). He connects the 
change in the portrait with his “sin” (89) largely by the way he knows he has made Sybil 
feel, recognizing his “callousness” and thinking of her “lying at his feet and sobbing like 
a little child” (88). However, if Dorian’s sin is having affected Sybil badly, or having 
ignored the fact that he would affect her, it is not really a sin in the traditional sense of 
breaking a moral rule. While Sybil’s demand, as an other who deserves a response, is for 
Dorian to follow through with his marriage proposal, Dorian hears a call from a different 
other—the other of his own affective body. It is impossible for Dorian to answer both 
demands, and it may be no better a fate for Sybil (or Dorian) if Dorian marries her after 
all. Moreover, while it may be an impossible demand not to affect anyone badly, it is also 
impossible to know in advance how one’s behaviour, speech, or feeling will affect 
another. This sense of the unpredictably of affective encounters is frequently emphasized 
                                               
96 I discuss the politics and ethics of touch more thoroughly in my chapter on Dracula. 
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in affect theory through Spinoza’s axiom, “no one has yet determined what the body can 
do” (155). The portrait registers affect’s impossible demands and their uncertain and 
embodied outcomes. 
Therefore, the portrait does not represent the spiritual or supernatural of the soul, 
but rather makes visible what would otherwise be the invisible world of affective 
relations—the way in which bodies and objects affect and solicit other bodies and 
objects. Dorian’s picture shows him that he affects others without providing any actual 
detail or transparent system of signification. It offers no ready answers or moral 
guidelines, but rather prompts both the reader and Dorian to ask whether the aesthete has 
responded to the demands of those bodies and objects he has affected and how he should 
continue to behave towards them. My argument for the portrait’s representation of 
physiological aesthetics differs from Morgan’s suggestion that the portrait offers a figure 
for the “mysterious principle by which consciousness emerges from inanimate matter” 
(257). Yet Morgan and I agree in our claims that the portrait’s logic is not supernatural or 
spiritual but materialist. While Dorian himself describes the portrait as recording his 
“sins,” this language is most often interpreted by scholars to mean sins of unbecoming 
indulgence or illegal activity during the Victorian era, including homosexual acts and 
drug use.97 That is, the language of sin is most often read already as a reference to the 
body. Reading the portrait as representing the affective, bare life of the body sheds new 
light on the way in which Dorian’s life story is made up by the nonsubjective or animal 
self at the heart of the social and political self. The portrait marks the queer body’s 
struggle to both escape from and be beholden to the demands of others. 
As an autobiography of the animal life of Dorian’s body, the portrait represents 
the border between the virtual and the actual by depicting only what lies underneath the 
conscious narrative: someone has been affected. We can connect the portrait’s 
representation of affect to the Victorian novel’s representations of character interiority 
through physiology (Dames, “Network”). I have already noted that Nicholas Dames uses 
twenty-first-century cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio to explain how Victorian novels 
                                               
97 See Pick (Degeneration) and Rohy, for example. 
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represent their characters through their “core consciousness,” or an organism’s sense of 
its own basic functioning, rather than as autobiographical selves represented by a unique 
set of individually distinct memories and habits (“Network” 218-219). However, The 
Picture of Dorian Gray goes one step further than this. In Descartes’ Error, Damasio 
puts forward a minimal version of subjectivity, the idea of a “metaself,” that occurs when 
that self comes into contact with another object. Damasio theorizes that “subjectivity 
emerges…when the brain is producing not just images of an object, not just images of 
organism responses to an object, but a third kind of image, that of an organism in the act 
of perceiving and responding to an object” (243). Damasio’s version of basic subjectivity 
is visual, not verbal, deploying the language of images. Further, he declares that he sees 
“no reason why animals without language would not make such narratives” (243). The 
Picture of Dorian Gray uncannily represents a similar version of subjectivity through the 
portrait and, in its non-verbal nature, captures the possibility of animal subjectivity in its 
images of sensorial responses. In terms of Damasio’s neural theory, the picture is an 
autobiography of Dorian’s self in as much as it as an autobiography of the metaself, a 
representation that traverses the boundary between human and animal. 
In the portrait, Dorian recognizes his affective connection to Sybil, and therefore 
her demand, and vows to reconcile with her and to never sin again. Too late, he finds, 
when Lord Henry tells him the next day that Sibyl has tragically committed suicide. As 
Dorian tries to decide how he feels about his responsibility in her death, he seems at first 
to cast himself as entirely responsible, declaring that he had “murdered [Sibyl] as surely 
as if I had cut her little throat with a knife” (Wilde 96). Carolyn Lesjak points out that the 
mutual influence of bodies and objects over each other expresses “the wonder of atoms 
for Wilde: the recognition that our bodies are simultaneously ours and others’” (18). 
Dorian’s concern over the way in which he has affected Sybil is the ethical extension of 
that recognition. Responsibility in this case has its beginning and end in affect: Dorian 
has affected Sibyl, and the actual relations that emerge from that virtual intensity are out 
of his control, even while he is implicated in them. Feeling is both political and ethical 
for Dorian in the sense that feeling makes him responsible for Sybil and therefore makes 
Sybil’s life count.  
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In The Gift of Death, Derrida offers a reflection on the ethical demand we receive 
from others and to which we must respond, in order to be responsible or to practice 
ethical responsibility. He draws on Søren Kierkegaard’s reading of the biblical story of 
God’s demand that Abraham sacrifice his son Isaac, and Abraham’s willingness to fulfill 
this request. For Derrida, this story exemplifies the impossibility of ethics as absolute 
responsibility towards others. Abraham is caught between two others in this story—God, 
the absolute Other, and Isaac, his son, a particular other—and he must behave unethically 
towards one in order to be responsible to the other. Derrida suggests that this is the 
impossibility of all behaviour towards others: we can only choose to be responsible to 
some others in their absolute singularity and respond to their particular demands if we 
ignore our possible responsibilities to all others. Of course, Dorian’s predicament with 
Sybil and his feelings of guilt do not map precisely onto the religious mythology of 
Abraham and Isaac, but Derrida’s articulation of ethics as an impossible responsibility to 
every other and not a calculable moral rule can help us to understand both the portrait and 
the body’s affective function, as it reminds Dorian of this responsibility. That is, Dorian 
should not marry Sybil because it is the right or moral or religious thing to do, but Dorian 
has a responsibility towards her because he has affected her. We might understand 
Dorian’s decision to break their engagement not as irresponsible, but as sacrificial 
(similar to, at the risk of sounding blasphemous, Abraham’s), in that Dorian must 
sacrifice Sybil to the otherness of his own body and queer desire.  
Regardless, Dorian recognizes that he is responsible to Sybil somehow, and more 
particularly, to Sybil’s feeling, and he struggles to acknowledge that responsibility 
through the correct register of his own feeling. He laments to Lord Henry, trying to 
decide who is to blame for Sybil’s death: “why is it that I cannot feel this tragedy as 
much as I want to?” (97). Lord Henry, described by the text as “irresponsible” himself 
(42), urges Dorian not to feel responsible through his grief (the ethical) (97), nor to 
practice that responsibility by attending the inquest into Sybil’s death (the political) (95). 
Discussing Derrida’s deconstructive ethics and the impossibility of absolute 
responsibility towards all others, Derek Attridge describes the difference between 
deconstructive ethics and politics as simply the move “from the realm of the impossible 
to the possible” (65). Lord Henry, however, dismisses the relationship of feeling to either 
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the ethical or the political. He reduces Sibyl to the status of bare life, an object to produce 
sensation aesthetically but one that is not properly or politically human: “you must think 
of that lonely death in the tawdry dressing-room,” he tells Dorian, “simply as a strange 
lurid fragment from some Jacobean tragedy, as a wonderful scene from Webster, or Ford, 
or Cyril Tourneur. The girl never really lived, and so she has never really died” (Wilde 
100). Lord Henry and Dorian decide that Sibyl will remain in the realm of the aesthetic 
and the affective, and that this realm is neither ethical nor political. Her life does not 
count, politically—she never really lived—and so her life is not grievable. Lord Henry 
tells Dorian, “…don’t waste your tears over Sybil Vane. She was less real than they [the 
characters she plays] are” (100). For Lord Henry, it seems, there is one humanist political 
order and he can decide who is outside of it.  
In doing so, Lord Henry suggests that grief is a political feeling by insisting that it 
properly belongs to subject-to-subject relationships and defining Sybil as an object. 
While Sybil is a subject, and exerts agency by taking her own life, that subjecthood need 
not define responsibility. Writing about Derrida’s own examples of the infinite types of 
responsibility, Attridge explains that “responsibility, if it is not mere calculation, can 
never be anything other than absolute, whether it is responsibility to God, to humans, to 
cats or to languages” (65). If affect registers the demands of any and all others, it offers 
the possibility of ethics and politics that cross boundaries like self-other, subject-object, 
male-female, human-animal. 
Judith Butler has written about grief as a political feeling, one in which the ability 
to mourn marks the political subjectivity and mutual vulnerability of the subject of grief 
and the subject who grieves. Dorian and Lord Henry both seem to recognize that grief for 
Sybil would constitute Dorian’s affective vulnerability and his responsibility. For Butler, 
grief functions similarly as it “contains the possibility of apprehending a mode of 
dispossession that is fundamental to who I am” (28). While Butler does not reject the idea 
of autonomy, she explains that “from the start and by virtue of being a bodily being, 
already given over, beyond ourselves, [we are] implicated in lives that are not our own” 
(28). Reading Butler alongside Derrida reveals the significance of the body in our 
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responsibility to own another, and grief as an expression of that responsibility.98 
Moreover, Butler writes that the self is “undone” by intimacy and grief, which challenges 
the very possibility of autobiography:  
What grief displays, in contrast, is the thrall in which our relations with 
others hold us, in ways that we cannot always recount or explain, in ways 
that often interrupt the self-conscious account of ourselves we might try to 
provide, in ways that challenge the very notion of ourselves as autonomous 
and in control. (23, my emphasis). 
There exists then an ethical potential for aesthetic feeling—affective response—to undo 
subjective selfhood because it expresses the potential of being connected to, and therefore 
responsible to, any variety of bodies and objects.  
Dorian attempts to refuse responsibility and grief in order to control his feelings 
and his narrative. If affect—the virtual realm of the body—is bare life, Dorian and Lord 
Henry attempt to occupy the opposite political position known as sovereignty. The 
sovereign is defined by Agamben as one who has the power to decide the rules regarding 
whose life counts (Dorian’s) and whose bare life does not (Sybil’s). The sovereign 
creates the political order, but also exists outside of it. Dorian’s behaviour represents 
political sovereignty in the sense that he desires to exist outside of the political order, 
without responsibility for any aspect of Sybil’s life or death. As in Agamben’s thinking, 
sovereignty and bare life are not just binary opposites—sovereignty relies on bare life. 
Bare life is the other that ensures and constitutes sovereignty. While Dorian attempts to 
exempt himself from responsibility through the aesthetic freedom of bare life, the portrait 
insists that responsibility is a part of bare life. 
Therefore, part of Dorian’s sovereignty includes a freedom from linear or 
narrative temporality, a feature of the virtual and of bare life. When Basil finds that 
Dorian has recovered from the news of Sibyl’s death so quickly, he is horrified, and his 
sympathy is directed towards the very bareness of her body: “You went to the Opera 
                                               
98 In a slightly different way, Lesjak also reads Butler alongside Wilde to open up the question of gender 
with the question of ontology: “to show how deeply interested [Wilde] is in the question of what is 
‘livable,’ using the matter of life itself within scientific discourse as the basis for his immanent critique of 
‘the real’ and ‘the unreal’ and the ‘possible’ that might emerge out of their changed and charged relations” 
(21). 
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while Sibyl Vane was lying dead in some sordid lodging?...Why, man, there are horrors 
in store for that little white body of hers!” (105). Basil insists that Dorian’s responsibility 
to Sybil is tied to her body, now to be violently subjected to an autopsy, and he narrates 
this responsibility temporally through Sibyl’s body in both a past and a future of Dorian’s 
possible grief (in a sordid lodging, at a morgue). Dorian, however, refuses this 
temporality, replying:  
What has the actual lapse of time got to do with it? It is only shallow people 
who require years to get rid of an emotion. A man who is master of himself 
can end a sorrow as easily as he can invent a pleasure. I don’t want to be at 
the mercy of my emotions. I want to use them, to enjoy them, and to 
dominate them. (105)  
Through Sibyl’s death and the first marking of the picture, the affective body structures 
Dorian’s being not as a subject that can create a temporal narrative out of an affective 
response, but rather as a sovereign whose power is based on the ability to manage both 
the feelings (bare life) of his body and the a-temporal suspension of affect itself. 
The history of emotion suggests that men are naturally more capable of 
controlling their feelings than women, who are subject to them. Both Dorian and Lord 
Henry equate the female bodies of the text with biological life and emotion. At first, Lord 
Henry notes that women with “straw-coloured hair” are “so sentimental” (47) connecting 
the physiological and psychological. Similarly, when Sybil is near Dorian, she is 
“dominated” by “an ecstasy of happiness” (84). In trying to absolve himself of his 
responsibility for hurting Sybil, Dorian repeats Lord Henry’s claim that “women were 
better suited to bear sorrow than men” because “[t]hey lived on their emotions” (89), and 
in further attempting to assuage Dorian of his guilt over Sybil’s jilting, Lord Henry 
declares women to be primitive, slaves who “appreciate cruelty” and “love being 
dominated” (100). While these examples are certainly a part of a larger tradition that 
equates women with emotion and weakness, The Picture of Dorian Gray attaches this 
sensitivity to the body by marrying the biological with the aesthetic—the affective and 
the affecting bare life of the body. For example, later in the text, the Duchess of 
Monmouth, vying for Dorian’s attention, insists he must think her husband married her 
“on purely scientific principles as the best specimen he could find of a modern butterfly,” 
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to which Dorian laughingly warns against her being stuck by pins (187).99 The discursive 
production of bare life around already vulnerable bodies threatens to make identity 
politics biological, giving these bodies a dangerous aesthetic framework for that bare life. 
3.3. The Virtual and the Wild 
After deciding to exert his affective sovereignty against the demands of others, 
Dorian enters the period of his life during which he explores and embraces the aesthetic 
responses of his body. In experimenting with the responses that objects and bodies 
produce for him, Dorian engages with the realm of the virtual. As the virtual describes 
the a-temporality of the affective body—where the body processes affective responses 
too quickly for consciousness to process them linearly—this part of Dorian’s life is 
punctuated by narrative syncopation. As Dorian enjoys the pursuit of sensation, he puts 
into practice his desire to dominate or be sovereign over his feelings, remaining at a 
remove from the other objects and bodies that, like Sybil, produce a powerful aesthetic 
response. Because what Dorian desires is queer, both in the sense that the text heavily 
implies his sexual relationships with other men and in the sense that his behaviour is non-
normative and non-reproductive, we can also see how his aesthetic sovereignty allows 
him to escape oppression. As Dorian embraces his animal self and rejects its political 
dimension, he also rejects political oppression. Lord Henry says that beauty “has its 
divine right of sovereignty,” implying that because Dorian is beautiful, he is also able to 
partake of this sovereignty (24). If we replace “beauty” with “aesthetics”—with the 
responsiveness of the body—that sovereignty begins to overlap with bare, or animal, life, 
offering a new possibility for the part of life that could otherwise be figured as bare, 
vulnerable, and unprotected.  
As the novel continues to form the autobiography of Dorian’s body, we are 
introduced to another textual form of autobiography, the yellow book given to him by 
Lord Henry that “seemed to contain the story of his own life, written before he had lived 
it” (123). This phrase, describing the uncanny familiarity of the text, “written before he 
                                               
99 For a reading of artistic representations of the biological inferiority of women as responses to burgeoning 
sciences of evolution and neurology, see Dijkstra. 
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had lived it,” sets the stage for the non-linear temporality of this section. Dorian’s 
encounter with this book, widely accepted to be À Rebours (Against Nature) by J. K. 
Huysmans, exhibits many of the characteristics of narrative syncope discussed above. 
The novel is absent of the usual markers of literary narrative, “without a plot and with 
only one character” (121). In place of plot, the yellow book tells of its protagonist’s 
attempt to compress a history of subjectivity into himself, “all the passions and modes of 
thought that belonged to every century except his own” (121). Like Lord Henry’s speech 
and like the physiological theory of the novel, the text is a rhythmic form rather than a 
meaningful one, with a “cadence of sentences, the subtle monotony of their music, so full 
as it was of complex refrains and movements elaborately repeated [that] produced in the 
mind of the lad, as he passed from chapter to chapter, a form of reverie, a malady of 
dreaming, that made him unconscious of the falling day and creeping shadows” (121). 
This rhythm banishes temporality while Dorian reads, unconscious as he is of the lapse of 
time. Notably, too, this rhythm is repeated in the repetitive punctuation of the sentence by 
its many commas. 
As Dorian attempts to focus on a “life of the senses” like the one that he finds in 
the yellow book (121), he describes the desired outcome of aesthetic responsiveness to be 
a “creation of worlds” that reject any connection with the past, which are “new and 
delightful” with an “element of strangeness” (127). What he is attempting to consistently 
access is the newness of feeling arising out of the syncope of affective response. He 
describes this newness of feeling through a metaphor of sleep, from which awakening to 
the actual of the morning is so often a disappointment, but which could be otherwise. As 
one wakes from sleep (or, we might say, comes to after a loss of consciousness or looks 
up when a novel has been finished), “[v]eil after veil of dusky gauze is lifted, and by 
degrees the forms and colours of things are restored to them, and we watch the dawn 
remaking the world in its antique pattern”: 
Nothing seems to us changed. Out of the unreal shadows of the night comes 
back the real life that we had known. We have to resume it where we had 
left off, and there steals over us a terrible sense of the necessity for the 
continuance of energy in the same wearisome round of stereotyped habits, 
or a wild longing, it may be, that our eyelids might open some morning upon 
a world that had been refashioned anew in the darkness for our pleasure, 
94 
and be changed, or have other secrets, a world in which the past would have 
little or no place, or survive, at any rate, in no conscious form of obligation 
or regret, the remembrance even of joy having its bitterness, and the 
memories of pleasure their pain. (127) 
The virtual affect of the body is akin to the “unreal” of the night, when things might be 
anything or in any relation, only barely glimpsed as “black fantastic shapes” (127). In an 
echo of the episode with Sybil, Dorian ultimately desires for these suspensions of the 
actual to have no consequences, although in the passage above, these are framed as social 
rather than political: obligation and regret. He also rejects the past in favour of a present 
ever opening to the newness of the future, suggesting a new aesthetic temporality where 
the body is free from having to remember any responsibility to others. 
To do so, Dorian makes himself affectively open in his “worship of the senses” 
(126) to a wide variety of objects and experiences, including “modes of thought” (127), 
the ritual of Catholic mass (128), perfumes and music (129), jewels (130-132), 
embroideries and tapestries (132-134), and ecclesiastical vestments (134). This famous 
Chapter Eleven is known for putting into literary representation Pater’s aesthetic 
philosophy, particularly his lament over the difficulty of always experiencing the world 
anew: “our failure is to form habits” (Pater 197).100 However, this chapter also engages 
Grant Allen’s insistence that the most aesthetically pleasing language is that which is the 
most sensually stimulating, as in the section on jewels, which describes Dorian’s visceral 
enjoyment of “pistachio-coloured peridot, rose-pink and wine-yellow topazes, carbuncles 
of fiery scarlet with tremulous four-rayed stars, flame red cinnamon-stones,” and more 
(Wilde 130). This is also the case with the yellow book, which is written in “that curious 
jewelled style” (121). Read alongside Allen’s theory, the narrative seeks here to write this 
portion of Dorian’s life by producing aesthetic sensations through language, and not by 
narrating a series of events. Not only does Chapter Eleven engage the affective body 
                                               
100 Karschay and Wainwright both turn to this chapter to argue for the novel’s scientific theories of 
heredity, including (for Karschay) Dorian’s limited free will and responsibility (Karschay 172-173). See 
Lewis J. Poteet and Elisa Glick for this chapter’s engagement with Huysman’s novel and aestheticism, 
Richard Ellmann for its reflection of Wilde’s own aestheticism, Regenia Gagnier (Individualism) on this 
chapter’s lists as a “private canon” reflecting decadent identity (90), Bonnie J. Robinson on the chapter’s 
importance to what she calls the “perversion of decadence,” and Andrew Elfenbein on the compression of 
time in this chapter as a “reactance against the poetics of realistic, triple-decker fiction” (502). 
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rather than the conscious subject, its listing of aesthetic objects mimics what Morgan 
calls “Allen’s lists of words,” which “disintegrates both the human being and the 
aesthetic object into discrete, immediately interacting elements such as nerves, muscles, 
colors, or curves” (Morgan 88-89). 
Chapter Eleven also expands and compresses time, as it spans the course of 
approximately two decades, chronicling Dorian’s various abandonments with non-
descriptive and heterogeneous temporalities that mark the beginning of paragraphs: “It 
was rumoured of him once” (128), “and so he would now” (129), and “at another time” 
(129). The formative events of Dorian’s life are untethered here from any particular time 
or sequence. So, too, is the way that Dorian sees his own subjectivity. In an act of overt 
autobiography, Dorian not only recognizes that aspects of his own “temperament” and 
“passions” are inherited from his ancestors, but he muses that his selfhood might have 
come from literary ancestry, or that “the whole of history was merely the record of his 
own life…in his brain and in his passions” (138). While Dorian’s interest in genetic and 
hereditary influence has been well-discussed by scholars like Michael Wainwright, for 
example, his discussion of ancestry is also significant for the way it compresses time, like 
the yellow book. History, here, is not a series of past events in which Dorian is politically 
implicated, but is rather a timeless amalgam that both inspires and exists through 
aesthetic response. 
As Dorian wants to remain sovereign over his feelings, he also refuses the 
histories of any of the objects or concepts he explores. That is, the histories of those 
objects or concepts exist purely in Dorian’s present, and not for the object or concept 
itself, and so they create no responsibility, no obligation or regret. For example, the text 
tells us that Dorian “collected together from all parts of the world the strangest 
instruments that could be found, either in the tombs of dead nations or among the few 
savage tribes that have survived contact with Western civilizations, and loved to touch 
and try them” (129). This acknowledgement of contact elides the painful history of 
Imperialist plunder, oppression, and genocide in favour of the pleasure of touch while 
reproducing a racist imperialist ideology by designating non-Western cultures “savage.” 
Dorian has also stolen a sacred instrument, the juruparis of the Indigenous peoples of 
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South America (129). His pleasure in this instrument unseats Western music as the most 
aesthetically pleasing, since “the harsh intervals and shrill discords of barbaric music 
stirred him at times when Schubert’s grace, and Chopin’s beautiful sorrows, and the 
mighty harmonies of Beethoven himself, fell unheeded on his ear” (129). Dorian desires 
the freedom of syncope without the demand of the other that moves him. He identifies the 
syncopation of non-Western music—the harsh intervals and shrill discords—as stirring, 
but also characterizes this music as “barbaric.” As he appreciates the aesthetic effects of 
syncopation but ignores its demands (for example, the recognition of a history of 
imperialism), Dorian fetishizes this music as product of colonized cultures. Even worse, 
the exoticized non-Western instruments are monstrous, “things of bestial shape and 
hideous voices” (130). Moreover, some of these items contain in their very materiality a 
history of animal and ecological violence, like the jewels pillaged from the earth, or the 
“Delhi muslins…stitched over with iridescent beetles’ wings” (135). 
Here we can see the political potential and danger of Dorian’s practice. On one 
hand, Dorian celebrates the animal life that is a part of every human, elevating it from the 
suppressed to the spiritual, from the body as shameful vessel to the body as aesthetic 
vehicle: 
The worship of the senses has often, and with much justice, been decried, 
men feeling a natural instinct of terror about passions and sensations that 
seem stronger than themselves, and that they are conscious of sharing with 
the less highly organized forms of existence. But it appeared to Dorian Gray 
that the true nature of the senses had never been understood, and that they 
had remained savage and animal merely because the world had sought to 
starve them into submission or to kill them by pain, instead of aiming at 
making them elements of a new spirituality, of which a fine instinct for 
beauty was to be the dominant characteristic. (126) 
Dorian also celebrates his own animal or nonhuman form in his delight with his ever-
changing portrait (135). Davis reads the nonhumanness of Dorian’s change as an 
instability of the self, noting Wilde’s engagement with Pater through Dorian’s “growing 
monstrosity” (554). For Davis, this monstrosity indicates something that we might align 
with the virtuality of affect and aesthetic response:  
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a depiction of the openness to transformation of any self and of the 
fundamental indeterminacy and unpredictably of the relations between 
mind, body, and external influence which this implies. The heightened 
sensory experience of aestheticism entails the basic instability of the self 
because it is precisely that instability which enables, and is compounded by, 
aesthetic response. (554) 
In other words, Davis recognizes that the novel figures monstrosity as a fundamental, 
even possibly positive, aspect of having a self.  
If affect is, by this measure, a condition of the body that allows an aesthetic 
response, it also unseats the hierarchy between human subject and nonhuman aesthetic 
object. Reading this possibility through other late-Victorian writers engaging with 
physiological aesthetics, Morgan suggests that  
To render aesthetic response animalistic or mechanistic, or to think of form 
as apprehended semiconsciously, might also require a consideration of the 
ways in which the surrounding matter and objects of the world could 
themselves become animated or bear human traits. Aesthetic experience 
might be that experience in which physical things themselves respond to 
acts of human perception. (128) 
Through affect, and through the virtual potential of syncope, aesthetic experience holds 
the potential to reorder a hierarchy of subjects and objects. Cohn suggests this possibility 
through The Picture of Dorian Gray’s attention to the agency of atoms: 
In this idea of unconscious vibration, Wilde evokes a molecular world that, 
in its indifference to human actions and human values, has egalitarian 
potential, expressed as ‘strange affinity’… Rather than fret at the problem 
of action, Wilde suggests an attraction, a strange affinity, between objects 
at every level from the molecular to the political. The idea of a materially 
shared world does not depend on forms of the human, or human institutions: 
it is differentiated not into autonomous individuals acting for themselves 
but into objects that have their own integrity. (“One” 202) 
Jane Bennett and Mel Y. Chen have pursued similar theories in their recent work, arguing 
for the vitality and animacy of bodies, parts, objects, and concepts. For these theorists, 
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affect is, or can be, a characteristic that animates humans and nonhumans alike.101 Affect 
brings nonhumans into relation with humans and has the queer potential to disorder 
proper hierarchies and intimacies; as Chen says, “queering is immanent to animate 
transgressions, violating proper intimacies (including and between humans and 
nonhuman things)” (11). As Dorian becomes a thing-like instrument affected by Lord 
Henry’s speech, his syncope or his subjection to the affect of queer objects (like 
instruments and jewels and religious vestments), queer chemicals (like opium), and queer 
relations (like male intimacy and sex) has the potential to reorder his place among those 
nonhuman things. 
However, on the other hand, Dorian can play with the ideas and objects of the 
politically “monstrous” or not-properly-human—the bare lives of those South American 
Indigenous whose artefacts have been removed—while also retreating to his white, 
moneyed, imperialist identity, “throw[ing] open to the world his beautiful house and 
hav[ing] the most celebrated musicians of the day to charm his guests” (125). Dorian can 
therefore experience transgressive intimacy with objects and others while still retaining 
his position as politically superior. The possibilities and dangers of celebrating the 
suspension of the self in favour of the body, the animal, and the monstrous, can be further 
illuminated by reading the concept of wildness through Dorian’s aesthetic sense-worship. 
Wildness is significant to my reading of The Picture of Dorian Gray because it appears in 
both recent queer theory and in Catherine Clément’s Syncope, one of the few works that 
directly addresses the philosophical and political implications of syncope. In queer theory 
and in Clément’s work, wildness describes a syncope that breaks with the civilized and 
orderly in a refusal of the social, the rational, the oppressive, and the self.102 Clemént’s 
work includes a compelling examination of the way the rationalist Western philosophies 
                                               
101 Massumi gestures towards something like this ethos when he writes of affect, “the absence of a clear 
line of demarcation between the physical, the vital, the human, and the superhuman; the undecidability of 
immanence and transcendence – also has implications for ethical thought” (39). 
102 Although it is not a point that she develops at length, Bennett notes that her concept of vibrant matter, or 
Thing-Power, “bears a family resemblance to…what Henry David Thoreau called the Wild” (2), which 
further has “interesting affinities with Deleuze’s idea of the virtual” (xv). While I do not draw on either of 
these particular theorists, Gilles Deleuze heavily influences Massumi’s theory of affect and Askin’s theory 
of differential narrative, and it is worth noting the connection Bennett makes here between his concept of 
the virtual and a theory of wildness that is “a not-quite-human force that addled and altered human and 
other bodies” (2). 
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of subjectivity are underwritten by losses of selfhood, consciousness, and temporality. 
However, her sections on syncope in Eastern philosophy veer dangerously close to 
exoticism and fetishism. For example, she writes in her introduction of India’s influence 
on her idea of syncope: 
India, however, brings a certain illumination to this terrain that is hers alone: 
the endless beauty of her percussions, their incredible melodic capability, 
their science of pauses; the daily contact with death, familiar, lived, and 
without terror; the charm of the ghazals, the power of this love poetry, even 
more enchanting because I did not know its language, Urdu, and the 
ravishing dancing women whose repeated performance finally thrust on me 
the shock, then the image, and finally the very word, “syncope.” (20) 
Clément’s homage to the syncopation of India’s music, dance, and poetry is neither 
disrespectful nor (necessarily) incorrect, but it is reductive and misleading. India is a 
large and heterogeneous country, and it strikes me that, like Dorian’s reception of the 
harsh intervals and shrill discords of non-Western music, the particular syncopation of 
Indian art is only highlighted because it is different to Clément, and not because it is 
particularly syncopated. That is to say, all music, all dance, all poetry is syncopated—or 
has the potential to be so.  
Jack Halberstam offers a similar critique of Michael Taussig’s conception of 
wildness as he extends this concept to queer theory, explaining that Taussig is an 
anthropologist who counters colonial narratives of wild and violent colonized people with 
the revelation that wildness is at the heart of colonial knowledge production (139). 
Halberstam writes that even as Taussig breaks down the difference between the civilized 
colonizer and the primitive colonized through wildness, he, like Clément, “actually 
reproduces the colonial terms of encounter within which a wild other embodies the 
unknown, the magical, and the antidote to the ills of Euro-American cultural values” 
(139). Dorian’s use of a variety of non-Western objects for the purposes of producing his 
own suspensions of Western selfhood reproduces this same troubling hierarchy.  
Nonetheless, wildness still offers potential for thinking about Dorian’s queerness 
and his queer relationships through the virtual and the actual of his body. For example, 
Dorian’s relationships with other men and his non-normative relationships with objects 
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are represented as wildly excessive and chaotic, “the spirit of the unknown and 
disorderly” (Taussig 219), the too much of the masses of jewels or the different types of 
music. But these relationships are also wild—outside of the social and political—because 
they do not appear to mark Dorian’s body. In the logic of the text, this means that Dorian 
(to a certain extent) has these interactions outside of actual relationships. The text 
connects Dorian’s flawless appearance and his wildly asocial behaviour explicitly as it 
introduces this period of Dorian’s life: 
Even those who had heard the most evil things of him, and from time to 
time strange rumours about his mode of life crept through London and 
became the chatter of the clubs, could not believe anything to his dishonor 
when they saw him. He had always the look of one who had kept himself 
unspotted from the world. Men who talked grossly became silent when 
Dorian Gray entered the room. There was something in the purity of his face 
that rebuked them. (124) 
Dorian can be affected, and in turn affect others, by the pleasures of the body that he 
seeks out in an “ill-famed tavern near the Docks…under an assumed name” (124), or in 
the “dreadful places near Blue Gate Fields” (135) because the history of these encounters 
is marked only on his picture. Wildness here means Dorian is physically unmarked by the 
politically transgressive. 
Dorian’s socially scandalous, queer encounters are wild and affectively virtual, 
taking place in suspensions of so-called “civilized” behaviour, time, and narrative. They 
exist out of time as “mysterious and prolonged absences” (124), periods defined vaguely 
as “day after day, until he was driven away” (135), kept out of memory or out of the 
linear temporality of autobiography by the “means of forgetfulness” of his other sensual 
experiences with jewels and music and other “treasures” (134). As markers of 
significance in Dorian’s autobiography, these encounters do not form a history of 
knowledge or experience but a history of syncope, a history of gaps and suspensions of 
knowledge. What happens in these prolonged absences is never fully revealed, only 
gleaned from the whispers of other men who hear “evil things against him” and “strange 
rumours” of “dishonour” (123-124). As Halberstam and Taussig suggest, wildness 
“challenge[s] the unity of the symbol” or disrupts meaning and signification (Halberstam 
144, Taussig 219), making it impossible to tell exactly what is dishonourable or exactly 
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what has marked Dorian’s portrait. Wildness disrupts the stability of signs like “evil,” 
“dishonour,” or “sin,” in the sense that these concepts are not applicable to an animal 
body or to the animacy of an object.  
Therefore, in as much as what is marked on the portrait is an affective encounter, 
and in as much as this section of the text underlines how transgressive or queer those 
encounters are, it is not strictly allegorical to say that what is “dishonourable” or sinful 
about these encounters is marked on Dorian’s portrait rather than his body. The 
transference of this marking is, instead, utopic, since it is politically necessary for Dorian 
to participate in queerness in this wild fashion to avoid the political threat to the body in 
the late nineteenth century (violence that remains a threat today). Chen and Bennett 
would no doubt agree with Halberstam’s statement that wildness is “queerly vital” (145). 
Syncope provides a wild escape from the biopolitical oppression of the queer body. But 
we should always keep in mind that in the novel this wildness intersects with Dorian’s 
“unspotted,” white, pure body, not just the body of the beautiful but the body of the 
politically sovereign. As the narrative reminds us, Dorian’s “great wealth was a certain 
element of security. Society—civilized society, at least—is never very ready to believe 
anything to the detriment of those who are both rich and fascinating” (136). Dorian’s 
security is predicated on his wealth, which is itself a product of his whiteness and his 
imperialism. His spotless identity belongs to a body that is not available to all subjects. 
Finally, this section of the text also includes the most transgressive 
autobiographical narration. In a section that offers a form of wildness by challenging the 
meaning of objects and acts and recreating them in aesthetic freedom, the narrative also 
breaks with its biographical reporting of Dorian to offer an opinion. Describing the 
refusal of wealthy society to reject one of their own, the narrative shifts to a clever 
inventiveness and epigrammatic turn of phrase that seems to mimic Lord Henry’s: 
For the canons of good society are, or should be, the same as the canons of 
art. Form is absolutely essential to it. It should have the dignity of a 
ceremony, as well as its unreality, and should provide the insincere 
character of a romantic play with the wit and beauty that makes such plays 
delightful to us. Is insincerity such a terrible thing? I think not. (136-137) 
102 
The form of this passage may be Henry-like, but the first-person “I” interjection is 
singular, the only occurrence of it in the text. In the Penguin edition of The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, editor Robert Mighall claims “[t]his is the only place in the book where the 
narrator ventures an opinion directly” (246 n. 11). This seems on the surface to be the 
case, but the next lines that follow this subjective interruption are, “It is merely a method 
by which we can multiply our personalities,” and, beginning the next paragraph, “Such, 
at any rate, was Dorian Gray’s opinion” (137). What exactly is covered by Dorian’s 
opinion here is unclear (although it certainly includes the multiplicity of personality), but 
it could also include the rejection of insincerity’s terribleness. If so, this is the 
autobiographical appearance of Dorian’s “I” breaking into the narrative, a kind of 
spontaneous writing of Dorian’s subjectivity through the nonsubjectivity of an unstable 
narrative perspective. In effect, this “I” is auto-written or auto-graphed, and this personal 
interjection is made personal and possible by the impersonal—the affective and temporal 
syncopation of Chapter Eleven.  
3.4. Vulnerable Life and Affective Ethics 
As the portrait marks the ways in which Dorian has affected others and been 
affected by them, the novel moves towards two extremes, as the management of affect 
within social and political contexts suggests that some lives are worthier of living, and as 
affective response reveals bare life as equal with, demanding of, and responsible to other 
lives. The latter chapters of the novel first position Dorian as sovereign, unconnected to 
the outcomes of those affective encounters. In his wildness, Dorian takes self-protection 
and sovereign potential towards extreme ends. As the narrative employs the language of 
the animal body and of automatism, it suggests a connection between the aesthetic escape 
of embodied pleasure and the frightening and violent compulsions of the animal body. In 
assuming that the laws of Victorian England no longer apply to him as a wild subject and 
an aesthete, Dorian does not perceive that the portrait reveals another system of affective 
connection. Instead, there seems to be no ethical imperative in Dorian’s behaviour 
towards others, and he approaches them as he did Sybil, as expendable bare lives. 
However, narrative syncope reveals the many contexts in which Dorian is vulnerable: as 
a body always open to being radically affected; as an animal guided by his senses; as a 
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queer subject living outside of the socially acceptable and the politically protected. 
Towards the end of the novel, the bare life of Dorian’s body—its material physiology, its 
animal responsiveness, its desire for pleasure and sovereignty, and its underlying 
vulnerability—occupies a more fluid and uncertain place in social and political 
hierarchies. Finally, James Vane’s hunt for Dorian and Dorian’s fainting spell bring the 
bare life of affective forms like humans, animals, and objects sharply into focus.  
Dorian’s murder of Basil Hallward clarifies his understanding of himself as not 
only outside any social or political order but with the power to decide which lives are 
worth living (as with Sybil Vane). Basil finally sees the altered portrait after a 
confrontation with Dorian, during which he laments the rumours plaguing Dorian’s 
name. As Basil begs Dorian to change his behaviour for the better, he lists the men and 
women who have come into contact with Dorian and been brought to social ruin. Basil 
approaches these transgressions with a mixture of social and spiritual concern, gesturing 
towards the “dreadful things” that are said about Dorian (143) and the insistence that 
“only God” can see Dorian’s soul (146). However, Basil also touches on an affective 
context when he asks Dorian to consider the responsibility that inheres in encounters with 
others, declaring that “[o]ne has a right to judge of a man by the effect he has over his 
friends,” and imploring Dorian to use his “wonderful influence…for good, not for evil” 
(145). While Basil’s use of influence here has connotations of moral direction and 
control, he nonetheless suggests (as the portrait does) that Dorian cannot simply remove 
himself from the consequences of his encounters.   
To Basil’s insistence that only God can see his soul, Dorian reveals the altered 
portrait. When Basil discovers the history of Dorian’s affective life in the picture, the 
focus in these scenes remains on Basil’s vulnerable body as nervous, affectively bare life. 
As Basil realizes what the picture represents (or imagines he does), his feeling is 
expressed through his body:  
He had never done that. Still, it was his own picture. He knew it, and he felt 
as if his blood had changed in a moment from fire to sluggish ice. His own 
picture! What did it mean? Why had it altered? He turned, and looked at 
Dorian Gray with the eyes of a sick man. His mouth twitched, and his 
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parched tongue seemed unable to articulate. He passed his hand across his 
forehead. It was dank with clammy sweat. (149). 
While his body is overtaken by the affective intensity of the moment, Basil’s language 
engages multiple contextual registers: aesthetic, as the portrait fills Basil with “disgust 
and loathing” as its “marvellous beauty” is being destroyed (149); supernatural, as 
whatever is changing the portrait seems an agent of “foulness and horror” (150); material, 
as that change is also embodied on the canvas like “leprosies” or the “rotting of a corpse” 
(150); and finally, moral and religious, as Basil attempts to atone through a “prayer of 
repentance” for the “evil” Dorian has done (151). In these swiftly changing discourses, 
Basil identifies the ways in which encounters with others become forms of embodied 
responsibility as he reacts viscerally to the aesthetic form of affective representation, and 
equates the overlap of supernatural affective production (foulness and horror) with the 
materialism of body (leprosy and rot). However, the language of bodily disintegration 
pathologizes and spiritualizes affective response, and is thus an inadequate framework for 
the portrait’s narrative.   
Dorian’s response to Basil, on the other hand, is affectively sovereign, as Dorian 
is described as an audience member to Basil’s performance (as he was with Sybil), 
“absorbed in a play when some great artist is acting,” experiencing neither “real 
sorrow…nor real joy” (149). However, any sovereign distance Dorian keeps here from 
the bare life of his body soon collapses, as he is overcome with hatred for Basil and “the 
mad passions of a hunted animal are stirred within him” (151). The affective encounter of 
these two vulnerable bodies ends up in a kind of horrible actuation of Butler’s concept of 
undoing, as Dorian opens the bare life of Basil’s body to himself in a violent killing. As 
Dorian violates the boundary of Basil’s body, the text emphasizes the physiology of 
Basil’s life and the vulnerability of the man as a body, as Dorian takes a knife to the 
“great vein that is behind the ear, crushing the man’s head down on the table, and 
stabbing again and again” (151). This fleshly materiality is also significant in that it 
figures the body that Dorian attacks in nonsubjective terms—the man and not Basil, a 
vein and not a person—suggesting that the death of this body might be occurring outside 
of a moral framework that would place either God or the liberal agential individual at its 
centre. In dying, Basil’s body is a thing of blood and bone and not an individual human; 
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in fact, the narrative itself vacillates between calling Basil’s corpse a man and a “thing” 
(152). It also breaks the wholeness of the subject into the nonhumanness of its individual 
parts, moving seemingly of their own accord as the “outstretched arms shot up 
convulsively, waving grotesque stiff-fingered hands in the air” (152).  
While lacking the same kind of de-individualizing narrative, Dorian’s animality 
and his wild violence against Basil’s body reflects a kind of syncope that is based in a 
nonhuman automaticity of the body. Dorian’s feeling of hatred is “uncontrollable” and so 
are his resulting actions, occurring without self-reflection. Dorian sees the “glimmer” of a 
knife, “move[s] slowly towards it,” “seize[s] it,” and “rushe[s]” at Basil (151). This 
representation of automatic behaviour reflects Huxley’s theory of physiological response, 
which preceded Grant Allen’s by a few years. Huxley captured public attention by 
positing that the responsiveness of the body was responsible for everything special, 
spiritual, and individual about humans. Like animals, Huxley claims, humans are guided 
by the automatic or mechanical reactions of their bodies, and their consciousness is 
merely the awareness of those reactions (577). Figuring humans as conscious automata 
was not only a distressing possibility for questions of free will and agency, but it was also 
seen as a sacrilegious one, since it did away with the notion of the soul as a guiding 
property of humans that distinguished them from lower forms of life. For many, too, 
automatism complicated the very idea of ethics or responsibility. If humans were not in 
control of their actions, how could they be responsible for them? And if they could not 
willfully choose to do either good or bad, what did ethical behaviour even mean? 
On the one hand, The Picture of Dorian Gray seems to perform the consequences 
of this concern: if there is no individual choice, there is no basis for ethics, and humans 
are, instead, simply caught like animals in a struggle for survival. On the other, however, 
the novel suggests that the body recognizes the absolute responsibility of one to another 
through affect, and reveals the mutual vulnerability of other bodies and objects. Ethical 
decision-making in this case is not about choice, in the humanist sense of the term, but 
about the impossibility of choice, the impossible knowledge that absolute responsibility 
means responsibility toward all others. Discussing Abraham’s responsibility to God, a 
responsibility that leads him to agree to murder his son, Derrida quotes Kierkegaard as 
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saying “the instant of decision is madness” (Derrida 66). Attridge glosses Derrida’s 
reading of Abraham’s decision by declaring that, “We cannot say whether it is more an 
act or an event, whether it is something Abraham does or something that happens to him” 
(Attridge 65). The realm of ethics is absolute responsibility, not agency. Dorian is not 
wrong in believing that his worship of the body means that he occupies a life beyond 
right or wrong, good or bad. What leads him to unethical behaviour is his belief that his 
adoration of the body, the nonhuman, the animal, the aesthetic, means he is no longer 
responsible to any other.  
Basil is in some ways a model for an ethics of responsibility, since he recognizes 
both the subjection of his bare life to Dorian’s ideal aesthetic form, admitting, “[a]s long 
as I live, the personality of Dorian Gray will dominate me” (15), and recognizes his own 
responsibility as the architect of both Dorian’s vanity and the portrait’s alteration, 
declaring, “I worshipped you too much. I am punished for it. You worshipped yourself 
too much. We are both punished” (151). The portrait captures the mutual responsibility 
and vulnerability, the affective encounter, of Dorian and Basil, and narrative syncope 
amplifies the bare life of their bodies in its nonhuman and non-individual character. For 
example, the narrator tells us, “There was a stifled groan, and the horrible sound of some 
one choking with blood” (151). As an effect of nonhuman style, the sentence is 
constructed passively and effectively made subject-less, an evacuation of the subject that 
is repeated in its objectivity and objectification. As an effect of that non-subject’s mutual 
vulnerability with other forms of life, the narrative substitutes the phrase “some one” for 
Basil as the subject of the attack, implying, like Basil’s “thing”-ness, that it could be any 
body made actual and mortal in this way.  
As Chen’s methodology suggests, reading the language of Basil’s death through 
the concept of animacy reveals that Basil does not need to be alive to affect Dorian. In 
Dorian’s desire to be rid of Basil’s body, we can read an aesthetic hope along with his 
legal one that the destruction of the body will also destroy any affective connection with 
Basil and so responsibility towards him. Dorian’s fear that he will be left with Basil’s 
body prompts another episode of syncope, in which the “suspense” of uncertainty over 
whether Alan Campbell will appear to destroy the body coincides with a suspension of 
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Dorian’s subjectivity. Watching the clock, Dorian becomes “horribly agitated” and his 
behaviour resembles that of an animal, as he begins “to pace up and down the room, 
looking like a beautiful caged thing” (159). Dorian’s shuddering body stops keeping pace 
with industrial temporality, that marker of human civilization, as time starts “crawling 
with feet of lead” and then stopping altogether (159). At the same time, he also 
experiences a more physiological kind of syncope that seems connected with the 
circulation of his blood, as his hands become “curiously cold” (159).103 In an effort to 
convince Alan to carry out the horrible destruction, Dorian describes this suspension as a 
near faint (162), framing his body as vulnerable in its terror and his circumstances as 
vulnerable to a matter of “life and death” (160). 
  However, Dorian’s vulnerability is not enough to move Alan and neither is his 
figuring of Basil’s dead body as an affectless object of scientific and “intellectual 
curiosity” (162). Dorian therefore resorts to blackmailing Alan with the threat of social 
ruin, writing a scandalous secret on a piece of paper. This manipulation does indeed 
inspire help, but it also reveals Alan’s own body as vulnerable. The written word, 
unknown but perhaps hinting at queer behaviour (either sexual or non-normative in 
another way), provokes an affective response, as the scientist turns “ghastly pale” and 
“felt as if his heart was beating itself to death in some empty hollow” (163). The narrative 
turns to the affective physiology, the animality or bare life, of Alan’s body and its 
syncope, in the action of his heart and in his shuddering, groaning, and shivering, as the 
clock seems “to be dividing Time into separate atoms of agony” (163). Moreover, the 
vulnerability of Alan’s body reads the threat of other bodies as material as metal, “as if an 
iron ring was being slowly tightened round his forehead,” as Dorian’s “hand upon his 
shoulder weighed like a hand of lead” (163). Like Dorian, Alan behaves automatically in 
this syncope, replying “mechanically, as if words could alter things” (163). As with 
Dorian’s response to Lord Henry’s speech, the narrative suggests that the power of words 
is in their ability to affect the body through their form but not necessarily their content. 
                                               
103 I address blood circulation and syncope more fully in my chapter on Dracula.  
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Whatever it is that Dorian writes, the narrative never reveals; the paper contains any 
number of meaning-evacuated or meaning-full words (163). 
The vulnerable animal body, located at the heart of biopolitics as Dorian decides 
whose life is worth living, appears in this scene in another way. Alan arrives at Dorian’s 
wearing an Astrakhan coat, a coat made from the wool of fetal lambs. While any clothing 
rendered from animal products gestures to violence (as in the threading of muslins with 
beetles’ wings), this type of coat seems particularly horrific in its violent production, as 
the lambs may be extracted via induction or abortion (if they are not miscarried), often 
alongside the deaths of their mothers, before they are skinned. On one hand, this 
envelopment in the animal body makes visible Alan’s own animality, as though he is a 
lamb to the slaughter of Dorian’s sovereign. On the other hand, the coat is also 
recognizable as the body of the animal (bare life) that serves its purpose for Alan, a life-
taking that is neither murder nor a sacrifice. With its skin as coat, the animal body 
guarantees the humanness of the subject that can use it to supplement their own 
nakedness, their lack of warmth and protection.  
As the novel moves towards its end and the destruction of Basil’s body does not 
release Dorian from affective connection or responsibility to it, Dorian’s intimate 
connections with other bodies begin to appear differently to him. A chance meeting at an 
opium den with Adrian Singleton, a social outcast whose exile is blamed on Dorian by 
Basil, “strangely move[s] him,” and prompts Dorian to wonder if “the ruin of that young 
life was really to be laid at his door” (181). The narrative shuttles between an acceptance 
and a dismissal of responsibility: on the one hand, the narrative seems to take on Dorian’s 
own thoughts as it declares that “[e]ach man lived his own life, and paid his own price for 
living it,” while at the same time, the next paragraph begins by reminding us that men 
and women sometimes “lose the freedom of their will. They move to their terrible end as 
automatons move. Choice is taken from them” (181). As a technique of syncopation, the 
narrative’s uncertain occupation of perspective reflects the very nonhumanness and non-
individuality of behaviour upon which it is theorizing. Either Dorian Gray or Adrian 
Singleton could be the object of this narrative reflection, suggesting that individuality and 
choice are not adequate frameworks for ethical responsibility. Here, the uncertainty of 
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autobiographical subject-object relations reflects Butler’s suggestion that vulnerability 
includes an undoing or interruption of the subject’s conscious self-narration. 
When Dorian responds suddenly to Basil with feelings of hatred, he claims that he 
feels like a hunted animal. He is not wrong in his feeling, although its object may be 
misplaced, since he is in fact hunted as an animal by Sybil’s brother, who blames Dorian 
for Sybil’s death. James bases his own sovereignty, his ability to decide that Dorian’s life 
can simply be taken, on the (unpredictable) consequences of Dorian’s affective encounter 
with Sybil and through the discursive production of Dorian’s life as animal. In James’ 
concern over the possibility that Dorian may mistreat Sybil, he swears to his mother, 
“believe me that if this man wrongs my sister, I will find out who he is, track him down, 
and kill him like a dog” (69). Here, the identification of Dorian with a dog produces 
James’ sovereign power because it engages a set of linguistic suggestions about power 
over life and death, and not because anything politically inheres in “dog-ness”; as Chen 
writes, “the statement that someone ‘treated me like a dog’ is one of liberal humanism’s 
fictions: some dogs are treated quite well, and many humans suffer in conditions of 
profound indignity” (89). For James to use the dog as a figure that gives him power over 
Dorian’s life is to reveal the way that the concept of bare life is always an available 
political category for humans.104 Cary Wolfe describes this as a characteristic that defines 
modern biopolitics, pointing out that “the distinction ‘human/animal’—as the history of 
slavery, colonialism, and imperialism well shows—is a discursive resource, not a 
zoological designation” (10). The same historical moment that for Dorian and Grant 
Allen finds the human in the animal life of the body is also one that finds the power over 
life in the same realm. 
Indeed, James tries to make good on his promise when he finds Dorian at the 
opium den. Temporality becomes the grounds on which James will or will not carry out 
his threat of death in punishment for Sybil’s suicide. When Dorian questions how long it 
has been since Sybil’s death (eighteen years), James declares that time is of no 
importance, that what matters is that Dorian accept the consequences of his encounter 
                                               
104 See Nicole Shukin on the contemporary political significance—and instability—of the human-animal 
boundary to capitalism and biopolitics (the politics of and power over biological life).  
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with Sybil. Dorian, however, uses the lack of time’s mark on his body to insist he could 
not possibly be the man that James is hunting, as his face “had all the bloom of boyhood, 
all the unstained purity of youth” (Wilde 182). In this exchange, not only does James 
simply have no other information about Dorian that would help to confirm his identity, 
but Dorian’s selfhood is reduced to the autobiography of his body (which exists 
elsewhere, on his picture). James needs a temporally linear and thematically coherent 
autobiography in order to establish his power over life and death, whereas Dorian’s body 
escapes this narrative. 
However, James soon discovers that Dorian is, in fact, the same man that broke 
his engagement to Sybil, and he pursues him to Selby Royal. As host of a party one 
afternoon, Dorian finds himself staring at the face of the vigilante at his window and 
promptly faints. As the full physiological expression of the virtual, this swoon is an 
interruption of consciousness and time for Dorian and, as a narrative technique, it is both 
overfull of potential meanings and evacuated of any meaning at all, occurring outside of 
the purview of the narrative. The nonsubjectivity of the faint is amplified as Dorian’s 
body is removed from narrative sight; when Dorians swoon he is in another room, while 
the narrative perspective remains with Lord Henry and the Duchess of Monmouth. The 
narrative again takes the position of the spectator, evacuating subjectivity both from the 
sentence and the scene, describing the inarticulate sounds of the body without a subject: 
“[f]rom the far end of the conservatory there came a stifled groan, followed by the dull 
sound of a heavy fall” (190). In this sense, the faint is doubly virtual; if for Massumi, 
affective encounters are virtual in that they happen too quickly for the subject to realize 
them, the narrative agrees by highlighting its incapability of registering the virtual.  
Further emphasizing the nonsubjective nature of syncope, Dorian does not narrate 
his own faint; that is, he is not the one who writes the syncope into his autobiography. As 
Lord Henry arrives late on the scene to discover what has happened to Dorian, finding 
him “lying face downward on the floor in a death-like swoon,” Dorian is confused, 
asking what has happened before belatedly remembering (190). It is Lord Henry who 
narrates the nonconscious time of Dorian’s body, telling him, “you merely fainted. That 
was all” (190). Prior to this, Dorian’s pleasure in the virtual of the body—its wildness, its 
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affective responses, its sensual experiences—has relieved him of much social and 
political consequence. Now, in its similarity to the state of death, Dorian’s faint reflects 
his vulnerability. It also provokes the compassion and care of those around him, because 
the affecting vulnerability of the fainting body itself comprises a demand for ethical 
response. Where Dorian’s body has been out of narrative sight, it now takes center stage 
in its very physical materiality, as Dorian’s guests “carr[y] him at once in the blue 
drawing-room” and lay him on the sofa; as Lord Henry reassures him he is alright; as 
they provide Dorian with the comfort he has previously shunned but suddenly needs post-
swoon, when he “must not be alone” (190).  
After this definitive break with subjective consciousness, at the mercy of his body 
and those who can decide whether it counts or not, Dorian is no longer sovereign over his 
embodied responses. Again, he describes himself as “hunted, snared, tracked down,” and 
further, “sick with a wild terror of dying, and yet indifferent to life itself” (191). As 
James has declared his promise to kill Dorian like a dog, bare life underwrites the sense 
of Dorian’s vulnerability—hunted like an animal and under threat of being killed without 
trial, Dorian is the figure of bare life to James’ sovereign. He spends three days in his 
room, its own kind of syncope as a period of an “excess of anguish” (192), before 
reemerging at the party, seemingly himself again and in control of his feelings. Almost 
immediately, however, he is overwhelmed. As I noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
when Dorian joins Sir Geoffrey Clouston on a hunt, he is suddenly “strangely charmed” 
by the hare that bounds in front of them, crying, “Don’t shoot it, Geoffrey. Let it live” 
(193). Undone again by the affective force of the “loveliest of little live things,” Dorian is 
unwilling to be sovereign over the life of the hare (196). Moreover, this call for 
compassion is also seemingly subject-less and non-agential, as Dorian explains, “I don’t 
know what made me say it. Some whim, I suppose” (196). Mutually vulnerable this time 
with the hare, Dorian’s autobiography or self-conscious account is again interrupted. 
What Dorian and the hare share is the mortality of bare life, but as the basis for sensual 
experience and aesthetics, bare life is not the state of exception, but the condition of 
humanness—and humaneness—itself.  
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Nonetheless, there is an ethical question raised by The Picture of Dorian Gray’s 
responsive, aesthetic bodies in their conscious, narrative representation.105 The hare is an 
aesthetic body because it produces an aesthetic response. The hare is as vulnerable as it is 
lovely, and it is as lovely as it is lively. As an aesthetic body in both its quivering 
sensitivity and its beauty, the hare connotes innocence and fragility through its physical 
appearance and social history.106 The hare and Dorian therefore both share the kind of 
spotlessness that helps to guarantee the correct kind of wildness. The Jewish theatre 
manager, by contrast, is “hideous,” with “greasy ringlets” and a “soiled shirt”; fat, with 
“an oily tremulous smile” and hands covered in jewels (49, 79). This representation is 
one of incorrect wildness or unruliness, of an aesthetic body that does not just produce a 
response (in this case, of loathing from Dorian [79]). Rather, the Jewish manager evokes 
the dirt and uncleanliness of which an early reviewer of the novel in the Daily Chronicle 
accused the entire book, noting its “garish vulgarity” and its transgression of the 
boundaries between “Humanity and Animalism” (217). The reference to the 
uncleanliness of animality invokes the concern with immunity from contagion that 
Esposito claims characterizes modern biopolitics, one that will appear most horrifically in 
the discursive production of the Jewish people by the Nazis as parasites (116) (or, as 
Agamben has it, as lice [114]).  
The Jewish body in the novel also evokes disgust, described by Ahmed as the 
affective response to the stickiness of and contamination by the unclean object or other. 
In describing the association of disgust with food, Ahmed writes that “[s]urvival makes 
us vulnerable in that it requires we let what is ‘not us’ in; to survive we open ourselves 
up” (83). The connection of disgust with the vulnerability of openness—the ingestion of 
the disgusting thing—leads Ahmed to claim that disgust “shows us how the boundaries 
that allow the distinction between subjects and objects are undone in the moment of their 
making” (83). In other words, the very affective response that would distinguish between 
the self and the disgusting other breaks down that distinction through the affective 
openness of the self to the other. Since affect is a zone of encounter and intimacy, the 
                                               
105 For a theory of response as trans-species ethics, see Kelly Oliver and Cynthia Willett. 
106 For a reading of rabbits as representative of class conflict in The Time Machine, see James T. Collinge. 
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representation of the Jewish manager as greasy, soiled, and oily suggests an attempt to 
identify proper and improper aesthetics via the fear of affective contact by the “sticky” 
racialized body. We are left with the ethical question of whether or not Dorian’s 
compassion for the hare is grounded in the cultural context of racialized aesthetics. 
Finding himself free upon discovering that it is James Vane who has been killed 
by Sir Geoffrey’s shot, Dorian spends the remainder of the novel trying to decide how to 
proceed. He wants to “be good” (200), but does not know how to go about it. When 
Dorian abandons Hetty Merton by breaking their plans to run away together, he thinks he 
has been selfless by preventing her ruin, but not only does Lord Henry point out that 
Hetty will never be happy in her own class again (Wilde 201, C. Levine 192), Dorian 
seems to miss the fact that this behaviour is precisely what led to Sibyl’s suicide. In 
wanting to enjoy the pleasurable responses of the body without having to recognize the 
vulnerability and responsibility that occasions those responses, Dorian has also missed 
the vulnerability of other bodies and objects. As his autobiography exists apart from 
himself, Dorian has no readily-available temporally self-reflective narrative to remind 
him of his past encounters and their consequences. While Lord Henry has given Dorian 
all manner of contradictory and, at times, empty advice, he now seems to recognize the 
ethical significance of the bare life of the affective and animal body, as he tells Dorian:  
Life is not governed by will or intention.  Life is a question of nerves, and 
fibres, and slowly built-up cells in which thought hides itself and passion 
has its dreams. You may fancy yourself safe, and think yourself strong.  But 
a chance tone of colour in a room or a morning sky, a particular perfume 
that you had once loved and that brings subtle memories with it, a line from 
a forgotten poem that you had come across again, a cadence from a piece of 
music that you had ceased to play—I tell you, Dorian, that it is on things 
like these that our lives depend. (Wilde 206-207) 
Lord Henry here claims that it is affective responsiveness that provides the grounds for 
life and the grounds for ethics, both the subjective life of which the self is aware, and the 
simultaneously animal and political life of the body that affects and is affected by others.  
Dorian, however, does not come to fully understand the ethical significance of 
affect. He believes that, freed of the bodies of Sybil Vane, Basil Hallward, Alan 
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Campbell, and James Vane (and, in another way, of Hetty Merton), he is without history 
and therefore without consequence. The picture, however, seems to disagree, as it marks 
Dorian’s break with Hetty by intensifying “the scarlet dew that spotted the hand…like 
blood newly spilt” (211). Frustrated, Dorian imagines that it is his motives and not his 
actions that the portrait is marking—”Vanity? Curiosity? Hypocrisy?” (212). Yet, as the 
portrait counts Dorian’s consequence in the lives of others, this stain and Dorian’s self-
reflection make sense, because once Dorian has affected Hetty, it is impossible to predict 
how she will respond. Wanting to rid himself of ethical obligations, Dorian destroys the 
painting with the same knife he used to kill Basil (212). This final act only fails to destroy 
Dorian, however, because the painting has marked the affective connections upon which, 
as Lord Henry has explained, life is dependent. The narrative syncope of this moment 
reflects that of Dorian’s faint as, again, the narrative turns away from the affective subject 
of the sentence: “There was a cry heard, and a crash. The cry was so horrible in its 
agony” (212). Unlike the faceless body of Dorian’s swoon, this body is “withered, 
wrinkled, and loathsome of visage,” and at first (too quickly to have happened), he is 
unrecognizable to his servants, any vulnerable body (213). Dorian’s autobiography closes 
with a full rejection of subjectivity, as the cry of no one emanates from a newly blank 
canvas representing the youthful Dorian and a body identified only by the inhuman 
jewels that mark its hands. Dorian cannot refuse responsibility without destroying the 
body itself. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In 1895, five years after the first publication of The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
Wilde was accused of being a sodomite by the father of his lover, Lord Alfred Douglas. 
Concerned about his reputation and urged by Douglas, Wilde sued the Marquess of 
Queensberry for libel. The case lasted only days before Wilde withdrew the suit and 
Queensberry was declared not guilty. If the Marquess had reason for calling Wilde a 
sodomite, then it seemed almost certain Wilde would be prosecuted—which, indeed, he 
was, and eventually found guilty and jailed. In the brief period before he was arrested, it 
was thought Wilde might flee to France. Reportedly, the Marquess told Wilde, “If the 
country allows you to leave, all the better for the country. But if you take my son with 
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you, I will follow you wherever you go and I will shoot you like a dog” (Robins 14). If 
true, the Marquess threatens Wilde with the same language of bare life that Wilde had 
used five years before in The Picture of Dorian Gray to drive home the violence of James 
Vane’s threat. While the turn of phrase is not an unusual one, I want to emphasize the 
importance of its use against Wilde as a signifier of the logic of the Marquess’ violence 
against the threat Wilde supposedly posed. To accuse Wilde of being a sodomite, a 
capacious term capturing any sexual intimacy between men, was to accuse him of 
immorality, unnaturalness, transgression, and queerness. To invoke the animal as a figure 
to hold that threat is significant. As Agamben, Esposito, and Wolfe have pointed out, 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries the discursive production of human 
life as animal or bare life—as contagious, unclean, or wild—has underwritten political 
violence. Queerness has shared a particular relationship with animality, in that as much as 
sexual intimacy between two men has been deemed unnatural, contemporary discourse 
has compared it to sexual intimacy between humans and animals. Without putting too 
much pressure on the specific recourse to canine symbolism here, I want to follow 
Chen’s example in attending to the ways that “animality, sexuality, race, ability [are] 
stationed in regard to one another” (98), suggesting that it is important for us to think 
through the political implications of Wilde’s—and Dorian’s—queer animality.  
As Wolfe has described, through the biopolitical production of bare life we are all 
potentially animals under the law. For those whose human and political rights are 
frequently endangered, as Wilde’s was, it is therefore crucial that we recognize the 
availability of queerness to abject animality in the production of bare life. Esposito places 
The Picture of Dorian Gray in a history of eugenics, in which the production of the 
Jewish people as parasites signals the biological threat of contagion and the state of 
emergency used by the Nazi regime to justify the violence towards them. While influence 
as contagion might also suggest this threat, I want to emphasize the production of 
Wilde’s body as “wild” and therefore bare and open to violence. To his detractors, Wilde 
was not beautiful or vulnerable, like the hare—his dress was loud, he was highly 
unnatural, he was like a woman in his hysteria, he was the worst of men in his egomania, 
he was unruly and undisciplined (Nordau 317-322). For the Marquess to call Wilde a 
dog, on the other hand, is to represent him as a tamed and abject companion to be put 
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down. Not only does the identification of humans with animals continue to justify state 
violence against them, as we have seen in Donald Trump’s invocation of the animal 
against Mexican immigrants and black bodies, but in the fragile anxiety of contemporary 
heteronormativity, queerness continues to be linked to the unnatural intimacy between 
humans and animals. By contrast, in its suspension of human agency, subjectivity, and 
control, narrative syncope evokes the animality of the bare body without yet ascribing 
any particular social or political symbolism or value.107 The Picture of Dorian Gray 
reveals the political danger of bare life that will be invoked in the life of its author, while 












                                               
107 In Still Life, Cohn also describes affect theory’s subversion of particular forms of value as its significant 
potential (193). 
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 “Insensible upon the machine”: The 
Technologies of Affect and Narrative in The Time Machine 
In H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895), the Time Traveller journeys into the 
future to encounter two species of evolutionary descendants: the pale, fragile, child-like 
Eloi, and the grotesque, cannibalistic, and subterranean Morlocks. In doing so, he travels 
more than 800,000 years in time—but moves in physical space only a few feet. During 
the Traveller’s initial voyage, he describes how difficult it is for him to stay conscious 
and aware while moving at a new pace through time. As he seats himself in the machine 
and presses the lever, he experiences an immediate physical response, “a nightmare 
sensation of falling” (76). As he speeds up his “motion” through time, he relates:  
An eddying murmur filled my ears, and a strange, dumb confusedness 
descended on my mind. I am afraid I cannot convey the peculiar sensations 
of time travelling. They are excessively unpleasant. There is a feeling 
exactly like that one has upon a switchback – of a helpless, headlong 
motion! (77)  
Eventually this feeling turns to “hysterical exhilaration” which makes him “too confused” 
to attend to either the unusual motion of the machine or the visions of the future that 
surround him (78). The movement through time affects the Traveller’s body as much as 
movement through space would. Creating a physiological response to time travel that 
results in a break with consciousness—a narrative syncope—the time machine disrupts 
both the Traveller’s embodied place in time and his subjectivity.   
This chapter explores the politics and ethics of affect that emerge in Wells’s novel 
as disruptions of human time and consciousness produce narrative syncope and reveal 
that nonhuman technologies are the basis of human subjectivity. This early scene 
suggests that, in order to remain conscious and in control of himself, the Time Traveller 
needs the temporality in which his body exists to be stable and linear. His confusion 
while on the machine suggests that human time—the temporality in which the Traveller 
retains conscious self-awareness—is opposed to technology, which has the ability to 
disrupt or suspend human time. However, affect adds another temporal layer to the 
opposition between humans and technology, since, as we have seen in The Picture of 
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Dorian Gray, affect is a-temporal; that is, affect happens to the body virtually, “too 
quickly to have happened” (Massumi 30). Moreover, Victorian science theorized that 
what we now understand as the affective body—the responsive, reactive, feeling body—
behaved like a machine. If technology in the novel, represented by the time machine, is a-
temporal, nonconscious, nonhuman, and automatic, so is the affective human body.  
Syncope both undermines and affirms humanness through the bare—or 
nonsubjective—life of the affective, automatic body, and the bare life of the disrupted 
narrative. Throughout the novel, as I will show, the Time Traveler seeks to reconcile the 
nonhuman and automatic part of his selfhood with his species superiority as a human and 
as a white, male, educated, bourgeois subject. At the same time, he struggles to 
differentiate himself from the animalistic others of the future while attempting to order 
the sequence of events lost in the gap of nonconscious time and the disruptive temporality 
of the affective body. After the publication of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, heterosexual 
British men, believed to be most firmly situated on the human side of the animal-human 
divide, were seen as vulnerable to their animal natures, which could “usurp masculine 
rationality and return man to a state of irrational chaos” (Hendershot 97).108 Scholars like 
Cyndy Hendershot and Carrie Rohman have demonstrated that Wells and other late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century writers “thematize clearly the post-Darwinian 
uncertainty [about] the human subject’s stability in relation to its species status” (Rohman 
64).109 In The Time Machine, the instability of the human-animal divide is yoked to the 
                                               
108 In Chapter 5 of her book, Hendershot explains that the animal within appears in three post-Darwinian 
texts, J. S. Le Fanu’s “Green Tea,” Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and 
Stevenson’s “Ollala,” writing that animality is ultimately a threat to gender difference and power. All of the 
texts in this dissertation—and in fact, all texts, including all texts featuring fainting men—are underwritten 
by the animal or nonhuman of the narrative. Post-Darwin, however, this animal appears through the 
physiology of the human body. Jekyll and Hyde certainly offers another model of the syncopated text, 
wherein Jekyll’s conscious and nonconscious selves slip back and forth between each other, undoing any 
strict dichotomy between human subject and nonconscious animal life. Further, one of Hendershot’s 
examples (Le Fanu) features a man haunted by animality in the form of a monkey; Wormwood, the novel 
example with which I begin the Introduction, features the same trope, as the fainting Gaston is followed by 
a leopard.  
109 Rohman uses this phrase in support of an argument about subjectivity in the modernist genre, claiming 
that Wells is “among the first modernist writers” to narrate his human character’s animal subjectivities 
(64). Analyzing two of Wells’s other novels, The Island of Dr. Moreau and The Croquet Player, Rohman 
uses Freudian psychoanalytic theory and Continental philosophy to read the inability of humans to repress 
their animal natures as evidence of the ontological (or biological) similarity between humans and animals. 
For her part, Hendershot reads the animal within as psychologically repressed in Le Fanu’s story, and 
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automatic and the technical, creating a syncopated narrative wherein disruptions of 
temporality are both challenges to and constituents of autobiographical narrative and 
forms of humanness.  
The Time Machine, therefore, does not represent the repression of the animal 
within in order to uncover its meaning, as Rohman and Hendershot partially claim. 
Instead, like the other novels in this dissertation, it expresses the instability between what 
is human and what is not. The Time Machine embodies the kind of “impossible” narrative 
that Jacques Derrida outlines in Without Alibi.110 Derrida writes that literary events, in 
particular the life-changing events of autobiography, are underwritten by a kind of 
mechanism or automaticity of behaviour or grammar. Derrida suggests that if we could, 
in fact, begin to imagine the “organic” and “aesthetic” form of the singular event with the 
“repetition” and “calculable programming” of the inorganic machine, we could produce a 
“new figure,” an “im-possible event” that belongs to the future (72-73). For Derrida, the 
term im-possible indicates the “the edge that forms the union and the separation of the 
possible and the impossible, the dash between them—the im-possible as possible or the 
possible as im-possible” (quoted in Fagan 70).111 In other words, the “impossible” makes 
the “possible” possible, or creates the conditions for the “possible” to happen.  
In fact, The Time Machine does imagine the event and the machine together, 
using im-possible temporalities of future history and future memory to recall a narrative 
in which everything that is singular or unique—the event of time travel, the human 
autobiographer, and his narrative of the future—is only made possible by the disruptive 
                                               
claims that Wells’s The Island of Dr. Moreau turns the animal within to the “animal without, a projection 
that protects the British subject from his own biological connection to the animal world and which provides 
ideological justification for imperialism” (129). It is worth noting that scholars pay the most attention to 
The Island of Dr. Moreau when analysing Wells’s interest in neurology and in the animal-human boundary. 
For example, in Popular Fiction and Brain Science in the Late Nineteenth Century, Anne Stiles 
investigates Wells’s interest in evolution and brain development; in Stiles’s edited collection on neurology 
and literature, Laura Otis compares Dr. Moreau to the recent trial of brain scientist David Ferrier, 
prosecuted for his use of vivisection in his experiments on animals. 
110 Darko Suvin claims The Time Machine is crucial to the history of science fiction as a literature of 
cognitive estrangement, another kind of impossibility that depends on the “opposition between the 
bourgeois reader’s expectations and the strange relationships found at the other end” (209-210). 
111 This quotation is originally from Derrida’s “Deconstructions: The Im-Possible,” in Sylvère Lotringer 
and Sande Cohen’s French Theory in America. 
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automatism of machines, through the time machine itself and the automaton body of the 
Traveller. Elana Gomel has already noted the two incompatible versions of evolutionary 
temporality that make up The Time Machine: one in which the future is determined (or 
automatic) and one in which the future is contingent (or singular) (“Shapes”). Building on 
that insight, this chapter turns to the way in which the Traveller’s singular 
autobiographical humanness—his subjectivity, self-representation, and sovereignty—are 
predicated on nonhuman technologies—his automatic body, the time machine, and the 
narrative.  
While each novel in this dissertation explores the centrality of automaton bodies 
to representations of human subjectivity, The Time Machine most fully ties self-
representation and human power to technology and machines. The Picture of Dorian 
Gray is largely focused on the ways in which the human body itself is animal, with 
Dorian desiring to escape into the wildness of bare, animal life while also remaining 
sovereign enough to control the animality of the body. As we will see in the next chapter, 
Dracula’s automatism is connected to the body’s circulatory system, a representation of 
the otherness of human and animal bodies. By contrast, The Time Machine grapples most 
fully with the possibility of the human as an animal-machine, while the Traveller’s desire 
for power is predicated on his ability to control the technical aspects of human life. 
Moments of narrative syncope, the points where the difference between the Traveller and 
the seemingly less-than-human beings of the future break down, reveal how narrative 
itself is both a technology of power and an automatic, “bare” form. Tim Armstrong, Sue 
Zemka, Elissa Marder, and Karl Heinz Bohrer have demonstrated how modern 
technological advancements in transportation, communication, perception, and even 
time-keeping itself have given rise to narratives characterized by temporal disruptions, 
distraction, fragmentation, and a focus on the singular moment.112 What needs to be more 
                                               
112 These narratives are characterized by distracted subjectivities (Armstrong “Two”); fragmented, 
supplemented, and regulated bodies (Armstrong Modernism); and an increased attempt to narrate the 
significance of singular moments (Zemka). As I mention in Chapter One, scholars like Elissa Marder and 
Karl Heinz Bohrer argue that disorders and interruptions of temporality in modern literature are responses 
to the experience of modernity (Marder) and constitutive of modern aesthetic form more broadly (Bohrer). 
For rigorous analyses of nineteenth-century technological advancements, see for example Anson 
Rabinbach and Wolfgang Schivelbusch. 
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fully addressed is both the way that modern technological advancements were coupled by 
understandings of subjectivity itself as automatic or animal-mechanical, and the ways in 
which these disruptions or failures of self-representation in narratives of modernity are so 
closely tied to assertions of human power.113 
The Time Traveller’s aim to speak the temporally-fractured body and world into 
linear and legible narratives, to write himself as an autobiographical being and to write 
himself in human time, works to form a justification for his fear and violence towards the 
beings of the future. Instances of narrative syncope, when it is uncertain or undecideable 
whether the Traveller’s body or the narrative form is human or nonhuman, are therefore 
ethically-charged. In fact, even the Time Traveller’s putative first-person account of the 
future is actually second-hand, reported by the frame narrator. Following Derrida’s 
theory of an im-possible future event, the narrator’s account of the Time Traveller’s 
journey combines the im-possibility of narrative with the im-possibility of making a truly 
ethical decision: one that responds to our obligations to all other beings, in complete 
openness towards all other beings. As Madeleine Fagan writes of Derrida’s ethical 
position, “the im-possible offers a way of conceptualising ethics that engages with the 
difficulties internal to the concept as its very condition of possibility; the condition of 
possibility of any ethics or responsibility is that it is without stable foundations” (70-
71).114 I argue that the very uncertainty of hierarchical categories like human and 
nonhuman, or agency and automatism, creates an im-possible field for ethical decision-
making, and therefore makes any ethical decision possible. While The Picture of Dorian 
Gray suggests that the body determines the im-possible ethical field of responsibility, and 
(as we will see) Dracula that the body is central to and engages in absolute and im-
possible generosity, The Time Machine’s ethical tensions remain in challenging those 
                                               
113 A notable exception to this is Zemka’s chapter on Joseph Conrad’s Lord Jim, which argues that Jim 
engages in a kind of animal-time that upsets hierarchies of power. Technology, however, is largely absent 
in Zemka’s analysis of this novel. Zemka writes of Jim’s panic and his narrator Marlow’s “rapturous 
insight” that “Jim is an anxious adventurer and Marlow is his anxious interpreter: each pursues his 
vocation, which in the terms of this analysis are temporal vocations, ways of living and narrating time, 
specifically as it consolidates around the virtues of human self-mastery and human apprehensions of the 
other” (181).  
114 See also Cary Wolfe, Derek Attridge, and Michael Anker for readings that emphasize uncertainty and 
impossibility in Derrida’s writings on ethics.  
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human attributes like thinking, choice, knowledge, and memory, while acknowledging 
that they are nonetheless necessary to ethical decision-making.  
Each instance of syncope in The Time Machine develops the idea that what makes 
humans singular, individual, unique, and powerful is a product of the automaticity of the 
animal-machine and its technological supplements. The first syncope of the novel 
introduces the affective body as technological and the time machine as a prosthesis, 
through an engagement with contemporaneous theories of consciousness and automatism. 
The second syncope reveals an uncanny encounter with future forms of life that represent 
technological, nonhuman aspects of the self. The third introduces the ethical significance 
of the im-possible conjunction of the automatic and the event, through the idea of 
uncertainty. Finally, the fourth syncope, occurring towards the end of the novel, offers an 
opportunity to read the syncopated narrative form as underwriting the possibility of 
autobiography. In the conclusion, I turn briefly to the possibility that we might read in 
narrative syncope a resistance to Wells’s later eugenicist beliefs. 
4.1. Technologies of Consciousness 
The first syncope in the novel, the disruption of the Time Traveller’s conscious 
attention with which I began this chapter, demonstrates the way in which subjectivity is 
both made possible and disrupted by technology. On the one hand, the time machine is an 
extension of human consciousness, and therefore a prosthesis that affirms the Traveller as 
a powerful, technical (or tool-using) human.115 At the same time, human consciousness 
itself, as it is represented through the Time Traveller’s narrative, is characterized by the 
technology of automatism.  
The first time the Time Traveller presses the lever on the machine, allowing him 
to move through the middle hours of the day in an instant, he experiences a “nightmare 
sensation of falling” (76). This sensation is unconnected to any other kind of disturbance, 
either visual or aural, but is instead the sensation of nonhuman temporality—the 
                                               
115 Tim Armstrong identifies Wells as an author of what he calls prosthetic modernism, but he focuses only 
on Wells’s narrative use of body modification and does not mention The Time Machine (Modernism 85). 
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sensation of having time move at a different speed than the Traveller’s consciousness. 
However, the disconnect between the feeling of falling and the apparent lack of change in 
the Traveller’s surroundings leads him to claim that his “intellect had tricked [him]” into 
believing he was moving (76). The Traveller seems to believe that his mind is affecting 
his nervous system, as the feeling of falling could be an illusion of consciousness, but the 
opposite turns out to be true: as an accelerated temporality produces sensation, it also 
disrupts consciousness. As the Traveller begins to speed into the future, he notes that 
those unpleasant sensations challenge his conscious attention, describing his mental state 
as a “veil of confusion” (78). Explicitly connecting confusion with physiology, the 
Traveller notes that “insensibly, the absolute strangeness of everything, the sickly jarring 
and swaying of the machine, above all, the feeling of prolonged falling, had absolutely 
upset my nerve” (79). As the Traveller laments his inability to determine how and when 
he should halt the machine, he theorizes that his body’s molecular cohesion is, like 
attentive consciousness, dependent on or a product of human temporality. “So long as I 
travelled at a high velocity through time,” he explains, “I was, so to speak, attenuated—
was slipping like a vapour through the interstices of intervening substances!” (78). 
Nonhuman time thins out or disperses the Time Traveller’s body as well as his 
subjectivity. 
In this scene of time travel, the Traveller is unable to narrate his experience, his 
thought, or his feelings, a set of autobiographical difficulties that places him in the 
company of literary modernism’s other characters.116 The machine acts as a supplement 
for the Traveller’s “limits of representation” (Greenberg 613), with many scholars 
claiming that the description of time travel mimics the techniques and technology of early 
cinema.117 However, few scholars have addressed the novel’s exploration of the material 
                                               
116 See for example Jonathan Greenberg and Caroline Hovanec. Michael Sayeau also categorizes The Time 
Machine as a modernist novel, which sees modernity’s industry and progress lead to stasis. 
117 See for example Keith Williams, Caroline Hovanec, Jonathan Bignell, Laura Marcus, and Chris Morash. 
Arguing that Wells’s oeuvre contributes substantially to modernity’s culture of cinema and technology, 
Williams concentrates on the visual effects of time travel that mimic the capacity of film, including the 
“accelerated motion,” “temporal condensation,” and the “alternation of light and darkness” as the day 
becomes night and then day again with ever increasing speed (25). For her part, Hovanec argues that 
cinematic effects of time travel produce a distinctly modernist “hazy aesthetic” (472). Hovanec also argues 
for the significance of embodied sensation by way of technology, claiming that by the end of the novel, the 
Traveller becomes “a Dorian Gray-like aesthete driven to experience ever more sensations” (475). 
124 
effects of time travel as it relates to late-Victorian conceptions of consciousness.118 That 
is, they have tended to understand the time machine as mediating and extending the 
human senses, particularly vision. While the time machine is an extension of the senses, 
we can also see in the Traveller’s period of syncope that the machine extends 
consciousness itself, while simultaneously revealing the archaeology of consciousness’s 
possibility. 
In the narrative that frames the Time Traveller’s adventure, the Traveller outlines 
his hypothesis that time or “duration” is the fourth dimension of any existing object (60). 
Consciousness obscures our ability to perceive time as a dimension of objecthood 
because “our consciousness moves along it” at “a uniform velocity” (60, original 
emphasis; 62). However, the Traveller insists that when we think about techniques of 
consciousness like memory, we can see how our minds are already time machines when 
we “jump back for a moment,” when we “become absent-minded” (62). For Philmus and 
Hughes, this theory “validate[s] time travel from the standpoint of human consciousness 
as a possibility of human consciousness” (53) in order to “reaffirm the possibilities for 
human will” (55), including freedom of thought from preconceived notions (49) or the 
agency of free will (53). However, there is a pervasive non-agency or automaticity that 
underwrites the possibility of agential movement through time. Even as one consciously 
attempts to access a memory, “jumping back” not only makes consciousness analogous to 
the technology of the machine that “mak[es] such movement both possible and prolonged 
within ‘objective’ or external time” (Williams 24), it also engenders a non-agential 
disappearance of self-presence—to become absent-minded.  
Consciousness and the time machine are indeed analogous in the novel but it is 
not the affirmation of human freedom that makes them so. Instead, syncope reveals that 
the time machine occupies a dual relationship to consciousness: on the one hand, the time 
                                               
Williams notes, too, that the Time Traveller’s use of the term “switchback” to refer to the machine is 
echoed by director D. W. Griffith to describe narrative flashbacks (30). For an alternate reading, see Miles 
Link, who reads the sensations of time travelling as a kind of euphoria for the Traveller, a case of 
“technophilia” in a novel that otherwise critiques the mechanization of time and of human potential (148). 
118 Exceptions are Keith Williams, who mentions that the Time Traveller’s theory of time consciousness 
resembles that of Henri Bergson (24), and Philmus and Hughes, who connect the theory with William 
James’s (48, n. 4). Neither develops their insights significantly.    
125 
machine is a technological object that mediates embodied consciousness. That is, the 
machine extends embodied consciousness into the future, allowing not just an extension 
of sight or sound into the future (as the camera or the phonograph do) but an extension of 
the entire human apparatus of consciousness to experience a new form of temporality. 
Marshall McLuhan writes that clothing is “an extension of the skin” like “the wheel is an 
extension of the foot,” “the book is an extension of the eye,” and “electric circuitry [is] an 
extension of the central nervous system” (31-41). While McLuhan is particularly 
interested in the way these prostheses enable human communication and perception, 
other theorists propose that extensions or supplements of the body and the mind 
constitute humanness itself. Derrida, for example, has written extensively about the 
supplements that replace a uniquely human lack, like language, writing, lying, and 
clothing. In contrast, animals are not lacking because (or if) they do not have access to 
these supplementary characteristics.119  
Bernard Stiegler clarifies the relationship between prosthesis and temporality by 
drawing on the myths of Epimetheus, the Greek god who gave animals gifts but forgot 
people, and Prometheus, his brother, who supplemented Epimetheus’ forgetfulness by 
gifting humans with fire and art. Stiegler theorizes that all technology represents a kind of 
prosthetic attempt to preserve humanness—human life and memory—in external forms. 
He writes, “As a ‘process of exteriorization,’ technics is the pursuit of life by means other 
than life” (17). As Cary Wolfe puts it, prostheses are “forms of technicity and materiality, 
forms that are radically ‘not-human’ and yet have nevertheless made the human what it 
is” (Wolfe xxv). In particular, Stiegler describes the way technologies for preserving 
memory in time mark humans as human, while also affecting both consciousness and 
memory. Temporal objects affect consciousness because “consciousness is itself to be 
understood on the basis of a temporal flux” (Roberts 59). The time machine’s extension 
of consciousness suggests that it, too, is a supplemental technology that distinguishes 
                                               
119 See, for example, Derrida’s discussion of clothing and nudity in The Animal that Therefore I Am (5). 
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between human and nonhuman, one that alters consciousness and the human capacity for 
self-awareness and subjectivity.120 
While on the one hand the time machine extends consciousness, on the other it 
activates and mimics the temporality and automatism of the affective body itself. As I 
have described in Chapters Two and Three, Brian Massumi and other modern affect 
theorists point to the non-cognitive time during which the body is affected and before the 
conscious subject registers the feeling of having been affected (either as internally or 
externally). Massumi calls this the virtual potential of the body. The time machine, too, is 
virtual in its temporality; it moves too quickly for the subject to register cognitively. Not 
only this, but for those subjects outside of the machine, it disappears; when the Traveller 
allows his dinner guests to send a model of his machine through time, it “became 
indistinct, was seen as a ghost for a second perhaps, as an eddy of faintly glittering brass 
and ivory; and it was gone—vanished!” (66). The Psychologist explains this as 
“presentation below the threshold,” equating this disappearance with the speed of a bullet 
or a turning wheel (67). While the examples emphasize the inability of the visual 
sensorium to keep up with the temporality of the machine, we might also understand 
“below the threshold” to be a virtual affective realm.  
In its dual relationship to human consciousness, we can imagine the time machine 
within a modern history of physiological and psychological experimentation that 
monitored and measured body-time and sought the human (the singular or evental) 
through the inorganic (technology), beginning in the nineteenth century. This history is 
one where, as in The Time Machine, the affective body and the conscious subject are 
produced through and with technology, both the technology of the experimental 
apparatus but also the automatism of the responsive body. In fact, Nigel Thrift locates a 
history of nonconscious affect in the experiments of Wilhelm Wundt in the mid-
                                               
120 Mark Hansen draws on Stiegler, along with other philosophers, to account for the role of affect in time 
consciousness, subjectivity, and perception. He analyzes new media art that uses technology to expand the 
possibilities for self-affection, “allows for a fuller and more intense experience of subjectivity” (589). 
Hansen turns to neurologist Francisco Varela to investigate the relationship between affect and tertiary 
memory; I do not draw on Hansen here because Massumi’s conception of affect as occurring too quickly 
for consciousness to grasp is a highly relevant theory for Wells’s novel. Varela’s theory is not irrelevant but 
it is unnecessary for my analysis. 
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nineteenth century, precursors to Massumi’s proposal that the body reacts before the 
mind and “that consciousness takes time to construct” (Thrift 67).121  Like nineteenth- and 
later twentieth-century experiments meant to measure physiological responses, the time 
machine stimulates an affective reaction. However, as Lisa Blackman and Henning 
Schmidgen have pointed out, such experiments ask us to reevalute what a machine is 
along with what consciousness is; that is, whether we can really isolate the organic and 
non-organic, or subjective and nonsubjective, parts of the experiment (Schmidgen 214, 
Blackman 371).122 While the Traveller’s conscious engagement in the time machine 
seems unlikely given the passage above, as the Traveller does little more than pull the 
lever and has a difficult time bringing himself to willfully halt it, Schmidgen and 
Blackman’s arguments suggest a fundamental uncertainty between the human and 
nonhuman, subjective and nonsubjective, organic and inorganic elements of the 
experiment. The Traveller is not really in control of the machine, prosthesis though it 
may be—he is in collaboration with it. Like Derrida’s im-possible event, it is difficult to 
                                               
121 Thrift connects these experiments with those of Benjamin Libet in the mid-twentieth century which 
conclude the same thing; Libet’s experiments provide evidence of Massumi’s influential theory of 
nonconscious affect (Massumi 29). Thrift also connects the revelation of nonconscious, reactive body-time 
to imperceptible movements—or unconscious temporality—of the body being made visible by the camera. 
In the early twentieth century, Walter Benjamin notes precisely the same thing, writing, “The enlargement 
of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals 
entirely new structural formations of the subject. So, too, slow motion not only presents familiar qualities 
of movement but reveals in them entirely unknown ones…Evidently a different nature opens itself to the 
camera than opens to the naked eye—if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a 
space consciously explored by man” (236-237). Moreover, in this essay Benjamin notes that watching a 
film creates a too-fast-for-subjective-attention (or below the threshold) affective response in the viewer, a 
shock effect that mimics the pace of modern life (238, 250 n. 19). Extending this type of analysis, Mary 
Ann Doane makes the case that film represented temporality as a-systematic to provide a site for affect in 
its absence from modern systematic temporality. Doane’s argument is that “such a strategy is not designed 
simply to deal with the leakage or by-products of rationalization; it is structurally necessary to the 
ideologies of capitalist modernization” (11). While these are relevant connections to the Traveller’s 
automaticity and his relation to the machine, this chapter is not primarily focused on the visual.  
122 Schmidgen explores the significance of Franciscus Donders’s experiments, writing that “physiological 
experiments are machines not simply because the historical focus is on instruments and technological 
systems; rather, they are machines because they combine technological components with parts of human 
and nonhuman organisms to form essentially precarious, but functioning, arrangements of flows and 
interruptions that are directed toward the production of semiotic events. I argue that this generalized notion 
of the machine allows us to investigate in detail the relation of matter, sign, and time that was (and still is) 
of crucial importance in the scientific practice of physiology and other experimental life sciences” (214). 
Lisa Blackman draws on Schmidgen and this history of experimentation to investigate Gertrude Stein’s 
early-twentieth-century experiments in automatic writing, which were, according to Stein, “a process of 
becoming unconscious,” wherein Stein’s conscious subjectivity and the automatisms produced by the 
experiment and its devices are inseparable (371).  
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separate the machine (which is automatic, programmed, repetitive, or inorganic) from the 
event (which is singular, unique, and organic).123 
In fact, the very nineteenth-century evolutionists that scholars note influenced 
Wells’s writing of the Time Machine—Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer—theorize 
the automatic nature of human behaviour and subjectivity. For Derrida, automatism is 
characterized by repetition and a lack of affect or autoaffection (a sense of self) (Without 
72); in other words, machinic behaviour is the result of a-subjective programming. As I 
describe in Chapter Two, nineteenth-century physiologists theorized that humans were a 
kind of automaton in that they behaved automatically as a result of responsive or reactive 
nervous systems, including the brain. While this theory existed before Thomas Huxley 
adopted it to compare the behaviour of humans and animals, Huxley developed the most 
explicitly mechanical theory of the mind in his lecture “On the Hypothesis that Animals 
Are Automata, and Its History.” As I have mentioned in previous chapters, Huxley 
responds to Descartes’ proposal that animals are “unconscious machines” by claiming 
that while animals do respond in an automatic way to their environment, they are 
“conscious, sensitive, automata,” whose “actions are the results of their physical 
organization” (574). Huxley cites experiments in modern physiology alongside 
evolutionary principles to hypothesize that the difference in animal and human neurology 
is one of degree; both forms of life are sensitive machines whose “affections of their 
sensory nerves give rise to molecular changes in the brain, which again give rise to, or 
evolve, the corresponding states of consciousness” (575). Far from being an agent of 
human behaviour, consciousness was a by-product of the body’s responsive relationship 
to the world, the “steam-whistle” on the engine of the body (575).124 Huxley insists that 
consciousness, what is often considered most human about humans (Anger, Review 50), 
                                               
123 Zemka too, notes, the importance of Hermann von Hemholtz’s experiments in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century on “the velocity of neural transmission,” meant to measure responses and reaction times 
to stimuli (24-25), the kind of experiments that informed representations of the “moment” in Victorian 
literature. 
124 Suzy Anger writes that Huxley’s thesis “took a profound hold on the Victorian cultural imagination,” 
and characterizes some objections as “near-hysterical” (Review 50, 51). Huxley’s theory provoked a series 
of responses from physiologists like William Carpenter and George Lewes, who, as I note in Chapter Two, 
were resistant to the idea that humans lacked sensibility or agency entirely (in other words, that they were 
merely programmed). 
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is actually a biological and technical, and therefore an animal or nonhuman, process. 
Moreover, he proposes that neither consciousness nor the soul (if it exists, an equally 
epiphenomenal concept) has any volitional effect. Instead, by Huxley’s account, free will 
is akin more to the feeling of freedom than to any actual exertion of agency and this 
feeling can be experienced by both humans and animals alike.125  
Like Huxley, Herbert Spencer is most often read alongside The Time Machine to 
illuminate the novel’s evolutionary influence,126 fittingly as the famous father of social 
Darwinism and promoter of the idea that the principles of evolutionary fitness governed 
the successful progress of society and its individuals. However, also like Huxley, Spencer 
was an automatist who believed that the psyche was dependent on the impressions it 
received from the outside world.127 In The Principles of Psychology (1855), Spencer 
writes, “Out of a great number of psychical action going on in the organism, only a part is 
woven into the thread of consciousness” (495). In summing up the material aspects of 
Spencer’s thinking, David Bates writes that for the physiologist, “the conscious mind was 
in a sense a complicated fiction constructed out of a limited set of sensory experiences,” 
while “the unconscious activity of the nervous system was continually generating 
responses, integrating memories, and producing automatisms” (158-159, original 
emphasis). Spencer theorizes that consciousness is generated when the body has to adapt 
to a new situation (566), but the subject’s will is no more than the feeling of these new 
automatisms.128 Spencer argues that “when an impression received from without” prompts 
the organism to change its behaviour, there are “various of the impressions which must 
accompany and follow” the possibility of “motor changes”; when those feelings and ideas 
                                               
125 See my chapter on the relationship between Huxley’s theory of human and animal will and Thomas 
Hardy’s representation of human and animal willingness and consent in Tess of the D’Urbervilles. 
126 See, for example, Steven McLean and Elana Gomel (“Shapes”). 
127 Although the quotation from Spencer is too late to be directly applicable to The Time Machine, C. U. M. 
Smith writes, “Spencer’s general position is summed up in the Autobiography he worked on at the end of 
his life and which was published posthumously in 1904: ‘the form of life which we call Mind, emerges out 
of bodily life’” (137).  
128 Bates writes: “Reason, for Spencer, was explained as a gap in the series of automatic functions, a 
moment of interruption, that is, where these acquired ideas and memories, the evolutionary inheritance, this 
whole storehouse of automatisms, would be newly organized to help adjust the organism to its challenging 
environmental circumstances. Reason existed to bridge the difference between the ‘perfectly automatic’ 
and the ‘imperfectly automatic’” (158-159). 
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prompt new behaviour, it is “the ego which is said to will the action” (618, original 
emphasis).129 Spencer’s concepts of consciousness and will, like Huxley’s, sound very 
alike to the Traveller’s self-narration or autobiography: unpleasant sensations and a series 
of external impressions substitute for an articulate description of self-presence, then give 
way to a sudden change in behaviour that might be described as willful but that is not 
precisely an act of volition. 
The Time Traveller’s record of his experience during time travel echoes some of 
the narrative aspects of conscious automatism described by Huxley. As the Traveller 
describes the inability of his confused mind to “attend” to the machine, he also notes that 
he is unable to think of anything “but these new sensations” of time travel. Like Huxley’s 
automaton, the Traveller’s mind can exert no agency over his body but is rather carried 
along by his embodied affections. Even when he begins to muse on the possible progress 
of civilization he is about to witness, the Traveller describes these thoughts occurring 
from “a fresh series of impressions [that] grew up in my mind—a certain curiosity and 
therewith a certain dread—until at last they took complete possession of me” (78). By 
this description, his thinking is not evidence of the self-presence of the subject, but rather 
a kind of gradual accumulation of thoughts that exist almost as their own agents, apart 
from the Traveller. They are not the product of the Traveller’s conscious attention but 
rather something that happens to him—they “grow up in [his] mind” and take “complete 
possession” of him. As such, this series of impressions undercuts any self-aware 
autobiographical narrative they are meant supply. When the Traveller decides, despite his 
aforementioned concern about molecular cohesion, to stop the time machine, his 
representation of the moment also carries the charge of automatism with it. He has 
already described how time travel has “upset [his] nerve.” The neurological response of 
syncope carries with it here the physiological symptoms of confusion and sickness; he 
recalls that, in this state, “with a gust of petulance I resolved to stop forthwith. Like an 
impatient fool, I lugged over the lever” (Wells 79). While the Time Traveller ostensibly 
tries to exert some control over the situation, his actions sound out of control, the 
                                               
129 In the third edition of The Principles of Psychology (1897), Spencer clarifies this section on the will and 
more fully undercuts the self-presence of the subject by arguing that “the mental I” is the organism’s 
“aggregate of feelings and ideas” (504, original emphasis). 
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suddenness of his “gust of petulance” underlining the spontaneous automaticity of his 
“foolish” actions. The Traveller’s impatient discharge of energy sounds very much like 
the greyhound of Huxley’s automaton theory, who exerts his will as a “free agent” 
insofar as “his action is in accordance with his strong desire to catch the hare,” and 
insofar as there is no leash to hamper him (Huxley 575-576). 
There are two other aspects of the Traveller’s recollection of his own thinking that 
form an automatist or nonhuman form of autobiography. The first is that the phrase 
“series of impressions” suggests imagery rather than a narration of thought, resisting (like 
the narrative of The Picture of Dorian Gray) an articulate or linguistic—human—form of 
consciousness. Not only does this prefigure the kind of image-based self-narration that 
modern affect theorist Antonio Damasio has claimed is available to animals, but it also 
echoes the kind of self-narration Huxley proposed was open to animals. Huxley writes 
that animals have the same kind of consciousness that humans do, but that animal 
consciousness differs in both its lower intensity and its linguistic lack: animals “can have 
no trains of thoughts, but only trains of feelings” (574). The Traveller’s series of 
impressions slides between these two types of narration, as both thoughts of humanity’s 
“wonderful advances” and feelings of a “certain curiosity and therewith a certain dread” 
(Wells 78). The second Huxleyan aspect of the Traveller’s narration is the materiality of 
the phrase “series of impressions.” Huxley writes that the “emotions of brutes, and such 
ideas as they possess” are “dependent upon molecular brain changes” which are caused 
by the “affections” of the nervous system (575). Memories are also the result of these 
nervous affections, as “each sensory impression leaves behind a record in the structure of 
the brain” (575). Like a printmaker’s press, the nervous system leaves behind its affective 
ink in the brain. 
Read together, Huxley and Spencer illuminate some of the stakes involved in the 
temporal form of the Traveller’s self-narration. Both physiologists understand 
consciousness to be an organic trait, varying only in degree or complexity between 
animals and humans. For Huxley, this is the difference between trains of feelings and 
trains of thought; for Spencer, simple changes of state result only in a kind of basic 
animal consciousness, not “one which we can in any sense realize to ourselves” (324). 
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Moreover, Spencer illuminates the significance of time to this automatist autobiography. 
Writing years before Wells on the movement of consciousness through time, Spencer 
explains: 
our notion of Time is the notion of relativity of position in the series of states 
of consciousness; as this presupposes a series of such states; as this 
presupposes successive changes of state; it follows that that which is 
required to produce changes of state, is that through which Time is 
disclosed. (253) 
For Spencer, time is a product of our sense of change—which is precisely what 
constitutes consciousness itself.130 Not only does this speak directly to the Traveller’s 
theory of the relativity of time and consciousness, but Spencer also describes the 
importance of linear temporality to consciousness. Organic changes alone, he tells us, are 
not enough to constitute what we understand as consciousness. “Consciousness is not 
simply a succession of changes,” he writes, “but an orderly succession of changes—a 
succession of changes combined and arranged in special ways. The changes form the raw 
material of consciousness; and the development of consciousness is the organization of 
them” (323-324, original emphasis). As though foreshadowing Stiegler, Spencer 
describes consciousness as a kind of aesthetic technique of the subject, the making of 
consciousness out of temporality.  
Out of these automatist theories arises a kind of complex or articulate self-
presence that distinguishes between animal and human consciousness. Nevertheless, even 
that self-presence is, ultimately that of the automaton—the self-presence of the conscious 
machine. Conscious automatism in The Time Machine differs from its appearance in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray. While Wilde’s novel has a narrative form that is underwritten by 
nonconscious interruptions of subjectivity, Wells’s novel proposes that the difference 
between humans and nonhumans can be found in narration, in the ability to create a 
coherent story from a temporally linear train of thoughts. While Dorian seeks power 
through sovereignty over his body and its feelings, even if this includes rejecting linear 
temporality, the Traveller finds power in his use of technology, which includes the 
                                               
130 Spencer continues: “And it needs but a little reflection to see, that without motion, subjective or 
objective, no changes of consciousness could ever have been generated” (253). 
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technology of narrative. Or, perhaps it is the frame narrator that wields this power. That 
is, either we understand the Time Traveller’s reported narrative as faithful—that it is, 
indeed, what the Time Traveller said—or we understand it as the editorial work of the 
frame narrator. In what follows, I take the frame narrator’s retelling of the Time 
Traveller’s narrative to be faithful enough, while acknowledging that its very im-
possibility is a part of narrative self-presence itself. 
The time machine has given the Traveller the power of authorship, as it gives him 
the opportunity to tell this unique and singular story to his audience in a demonstration of 
his mastery over the organization of events and over the mechanisms of time itself. 
However, the time machine also undercuts this power by denying the Traveller the 
possibility of organized, linear narration, as it disrupts subjectivity and creates a gap—or 
a syncope—between the years 1894 and 802,701. When the Traveller reaches future 
London, he is left without the power of autobiography or self-narration, both for himself 
and, on a massively autobiographical scale, for humankind because he does not know 
what has happened in the intervening years and immediately imagines himself as a 
powerless animal. He worries whether “cruelty had grown into a common passion” and 
“the race had lost its manliness, and had developed into something inhuman, 
unsympathetic, and overwhelmingly powerful?” (80),131 lamenting that he might be seen 
as less-than-human by the creatures of the future, like “some old-world savage animal, 
only the more dreadful and disgusting for our common likeness—a foul creature to be 
incontinently slain” (80). Panicking, the Traveller describes himself as feeling “naked in 
a strange world” (81). This reference to nudity can be understood as a reference to what 
Derrida has called human lack—like other prostheses, clothes supplement the human lack 
of fur, feathers, or scales, and represent both their need for and their ability to create and 
use this supplement. Clothes, too, are the result of technology; they are the product of the 
skills of weavers and seamstresses and the mechanics of industrial looms, and the product 
of human ability to use nature and technology to their advantage. To be without a 
narrative of history is to lack protection and to be a naked, vulnerable, human-animal. 
                                               
131 Theresa Jamieson claims this is the case and the lesson of the novel, arguing that The Time Machine 
figures a degenerative crisis of masculinity resulting in part from a lack of labour. 
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The unknowable gap between nineteenth-century and future London is not the 
only challenge to the Traveller’s narration. The Traveller’s narrative is non-linear in and 
of itself because he has travelled to the future and back again and is now narrating for his 
audience things that have happened in their collective past (over the last week) but in 
humanity’s collective future. Describing the frugivorous diet of the Eloi, the first future 
form of life the Traveller encounters, he seemingly checks himself; “however,” he says, 
“I am telling you of my fruit dinner in the distant future now” (Wells 86). This phrase 
functions as its own kind of syncope, a self-reflective pause or glitch in the narrative that 
acknowledges the impossibility of what the narrative seeks to do in the tension of its 
temporal grammar (I am telling you something now that happened in the future which is 
my past). Just as Derrida has theorized what he has called the im-possible event of 
thinking together both the repetitive programming of the machine and the unique 
singularity of the event, this is reflected in the im-possible grammar of the narrative, as it 
tries to account for both the repetitive or programmed future while also describing the 
unique event.  
4.2. Being with Machines 
The second example of syncope in the novel appears in the complete loss of 
consciousness the Time Traveller experiences after he comes face to face with the 
Morlocks. In future London, the Traveller is desperate to assert his superiority over what 
he sees as the less-than-human creatures of the future. However, the difference between 
the Traveller and his evolutionary descendants is largely illusory; while they may look 
and act differently, their ontological similarity—the ways in which they are the same 
kinds of beings or forms of life—belies the underlying insistence in the narrative that 
they are the animals to his human. Instead, both the Traveller and the future inhabitants 
of London can be understood as posthuman, as forms of life who slip ontologically 
between the categories of human, animal, and machine. This second syncope emphasizes 
how ontologically similar the Traveller is to the Morlocks, while also drawing attention 
to the narrative techniques that affirm human autobiography.  
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Following his moment of fear upon arriving in the future and briefly attempting 
escape, the Traveller meets the Eloi. His fear abates as he is able to render them inferior 
by infantilizing and feminizing them, describing them as “exquisite” and “frail” with a 
“graceful gentleness” and “childlike ease” (82). Their clothes are a distinguishing feature 
of their difference, as they are more naked than he but not suffering from it, with bare 
legs, bare heads, and simple clothing that accompanies their own seeming physical and 
intellectual inferiority (81-83). The Traveller’s narrative suggests they are also like 
animals, as he claims they touch him with their “tentacles” and eat their meals of fruit 
with “a pretty absence of ceremony…with their hands, flinging peels and stalks, and so 
forth, into the round openings in the sides of the tables” (85). Language, too, is a 
supplement or prosthesis that supposedly separates humans from animals, and the Eloi’s 
language, like their bodies and their clothing, is childlike and unsophisticated. The Eloi’s 
language is as much music as it is communicative, as they speak “in soft cooing notes to 
each other (83). And though they might understand each other perfectly well, they are 
uninterested in bridging the communicative gap between themselves and the Traveller, 
giving him an opportunity to demonstrate his linguistic mastery by trying to teach them 
English, “like a school-master amidst children” (86).  
The Traveller’s sense of species superiority is short-lived, however, as his 
machine is taken underground soon after his arrival by the Morlocks. Its disappearance 
creates a lack of technological supplementation for the Traveller, and his feeling is again 
represented as embodied and material; again, thought comes to him as though from some 
external source, “like a lash across the face” (94). Imagining that he could be left 
“helpless in this strange new world,” the Traveller insists that “the bare thought of it was 
an actual physical sensation” that “grips [him] at the throat and stop[s his] breathing” 
(94). The Traveller sprints around, crying, yelling, and flailing in a moment Hovanec 
reads, along with others like his fainting spell, as a manifestation of male hysteria. For 
Hovanec, who places the Traveller in the company of Jean-Martin Charcot’s male 
hysterics suffering from the shocks of modern life and travel, this hysteria is indicative of 
his unreliability as a narrator and thus of the text’s status as modernist and aestheticist 
(Hovanec 469, 475). Unlike many other scholars of hysteria, Hovanec does not connect 
the pathology to a sexual cause, but rather a traumatic one; the chapter title is, after all, 
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“A Sudden Shock.” Israel Zangwill, a late-nineteenth-century author, notes in an 
otherwise generally positive review that this is the oddest aspect of the novel—that a 
“cool scientific thinker” like the Traveller “behaves exactly like the hero of a 
commonplace sensation novel” (in Wells 273). Whether or not we choose to label the 
Traveller’s state as hysterical, however, his behaviour is utterly rooted in sensation; he is 
like Huxley’s and Spencer’s automaton in that he is not in control of his actions and his 
embodied response is syncopated in the sense that it creates gaps in conscious awareness 
and self-reflection. 
His first-person narrative, then, is characterized by a syncopation of self-
awareness and memory, gaps in both his consciousness and agency. The Traveller feels 
“faint and cold” when he realizes the time machine is gone, as though the distinguishing 
human trait of consciousness disappears along with the human technology of the machine 
(95). Moreover, this moment is marked by a sense of dispossession and uncertainty, as 
the Traveller cannot quite remember what exactly he does in his state of panic. “I think I 
must have had a kind of frenzy,” he conjectures and, after describing what he can 
remember—“sobbing and raving in my anguish of mind”—remarks that waking the next 
morning he cannot immediately “remember how I had got there, and why I had such a 
profound sense of desertion and despair” (95-97). If the affective body is like a machine, 
conscious self-awareness is not only a by-product of the body (like Huxley’s steam-
whistle), it also lags behind the body’s automatic behaviour, a glitchy recording that 
requires a minute to warm up. Again, the Traveller connects the loss of his technology 
with animal helplessness, hearkening back to his earlier fear and vulnerability when he 
arrived in the future. Further, this automatism is not just mechanical but also animal, for 
as the Traveller fears the loss of the time machine, he sees himself like an animal, like the 
Eloi, “cut off from [his] own kind—a strange animal in an unknown world” (96), caught 
in “the most hopeless trap that ever a man devised” (99). Finally, this feeling of 
animality, provoked by the disappearance of supplemental technology, is also repeated 
here through a lack of other supplemental technologies. As the Traveller panics trying to 
find the machine, he rushes into a dark building where some Eloi are sleeping. He 
describes what he assumes his appearance must be to them, “strange enough, coming 
suddenly out of the quiet darkness with inarticulate noise and the sputter and flare of a 
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match” (96). Frustrated that the Eloi cannot help him, the Traveller drops the match. In 
this moment he loses two supplements that represent humanness—the supplement of 
language (now, just “inarticulate noise”) and Promethean fire (now, an extinguished 
match).  
There is, however, a way in which the technology of the body, its automatism, is 
used by the Traveller as a tool. To recover the time machine, the Traveller believes that 
he needs knowledge of the future, to “learn its way, watch it, be careful of too hasty 
guesses at its meaning,” to “find clues to it all,” as he continues to learn the Eloi language 
(99). Besides the fact that the Traveller does almost nothing but make “hasty guesses” at 
the history of 802,701 (a point to which I will return), he also seems to claim that 
knowledge about the time machine’s location will come as a result of the nonconscious 
brain. “I determined to put the thought of my Time Machine,” the Traveller tells his 
audience, “and the mystery of the bronze doors under the sphinx, as much as possible in a 
corner of memory, until my growing knowledge would lead me back to them in a natural 
way” (99). Tasking his brain to work out the machine’s location without his conscious 
attention, the Traveller seems to refer here to unconscious cerebration, the idea, brought 
to public attention by William Carpenter in 1874, that the unconscious brain works to 
produce meaning which is then revealed to consciousness.132 Referring to the automatism 
theories of Carpenter, Spencer, and others, David Bates writes that in the nineteenth 
century, thinking was understood as 
something that took place both unconsciously and consciously. The 
relationship was not antagonistic necessarily, but neither was it wholly 
harmonious. Intellectual insight came from both conscious attention and the 
interruptions from the automatic nervous system. (159)  
Bates explicitly connects these theories of mechanical intelligence with twentieth century 
conceptions of computational intelligence, but what may be even more relevant is the 
idea that, as Schmidgen and Blackman have suggested, there is no definitive way to 
                                               
132 Scholars like David Glover, John Greenway, William Hughes (Beyond), Jill Matus, Anne Stiles, Jenny 
Bourne Taylor, and Sally Shuttleworth have all examined the appearance of unconscious cerebration in the 
Victorian novel; Glover, Greenway, Hughes, and Stiles in particular in relation to another text in this 
dissertation, Dracula.  
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separate what is automatic from what is creative, or what is programmed from what is 
unique—in other words, what is machine from what is event. The Traveller relies here on 
the unconscious technology of the body, its automatic memory function and its 
nonconscious processing, to prevent him from being an animal. 
The Traveller does not only need the prosthetic supplement of technology as a 
human, he emphatically locates some of those technologies within his body itself. This 
collapse between human and technology suggests that the Traveller is a form of technical 
or mechanical being that contemporary theorists like Wolfe would call posthuman. Wolfe 
writes that the term “posthuman” names “the embodiment and embeddedness of the 
human being in not just its biological but also its technological world, the prosthetic 
coevolution of the human animal with the technologies of tools and external archival 
mechanisms (such as language and culture),” and also “the decentering of the human by 
its imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks” (xv). The 
representation of the Traveller’s body as affectively automatic, technologically mediated, 
and capable of producing information nonconsciously are all examples of the way 
humanness—emotion, capability, reasoning—are embedded in and overlap with 
technological systems. Nicholas Gane’s recent summary of posthuman theories notes that 
theorists like Donna Haraway and Katherine Hayles describe posthuman bodies as 
prostheses or information systems, both alike to and able to integrate with other 
prostheses, communication systems, and technologies. The Traveller’s attenuation of 
subjectivity on the time machine and his body’s nonconscious processing of information 
fit neatly into the kind of posthuman framework these theorists describe. Further, the 
approaches of Huxley and Spencer (and many of their contemporaries) to the automatism 
of human intelligence, creativity, feeling, and will show how both nineteenth-century and 
current neuroscience suggests that consciousness is posthuman.133   
The Traveller’s representation as posthuman is significant because many scholars 
understand the Eloi and Morlocks to be posthuman. Both Ralph Pordzik and Elaine 
                                               
133 Wolfe devotes a chapter in Posthumanism to the neuroscientist Daniel Dennett and his theory of 
language; see also Pramod K. Nayar’s chapter “Consciousness, Biology, and the Necessity of Alterity” for 
an overview of the way modern theories of neurology see posthuman consciousness arising from the 
information system model—interactions between the body and its environment. 
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Despres explore the way descriptions of forms of life in the novel seek to differentiate 
between the human and the posthuman, in this case drawing on the term posthuman to 
describe the Eloi and Morlocks as evolutionary human descendants.134 Kelly Hurley coins 
the term “abhuman” to describe not only the frightening evolutionary mutability of the 
white, imperialist human form into the abject creatureliness of the Morlocks, but to read 
that creatureliness back into the contemporary form of the human. While Hurley’s 
reading of The Time Machine (and her readings of the abhuman more broadly) 
concentrate on the mutability of the body’s form, she agrees that little separates the 
Traveller from his descendants of the future, despite his desire to the contrary.  
The appearance of the Morlocks continues to destabilize the difference between 
the Traveller and the posthumans of the future. Like the nonhuman temporality of the 
time machine and future London, the Morlock encounter activates the automatism of the 
Traveller’s body. In the dark ruins of the future, the Traveller sees two eyes watching him 
and experiences what he calls “the old instinctive dread of wild beasts” (106). While the 
Traveller claims to “overcom[e his] fear to some extent,” it is nonetheless expressed 
through automatic physiological response—a moment of syncope in which he clenches 
his fists and seems paralyzed. When he tries to speak to them, his voice is “harsh and ill-
controlled” (106).135 There is every reason to sympathize with the Traveller’s initial fear 
of the Morlocks since he encounters them in the dark and he has no idea what dangers the 
future holds. However, this scene hints that his embodied response to their creatureliness 
is not the fear of prey for predator, but rather ontological identification: the uncanny 
response of two forms of life that are alike in their lack of humanness and in the 
prostheses or supplements that they use to make up for this lack. The Traveller, like the 
Morlock, lacks the technology of speech here, both because his voice falters and because 
speech ultimately accomplishes nothing in this encounter. Moreover, both the Morlock 
and the Traveller are caught out-of-time—the Morlock in this new a-historical age and 
                                               
134 See also the off-handed use of the term by Sayeau and Hovanec to seemingly indicate the same. 
135 Parrinder reads this as a moment in which eye contact is disturbing because it puts the animal Morlock 
and the human “on terms of equality” (59). 
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the Traveller in a sudden suspension of time, as he is “halted spellbound” in the im-
possible temporality and “profound obscurity” of the future’s ruins of the past (107).  
If it is true that an instinct of survival against a predatory threat prompts the 
Traveller’s response to the Morlocks, this ought to be borne out by his narrative 
description of them. However, the Morlocks are not rendered in particularly threatening 
terms (a point to which I will return); rather, their features slip between human and 
animal. Their figure is “ape-like,” and their colouring is “dull white”—a descriptor that 
seems uncertainly attached to skin or fur. They have “strange large grey-ish red eyes” and 
“flaxen hair on its head and down its back” both like a human and like an animal. In fact, 
the Traveller seems to express more revulsion than fear towards the Morlocks, as when 
he tells his audience that the “small, white moving creature” locks eyes with him, making 
him “shudder” because it is “so like a human spider,” a “little monster,” “a “bleached, 
obscene, nocturnal Thing” (107). This shudder is not because he identifies the Morlocks 
as threateningly unknown, but because he cannot identify a proper division between 
human and animal. In this scene, the Traveller’s instinct is again a kind of impossibility. 
It is both the automatic programming of his body while also a singular, experiential event 
(how can his body already know to be scared of a future species that is only threatening, 
if indeed it is threatening, because it has evolved to be so in the future?). 
Again, the uncertain species category of the Morlocks is replicated in the 
Traveller himself. When the Traveller and the Morlock come face to face, the experience 
is again one of ontological identification and uncanny recognition, a moment of syncope 
reflected as a loss of prosthesis and a loss of time in the narrative for the Traveller. As the 
Morlock climbs down a shaft, the Traveller lights a match to dispel both the darkness of 
the ruins and his lack of knowledge. However, as the Traveller identifies his disgust at 
the “human spider” and watches its retreat down the shaft, the match falls out of his 
hands, “going out as it dropped,” and by the time he has “lit another the little monster had 
disappeared” (107). Unlike the Morlocks, the Traveller cannot see in the dark, and his 
Promethean fire—a technology or supplement that means to distinguish humanness—
fails him in this moment, in which he becomes less equipped or advanced than the 
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Morlocks.136 He loses a sense of time as well, claiming, “I do not know how long I sat 
peering down that well. It was not for some time that I could succeed in gradually 
persuading myself that the thing I had seen was human” (107). Along with the loss of 
vision added by the match, the Traveller also loses his place in time and his ability to 
narrate. His reflection resumes as the “truth gradually dawn[s]” on him; the gap between 
encountering a Morlock and being able to narrate its history is marked by a gap in his 
own consciousness. As much as the Traveller recognizes the Morlock as a human-animal, 
his narrative uncannily represents himself as one, too. 
This encounter and narrative gap occur again, leading to a full break with 
consciousness, when he ventures into the Underworld in search of the time machine. The 
Traveller’s climb down into the Morlocks’ underground caves through a shaft 
immediately initiates a break or syncopation of human time that echoes his experience of 
time travel, as the Traveller experiences extreme physical discomfort in his descent and 
must stop at the first tunnel he finds to “lie down and rest” (115). At this point, he is 
emotionally exhausted from “the prolonged terror of a fall” and physically exhausted 
from holding onto the metal bars as he climbs down the shaft (115). The sensory input of 
the Underworld is temporally and physiologically disruptive in its “unbroken darkness” 
and its rhythmic “throb-and-hum of machinery pumping air down the shaft” (115), so the 
Traveller must lie down, losing time again in this syncope as he notes, “I do not know 
how long I lay” (115). The atmosphere, the smells and sounds of the caverns that are 
“stuffy and oppressive,” filled with the loud “thudding sound of a machine” and the 
“faint halitus of blood in the air” (115-116), along with the Traveller’s encounter with the 
Morlocks, creates a disorienting experience in many ways akin to time travel.137 Just as 
time travelling produces unpleasant sensations, the Morlocks are described as having a 
“peculiar unpleasant odour,” and their examination of him “indescribably unpleasant” 
(117).  
                                               
136 Parrinder identifies the Time Traveller with Prometheus, but claims that his gift of fire is not deserved 
by the degenerative Morlocks (48). This reading places the Traveller in the company of gods rather than 
posthumans. 
137 Halitus, meaning both vapour and exhalation, might also suggest that the Traveller breathes in particles 
of these others. 
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Moreover, like time travelling, the encounter makes him ill, with the Morlocks 
described as “nauseatingly inhuman” whose curious touching makes him “shiver 
violently” (117, my emphasis). Again, the Traveller lights a match to supplement his lack 
in the dark, reaffirming his superiority to the Morlocks who immediately run from the 
fire. Any possibility of prosthetic power is quickly dashed, however, as “the match burnt 
down, and stung my fingers, and fell, a wriggling red spot in the blackness” (116). Like 
the match, the Traveller’s self-control and consciousness fail him, as he lies down 
because the “throb” of the machinery is making him “giddy” (118), and his hasty climb 
back up above ground brings on a “deadly nausea” and “struggle against faintness” (118). 
Somehow, the Traveller wins this struggle until he is safely in the sunshine again, at 
which point he is no longer able to stay conscious: “Then, for a time,” he tells us, “I was 
insensible” (118). Like his time on the machine, his time underground causes the 
Traveller to lose control of both his agency and his position in time or his temporality. 
Further, as the technology of the time machine both mediates and reflects the automatism 
of the Traveller’s affective body, so does the technology of the Morlock machinery.   
This passage also reveals that, like the Time Traveller, the Morlocks are technical 
beings, and it is their uncanny affinity with the Traveller’s most human qualities that 
prompts his embodied response to them. The Morlocks are not just animal-machines in 
the evolutionary hierarchies of Huxley and Spencer, but they are makers, users, and 
controllers of technology. They are not just animal predators of the Eloi, but 
agriculturalists or ranchers, treating the Eloi like “fatted cattle” (125). They are perhaps 
also industrial processors of meat, since the thudding machines of the Underworld seem 
closely connected to the smell of blood and a “red joint” laid on a Morlock table (116). 
Like Derrida’s im-possible event, the Morlocks are im-possible beings, the biological 
result of the evolutionary coding of humans whose source originates in the Traveller 
himself, and yet still unique creatures whose identity category is unfixed, slipping 
between human, animal, and posthuman.  
Finally, in accounting for his fainting spell, the Time Traveller narrates that he 
was unconscious “for a time.” How much time is never specified; the chapter ends on his 
collapse in the morning, and the next chapter begins with a reiteration of his fear and 
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hatred for the Morlocks before returning to circadian temporality in the afternoon. This 
chapter break is an aesthetic technique that naturalizes the lost temporality of syncope 
through the regularized disruptions that characterize the form of Wells’s novel. In fact, 
the leap over lost time becomes the very form of the novel itself since, as readers, we are 
used to letting go of the temporality of plot at the end of a chapter and are ready to begin 
anew at the next. Nicholas Dames suggests nineteenth-century readers would likely have 
felt the same, as the period saw “the honing of the chapter…into a way of thinking about 
the segmented nature of biographical memory, as well as the temporal frames – the day; 
the year – in which that segmenting occurs” (“Chapter”). He also points out the 
paradoxical nature of the chapter’s aesthetic function, “a technique of discontinuous 
reading that finds a home in a form for continuous, immersive reading” (“History”), and 
notes that by the modernist period, the chapter both “dissolved and reaffirmed the unit of 
the chapter as a significant measure of human experience” (“Chapter”). Following 
Dames’ analysis, we can see how this break works in two ways. On the one hand, it 
demonstrates the mastery of the human autobiographer over the narrative, affirming a 
creative power over syncope, memory, and life-writing. On the other, however, the break 
makes the novel a kind of im-possible future form, where the syncope—the nonconscious 
or automatic—is necessary to the writing of human life—literally, to autobiography.  
4.3. Uncertainty as an Ethical Opening 
After the Traveller recovers from his fainting spell and the narrative resumes in 
the next chapter, he decides that he is vulnerable to the Morlocks and that he has the right 
to defend himself against them, at any cost. As he casts the Morlocks as forms of life that 
can be killed, he imagines that this sovereignty issues from—not over—the very bareness 
of his body: his feelings, his instinct, his automatism, and his perceived ontological 
difference from the human-animals of the future. However, the Traveller also experiences 
a syncope that disrupts the clear division between himself and the Eloi and Morlocks, a 
destabilization of difference that leads us to ethical questions about affect and power. 
Michael Pinsky has drawn on Derridean ethics in his reading of The Time Machine to 
explore the way the law is created by the singular “Other”; in Pinsky’s reading, this other 
is the time machine itself. While I agree with the significance of the other in The Time 
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Machine, I take Derridean ethics in a different direction by emphasizing that the category 
of posthuman troubles the demarcations of difference such that there is no clear, universal 
mode of deciding whether or how one has power over another and to whom one has a 
responsibility. Elana Gomel offers a similar consideration in her article on posthuman 
ethics in science fiction, noting that the question of ethics is so pertinent in texts that 
feature posthuman forms of life because “there is nothing natural or self-evident about 
human rights because there is nothing natural or self-evident about humanity” (“Science” 
340). Gomel suggests, however, that The Time Machine is not one of these texts since the 
Morlocks and Eloi are represented as innocent animals (344); I disagree.138 The syncope 
that occurs during what Hurley calls the “epic battle” (85) between the Traveller and the 
Morlocks helps us to explore this further, emphasizing the similarities between their 
forms of life, underlining questions of narrative and embodied vulnerability, and 
introducing an ethics that has no stable ground.  
As the Traveller recounts his feelings about the Morlocks following his swoon, he 
positions himself variously in relation to them. He tells his audience that the journey 
underground has made him feel hopeless about the possibility of escape. Before this 
encounter, he had assumed that he was capable of deciphering and overcoming any 
obstacle, including the “childish simplicity of the little people” and the future’s 
“unknown forces,” but now, he insists, he must face “an altogether new element in the 
sickening quality of the Morlocks—a something inhuman and malign” (119). I argue that 
it is not so much the inhuman in the Morlocks in opposition to his own humanness that 
worries the Traveller, but rather the fact that he cannot feel his species superiority to 
them. They are too much like him—perhaps as intelligent, as omnivorous, and as capable 
of using technology as he is. At any rate, they are interested in the very same piece of 
technology that he is, the time machine. As Hurley points out, try as he might to 
“renounce all kindship” with the Morlocks, “the novel always emphasizes his greater 
similarity to the abhuman ape-men,” and although the Traveller may be horrified by the 
smell of blood, his first act upon returning to his present time is to “wolf down a meal of 
                                               
138 By contrast, Gomel claims that it is another of Wells’s novels, The Island of Dr. Moreau, that asks 
questions about consciousness and ethics (“Science” 344).   
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red meat” (86-87).139 There is simply no reason why the Morlocks should nauseate him, 
why they should be described as unpleasant, or why he should cast them as less human 
than the Eloi or himself (although the Eloi are occasionally referred to as animals, the 
Morlocks are overwhelmingly so, as fish, owls, cats [107-109], as worms, Lemurs, and 
vermin [113]).  
Scholars who have attempted to find reasons for the Traveller’s abhorrence of the 
Morlocks have consistently proposed less-than-completely-compelling solutions. For 
example, Norman suggests that the Traveller may see the Eloi as more human because he 
has an emotional connection to humans and remembers them (incorrectly) as being as 
lovely as the Eloi, so that his memory of “mankind in general necessarily resembles more 
the Eloi than the Morlocks, thus erroneously rendering the Eloi the appropriate species on 
which to pin the hopes of nineteenth-century man” (13). While her reference to the 
significance of emotional connection and affective belonging is insightful, Norman’s 
explanation hinges on the Traveller’s memory as mistaken, as well as not accounting for 
the Traveller’s own acknowledgement of Victorian humans as effecting cruel class-
divided working conditions (Wells 110). Pordzik argues that the Traveller bases his 
connection to the Eloi on appearance alone—an argument supported by the Traveller’s 
statement that “the Eloi had kept too much of the human form not to claim my sympathy, 
and to make me perforce a sharer in their degradation and their Fear” (Wells 125)—in 
accordance with racist hierarchies of the nineteenth century. As cogent as this reading is, 
it does not explain the Traveller’s reaction so much as it points out that some bodies, like 
the Morlocks’ or like the non-white bodies of Victorian England, may be coded by those 
with power as being disgusting and nonhuman and therefore open to violence (a context I 
discuss in relation to The Picture of Dorian Gray). For Hurley, the “disproportionate 
terror and disgust” of the Traveller is a recognition of his own Morlock-like abjectness, 
while his violence towards them is evidence of his similar beastliness and his 
“overcharged hatred” of them functions as a way to distinguish himself (87). As I argue 
above, it is not abjection that the Traveller recognizes in the Morlocks but a shared 
posthumanism. Moreover, the Traveller’s violence does not mimic the Morlocks’ 
                                               
139 Nate comes to the same conclusion. 
146 
behaviour, since there is no evidence other than the Traveller’s insistence that the 
Morlocks are violent killers. In the end, Hurley seems correct in stating that the 
Traveller’s response to the Morlocks is ultimately something “he cannot quite justify or 
explain” (Hurley 84). His abhorrence is the uncomfortable affective possibility that can 
arise from ontological identification. 
The narrative’s inability to consistently distinguish between the Traveller and the 
Morlocks is repeated in the narrative uncertainty about whether the Traveller’s fear of the 
Morlocks is animal or human. The Traveller initially frames his fear as similar to that of 
an animal’s: “Instinctively I loathed them. Before, I had felt as a man might feel who had 
fallen into a pit: my concern was with the pit and how to get out of it. Now I felt like a 
beast in a trap, whose enemy would come upon him soon” (119, my emphasis). However, 
if he is not entirely an animal in relation to the Morlocks, as above, and his fear does not, 
in fact, arise from a biological response as prey to predator, then it arises because his 
nonconscious brain has already deciphered the fact that the Morlocks are cannibals. This 
second possibility figures both the Morlocks and the Traveller as hybrid human-animal-
machines: the Traveller gains knowledge from his mechanical, nonconscious body about 
the monstrous, inhuman, and technology-using habits of the Morlocks. Moreover, the 
Traveller decides here that the Morlocks are to be feared because they commit “foul 
villainy” under the cover of darkness, a descriptor that seems to belong more properly to 
human subjects (“villainous” seems an odd descriptor for animal predation) (119).  
The ethical conundrum of the text begins to emerge most fully in this passage. 
The Traveller suggests that it is the information processing of his body, its unconscious 
cerebration, that underwrites his sovereignty, or his right to make decisions to help live or 
make die. He is reminded of the meat in the Underworld, seemingly unrelated to anything 
he is thinking of “but coming in almost like a question from outside” (120). The meat 
vaguely resembles “something familiar” to the Traveller (120), and from this he will later 
extrapolate that the Morlocks are cannibals, feeding on the Eloi during the night.140 He 
                                               
140 The Time Traveller believes that the Morlocks and Eloi are the same species and therefore Morlock 
consumption of Eloi flesh is cannibalism: human “prejudice against human flesh is no deep-seated instinct” 
he notes. “I tried to look at the thing in a scientific spirit. After all, they were less human and more remote 
than our cannibal ancestors of three or four thousand years ago” (125). 
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narratively couples his embodied, instinctive fear and hatred of them with this hypothesis 
as, “with a sudden shiver, came the clear knowledge of what the meat I had seen might 
be” (124). However, before even explicitly entertaining this possibility, the Traveller 
decides he will find a protective basecamp and arm himself against the Morlocks, again 
basing this decision on his ontology: he insists he will not cower like the weak Eloi 
because he is “differently constituted” as a Victorian subject (120, my emphasis). On the 
one hand, to be constitutionally equipped to respond to fear in this way suggests the 
Traveller’s response occurs not because of a superior human agency or will, but rather as 
a predetermined outcome of his own evolutionary design. At the same time, the 
Traveller’s statement continues to underline how contingent any translation of feeling 
into external meaning is, since his audience must believe that both late-Victorian England 
and future Eloian England have prepared him to decipher the embodied fear and mystery 
that confronts him now. Moreover, his need for weaponry is the human need for a 
prosthetic supplement against the “natural” viciousness of animals. The fundamental 
ethical question of the text, which can never be properly decided, emerges here: is the 
Traveller an animal who instinctively perceives the Morlock threat through his automatic, 
affective body, and will respond instinctively, or is he a human who has the knowledge to 
decide whether the Morlocks are a threat and how to respond? In other words, is this an 
inscription or an event? 
The Traveller’s response to the Morlocks is both inscription and event because 
both the Traveller and the Morlocks are posthuman. It is therefore impossible to separate 
the technologies of the body (affective automatisms, unconscious cerebration) from 
technologies of human power (narrative, fire, weaponry) in the Traveller’s narrative, 
which makes it a fruitful text through which to explore affect in relation to posthuman 
ethics. That is, the syncopated text can help us to see how the affective body is technical, 
and it can also help us to think through how affect might relate to posthuman ethics. For 
example, the uncertainty over what role the affective body plays as an information 
technology seems to respond directly to Ruth Leys’ critique of theories of non-intentional 
affect. Leys writes that non-intentionalist paradigms of affect are appealing to theorists 
because “the moment one abandons [them] in favor of some kind of intentionalist 
interpretation of the affects one finds oneself forced to provide thick descriptions of life 
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experiences of the kind that are familiar to anthropologists and novelists but are widely 
held to be inimical to science” (471). Rather than suggest that automatist theories like 
Huxley’s, Spencer’s, Massumi’s, and Thrift’s are simply not applicable analytic 
frameworks to the work of narrative, thinking through the way nonconscious affect 
informs this thick description can help us focus on the way uncertainty is ethical—that is, 
the way uncertainty can ethically challenge positions of sovereignty and power. In fact, 
Derrida suggests, according to Cary Wolfe, that thick description is exactly what is 
necessary to each ethical moment, in “his insistence that we pay vigilant attention to the 
particular instance of decision, of justice, in all its thickness and heterogeneity, without 
letting formulae and maxims do the work for us” (96).  
Moreover, affect’s challenge to the Traveller’s human agency through the animal 
and machine, both the automaticity of his affective body and his explicit need for 
supplemental tools, complicates sympathy while replacing it with potential (if uncertain) 
ontological identification. The Traveller mentions sympathy only once in his narrative, 
after he visits the Underworld and as he works out why the Eloi are frightened of the 
Morlocks, claiming that “the Eloi had kept too much of the human form not to claim my 
sympathy, and to make me perforce a sharer in their degradation and their Fear” (125). 
Sympathy requires one of two things, either an a priori form of representation that can 
provoke a sympathetic response (as in, for example, George Eliot’s belief that realism is 
the aesthetic form most likely to produce sympathy), or a response that is automatic, 
produced through the affective body (as in, for example, the theories of physiologists 
Alexander Bain and Charles Darwin). Regardless, The Time Machine upends both 
aspects of sympathy, since the Traveller continually narrates both representational 
difficulty and affective uncertainty. The novel prompts a host of questions around 
sympathy: why should physical appearance be a more powerful force for sympathy than 
behaviour? Does “perforce” in the context of this revelation mean that the Traveller has 
no choice but also to be afraid, as some programmed automatism of his affective body? 
How can anyone behave ethically if their behaviour is programmed? And, if this 
sympathy is biological, does fear give the Traveller ethical grounds to behave violently 
towards the Morlocks? 
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Posthuman ethical thought, particularly the ethics of uncertainty that Derrida 
proposes, suggests that ethical behaviour involves attending to these questions. Derrida 
agrees with James in that he believes that anything that is “calculable”—that is, automatic 
or programmable—is not ethical; instead, he suggests, we must submit any ethical 
decision making to the “ordeal of the undecidable” (“Force of Law” 24). In The Time 
Machine, the explicit narrative inability of the Traveller to settle on whether the Morlocks 
or himself are human or not provides an opportunity to ask these questions about the self 
and the other. As Wolfe describes, Derrida’s work encourages us to see how “we are not 
that ‘auto-’ of ‘autobiography’” that we imagine ourselves to be—that is, we are not the 
self that writes or speaks its life. Instead, we are posthuman, “not just in the evolutionary, 
biological, and zoological fact of our physical vulnerability and mortality, […] but also in 
our subjection to and constitution in the materiality and technicity of a language that is 
always on the scene before we are, as a precondition of our subjectivity” (88-89).141 
Instead of making decisions as superior (autobiographical) humans towards other forms 
of life, we would have to acknowledge for each ethical decision that we are one 
(posthuman) form of life in relation to and affecting another.142 Like the im-possible 
moment in which the Traveller finds himself, Derrida asks for each ethical decision to be 
likewise treated as im-possible.  
Narrative syncope, therefore, becomes ethically charged in the uncertainty 
between similarity and difference, inscription and event. For example, the justification for 
the Traveller’s violence against the Morlocks seems to be their cannibalism, but if both 
the Traveller and the Morlocks are posthuman forms of life, then putting the slightest 
amount of pressure on this explanation causes the gap of uncertainty to appear. The 
Traveller’s nervous system and brain seem to produce this insight, working 
unconsciously to put the various obscure aspects of the future into a plausible narrative, 
                                               
141 Wolfe draws on Derrida to argue that we only know what mortality is like through the other, “and for 
that [we] are held hostage (to use Levinas’s term) in unappeasable ethical debt to the other” (84). For 
another discussion of Derrida’s “hyperbolic ethics” in relation to the animal, see Kelly Oliver.  
142 Wolfe writes, “What this means for bioethics in the pragmatic sense is that Derrida is of little use in 
enabling us to formulate new guidelines about particular surgical or experimental procedures that we could 
then generalize on behalf of more progressive policies. But he is of immense use in forcing us to live with 
the fact that no matter how such policies are drawn, the distinction between human and animal should be of 
no use in drawing them” (98). 
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while the “clues” meant to provide evidence of Morlock predation are continually only 
barely narratable.143 For example, the Traveller only knows that the Eloi express 
something like fear or aversion in the dark and around the Morlock wells; he “fancied” he 
saw the Morlocks “carrying some dark body” (105); Weena gives a “shiver” when asked 
about the Underworld, which the Traveller interprets as signs that she finds “the topic 
unendurable” (112); and the red joint conjures a “vague sense of something familiar” 
(120). Hovanec has referred to this as a narrative technique called “delayed decoding” 
after theorist of the novel Ian Watt, exemplifying modernist aesthetics as “a style that 
produces epistemological uncertainty, predicated on the failure of the senses to produce 
stable empirical knowledge” (464). If the Traveller’s body is an information system, it is 
not a truth-telling device. What Hovanec has defined in Wells’s novel as the “hazy 
aesthetic” of modernism is in fact the syncopation of an im-possible future, and that 
future’s resistance to categorization is open to the other. The future’s uncertainties are 
moments of not knowing the other while recognizing ontological similitude and 
vulnerability. Recognizing and attending to that uncertainty is ethical.  
The Traveller continues to narrate an uncertain history and his own uncertain 
place within it as he journeys to the Palace of Green Porcelain with an Eloi companion, 
Weena, to protect and arm himself against the Morlocks. The Palace, a ruined museum 
filled with decaying artifacts, becomes a site that continues to challenge both the 
Traveller’s species superiority and his right to enact violence on the Morlocks. On the 
exterior of the museum is an inscription, but since it is written in “some unknown 
character,” neither Weena nor the Traveller can read it, depriving them both of the human 
attribute of linguistic mastery (127). This is repeated in the library of the museum, full of 
books that have “long since dropped to pieces,” while “every semblance of print had left 
them” (131). The Traveller is unable to access language and history to maintain his 
superiority over the Eloi and Morlocks. This is also the case in relation to the technology 
of machinery. In the Palace, the Traveller finds “huge bulks of big machines” and feels in 
his element as he has a “certain weakness for mechanism” (129). Moreover, if the 
                                               
143 See Michael Parrish Lee for a reading of cannibalism in the novel that connects knowledge with 
physical consumption. 
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Traveller wants to “linger among” the machines (129), he is precisely like the Morlocks, 
who, he discovers, have an entrance to the Underworld through the Palace. The Traveller 
has no idea what the machines are for, and here, too, the supplements usually at his 
disposal fail him, believing that if he could only “solve their puzzles” he would have 
“powers that might be of use against the Morlocks” (129).  
Instead, the Traveller resorts to the technology of weaponry, refashioning a lever 
from one of the machines into a mace “for any Morlock skull I might encounter,” 
remarking that he “longed very much to kill a Morlock or so” while recognizing that it is 
“very inhuman, you may think, to want to go killing one’s own descendants!” (130). The 
status of the Morlocks and the Traveller are continually slipping here, as he claims at first 
that he is justified in killing Morlocks because it is “impossible, somehow, to feel any 
humanity in the things” and that only his “disinclination to leave Weena, and a 
persuasion that if I began to slake my thirst for murder my Time Machine might suffer, 
restrained me from going straight down the gallery and killing the brutes I heard” (130). 
In the moment of weapon-creating, which should be an affirmation of humanness, the 
Time Traveller admits killing Morlocks—whom he recognizes as human—would make 
him inhuman. Meanwhile, the language with which he describes such killing shifts 
between the animal lust for blood and the human transgression of law: if it is the 
Morlocks’ inhumanity that justifies his “thirst for murder” (130), “murder” also implies 
that Morlocks possess the status of subjects. Finally, this moment seems to echo an 
earlier one when the Eloi “fail to understand” and respond to the Traveller’s attempts to 
recover his machine, and he “had the hardest task in the world to keep [his] hands off 
their pretty laughing faces” (97). In this instance, the Traveller identifies this desire for 
violence as “a foolish impulse” prompted by “the devil begotten of fear and blind anger” 
that is “eager to take advantage of [his] perplexity” (97). Like a programmed machine, 
the Traveller describes a tendency towards violence when frustrated or confused, a 
tendency that does not quite belong to him but, like his thoughts and feelings, arrives 
from some external source.  
More exciting than the lever is the box of matches that the Traveller finds, 
ostensibly because the Morlocks are frightened of them, but also, I argue, because 
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matches are a Promethean supplement that distinguishes humans from animals. He 
almost immediately puts these matches to use as he and Weena journey to recover the 
time machine and return to nineteenth-century London. Before crossing a forest, he lights 
a fire, noting Weena’s joyful interest, a contrast to Morlock fear but nonetheless still (to 
the Traveller) evidence of an absence of knowledge about fire.144 They are soon pursued 
by Morlocks, and the Traveller is delighted that the fire he has set seems to be spreading 
(135). As the Morlocks approach, and as the Traveller uses matches and his fist to hold 
them off, Weena faints. Unable to tell if she is alive or dead, the Traveller experiences 
another instance of narrative syncope, losing both time, his new campfire, and his 
matches as he unexpectedly falls asleep:  
I felt very weary after my exertion, and sat down. The wood, too, was full 
of a slumbrous murmur that I did not understand. I seemed just to nod and 
open my eyes. But all was dark, and the Morlocks had their hands upon me. 
Flinging off their clinging fingers I hastily felt in my pocket for the match-
box, and—it had gone! Then they gripped and closed with me again. In a 
moment I knew what had happened. I had slept, and my fire had gone out. 
(137)  
The Traveller needs more time to process this scene’s full array of sensory experiences, 
including his own experience of consciousness, than he has. This lag in processing time 
produces a syncopation in the Traveller’s autobiography, as time disappears in a nod. The 
environment shifts radically from one sentence to the next—there is a fire and matches 
and then suddenly there is not and the Morlocks are close. The Traveller simply cannot 
properly narrate a story from which he has been absent and he cannot narrate a 
consciousness that is not under his control. This is not the only time, of course, that he 
has “dozed” unexpectedly, making him similar to Weena in not just his fainting spell but 
in the fact that he seems as “easily fatigued” as the Eloi. Moreover, in each case it seems 
as though sleep overtakes him, creating a syncopation of consciousness (124, 142).145   
                                               
144 For the relationship of fire-making to creativity and the values of imperialism, see Teresa Jamieson (89). 
While the Traveller indeed refers here to fire-making as “art” (135), I turn here to the way in which this art 
is meant to guarantee a greater human power, and not solely an imperialist one. 
145 Elisha Cohn writes about the suspensive narrative qualities of sleep in George Meredith’s works, 
arguing that they offer an alternative to “excessive attentiveness” (28). 
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After this syncope and without matches, the Traveller describes his defence 
against the Morlocks. For their part, the Underworlders pull him down, and seem to 
climb on top of him, with their “little teeth nipping at [his] neck” (137). The Traveller’s 
response to the Morlocks, however, is as disproportionate as Hurley has called his 
feelings; he takes pleasure in killing, as he describes the “succulent giving of flesh and 
bone under [his] blows” (137). The Morlocks become blinded by the light of the rapidly 
spreading fire, yet the Traveller continues his “furious” killing and crippling (138). He 
claims this is because he does not realize their blindness, but he has already described 
them as disoriented, “blundering hither and thither against each other” (138). His other 
excuse for viciously attacking the helpless blunderers is his “frenzy of fear” and the 
“quivering horror” they provoke in him (138, 139). The Traveller uses the automaticity of 
his body as justification for his violence, echoing an earlier interpretation of continued 
Morlock servitude to the Eloi: “they did it as a standing horse paws with his foot, or as a 
man enjoys killing animals in sport: because ancient and departed necessities had 
impressed it on the organism” (120, my emphasis). Power, the Traveller suggests, is 
inscribed on his body. 
However, this power is still syncopated by the recognition of shared vulnerability 
and mortality that Derrida and Wolfe have described, through both biological mortality 
and subjection to the technology of language. The Traveller’s collapse makes his body 
vulnerable and disposable, alike to Weena, who has shivered and fainted in her own 
syncope and whose body he will never recover, and to the Morlocks, whom he 
momentarily casts as possibly afraid in the face of his violence (137).146 Moreover, the 
Morlocks make “uncanny noises” in the face of the fire the Traveller has set, an almost-
speech that mirrors the Traveller’s own screaming through this “nightmare” time (139). 
As if to cement this similarity in mortality and technicity, the Traveller theorizes one 
final time on the relationship between the Morlocks and Eloi by casting the Morlocks as 
                                               
146 Derrida writes: “‘Can they suffer?’ asks Bentham, simply yet so profoundly. Once its protocol is 
established, the form of this question changes everything. It no longer simply concerns the logos, having it 
or not, nor does it concern, more radically, a dynamis or hexis, this having or manner of being, this habitus 
that one calls a faculty or ‘capability,’ this can-have or the power one possesses (as in the power to reason, 
to speak, and everything that that implies). The question is disturbed by a certain passivity” (The Animal 
27). 
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technical beings in both their biology and their tool use. He imagines that evolution might 
lead to a kind of perfect, if intellectually boring, society, where “an animal perfectly in 
harmony with its environment is a perfect mechanism. Nature never appeals to 
intelligence until habit and instinct are useless” (141). He then supposes that for some 
reason a shortage in food supply advantaged the Morlocks because they were tool-users: 
The Underworld being in contact with machinery, which, however perfect, 
still needs some little thought outside habit, had probably retained perforce 
rather more initiative, if less of every other human character, than the Upper. 
(142)  
The Traveller’s dismissal of the “other” human characteristics that no longer belong to 
the Morlocks rings hollow, as he makes a final attempt at producing a historical memory 
that casts himself as the being with more human character.  
4.4. Posthuman Narrative Technologies 
After the Traveller unfruitfully searches for Weena and the blaze he has set begins 
to die out, he continues on his way to recover the machine. When he finds it, he again 
repeats his desire for revenge, lamenting that he has no need of his iron bar to inflict 
violence during the machine’s recovery (143). He does, however, get his wish in butting 
heads with one of a group of curious Morlocks, whose only crime when they come upon 
the Traveller seems to be touching him. With the Morlock dispatched, the Traveller 
escapes, reminding his audience of the narrative syncope of time travel: “I have already 
told you of the sickness and confusion that comes with time travelling…For an indefinite 
time I clung to the machine as it swayed and vibrated, quite unheeding how I went” 
(144). As he journeys millions of years farther into the future, the sun grows red, forms of 
life become tentacular and monstrous, and the air turns cold, thin, and hard to breathe. As 
the Traveller brings the machine to a stop “to see if any traces of animal-life remained” 
(147), the combination of horror and lack of oxygen makes him physically ill, as he 
“shivered, and a deadly nausea seized [him]” (148). Feeling “giddy” he gets off the time 
machine, but, “sick and confused,” the sight of a round, tentacled life-form “hopping 
fitfully about” brings on another syncope: “Then I felt I was fainting. But a terrible dread 
of lying helpless in that remote and awful twilight sustained me while I clambered upon 
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the saddle” (148). That fainting eventually overtakes him is implied in the next chapter: 
“So I came back. For a long time I must have been insensible upon the machine” (149).  
This scene repeats aspects of the first two types of syncope I have described in 
this chapter: the interruption of subjectivity by the machine (and the machine-like body) 
and by an ontological identification with an uncanny form of future life.147 Moreover, like 
the Traveller’s swoon after visiting the Underworld, this syncopation of the body also 
becomes subsumed into the form the novel. The actual nonconsciousness of the Traveller 
occurs—or disappears—in the break between chapters, suggesting that the very art of 
autobiography itself holds space for the mechanical or automatic. This final section uses 
the syncope that occurs as the Traveller journeys millions of years into the future to 
consider the form of the narrative more broadly and what is political about this aesthetic 
form, bringing together some strands regarding memory as prosthesis and the ethical 
uncertainty of narrative. 
Since The Time Machine deals explicitly with the subject of human evolution, 
scholars have been particularly interested in the way Wells’s novel incorporates what 
David Shackleton calls inhuman time, or time that exceeds the scale of human life or 
understanding, through its narrative. Scholars generally fall into one of two camps 
regarding time travel and evolution: the first sees Wells creating a linear narrative about 
evolution, and the second sees him fragmenting linear narrative to complicate 
evolutionary time.148 Shackleton and Larry W. Caldwell both fall into the second camp, 
                                               
147 Michael Sayeau also supposes that it is the “the uncanny horror of this world” that “overwhelms him,” 
when “he feels he is about to faint, and leaps into the time machine…” (143). 
148 Link falls in the first camp, arguing that the time machine is a “conceptual device” that “allows its 
inventor to construct a story of humankind by organizing evolution into a beginning (nineteenth-century 
society), middle (the degeneration of humankind) and end (the death of life on earth)” (136). Link claims 
that this sequence produces a warning about human folly (136). He is in the company of Richard Nate, 
Steven McLean, and William Greenslade, who argue that Wells’s novel is a narrative of degeneration, and 
Herbert Sussman and Michael Sayeau, who find the “evolutionary catastrophe” (Sayeau 130) of The Time 
Machine’s future is a critique of industrial progress. Scholars who have investigated the novel’s 
subversions of narrative temporality include Gomel, as I have noted, who explores the way the contingency 
of evolutionary temporality is embedded within the deterministic narrative temporality of time travel. 
While her argument is that the two exist in tension with each other, she does suggest that the narrative form 
ultimately privileges “a design of history” (“Shapes” 344). Gomel repeats and expands this reading in the 
chapter “The Time Machines: H. G. Wells and the Invention of Postmodernity” to include three 
chronotopes: “the time-travel loop, evolutionary contingency and the apocalyptic intoxication of the End 
Times” (47). In this case, Gomel suggests that these temporalities form the basis for postmodern science 
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and offer particularly prescient arguments in relation to the ability of the Time Traveller 
to narrate his own story, his autobiography. These scholars frame the temporal order of 
narrative as something humans need, as “essentially consolatory,” as Caldwell puts it 
(133). Yet the Traveller’s narrative is not an ordering of events meant only to make sense 
out of evolutionary or geological history; rather, the narrative also seeks to order the 
events of the Travellers’ life and his own history, which includes the history of humans 
up until 802,701. This attempt at narration can be illuminated by Stiegler’s thought in two 
ways: the first is that individual human memory is also made up of what is passed down 
culturally, epigenetically—something the Traveller lacks once he speeds through time. 
As Mark Hansen summarizes Stiegler’s theory of memory technologies, “It is only 
because a subject has the capacity to assume a collective past that has not been lived by it 
that it can assume and re-present its own past (secondary retention or remembrance)” 
(596). The second is that consciousness as temporality or duration is only produced by 
forms of recorded memory, or temporal objects. To draw on Hansen’s summary of 
Steigler again, this means that primary retention, the act of consciously experiencing and 
retaining an event, “is not only thoroughly contaminated with the other forms of memory 
but is in fact conditioned by them” (597). This is demonstrated in the novel through the 
framing structure of the narrative, the conceit of which is that the Traveller has returned 
from the future and is now recounting his story orally to the frame narrator in a present 
which is actually three years later.149 The frame narrative thus repeats the grammar of im-
possible temporality contained within the time travel narrative itself, with the added 
suggestion that what ought to be the most authentic, transparent, original expression of 
memory is equivalent to the playing of a record. Further, what the frame narrator asks the 
                                               
fiction narratives. Charles Tung similarly claims that the multiple temporalities of the novel, including 
“Darwinian time” (104), critique the idea of a singular, “imperial and commercial” modern temporality 
(96). Holly Norman argues that Wells’s subversion of linear temporality works to synthesize evolutionary 
and biblical time, while Larry W. Caldwell argues that The Time Machine’s impossible linearity reveals the 
constructed nature of all narrative, including “master narratives” like evolution (132). For his part, 
Shackleton suggests that “through its resistance to narrative organization, the geological time of The Time 
Machine remains inhuman,” challenging Frank Kermode and Paul Ricoeur’s arguments that “narrative 
humanizes time” (852). Nicholas Ruddick, too, connects the novel with a geological time beyond human 
comprehension, but argues that Wells invokes it in order to return to what he calls the “topicality and 
temporality” of 1894. 
149 See Heidi Pennington on the suspension of readerly disbelief for failures of memory in fictional 
autobiographies.  
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reader to believe is impossible—that he has simply recorded exactly an incredibly long 
speech delivered by the Time Traveller. Narrative in both the frame narrator’s and the 
Traveller’s case functions like a machine, speech and memory like a recording device.  
The mechanistic or automatic quality of the Traveller’s autobiographical narrative 
appears in the multiple failures of memory that reveal the narrative to be syncopated in its 
form as well as its content. That is, the Traveller’s story does not just contain suspensions 
of consciousness at the level of the affective body, but also at the level of memory.150 For 
example, the Traveller tries again and again to correctly narrate the temporal progression 
of his descendants, “watchful for every impression that could possibly help to explain the 
condition of ruinous splendor in which I found the world” (87). Impressions, however, 
are not something one can have mastery over or absolute knowledge about, as the 
Traveller’s own earlier “series of impressions” suggest. Nonetheless, he first imagines 
that a shift in British political economy to Communism and lives of “ease and security” 
would explain the landscape and the gentle androgyny of the Eloi (88). While he is at 
pains to affirm to his audience that his suspicions about the precocity of Eloi children are 
correct (88), he begins a lengthy discourse on the progress of society by saying that he 
“had got only a half truth—or only a glimpse of one facet of the truth” (90), and closes 
his explanation of humankind’s “perfect conquest of nature” to admit that his explanation 
was simple and “plausible enough—as most wrong theories are!” (92). I have already 
discussed the ethical consequences of the Traveller’s belief that the Morlocks are 
cannibalizing the Eloi. In addition, though, the inability of the Traveller to narrate an 
epigenetic history for himself suggests that he is alike to both the Eloi and the Morlocks 
in this way, too, as their lack of history is evidenced by the decay of books and 
inscriptions in the Palace of Green Porcelain (131).  
However, the failures of the Traveller’s memory also seem to guarantee his 
unique humanness as well as undercut it. That is, the repetitive programmability of 
memory guarantees the unique singularity of the event precisely where it breaks down. 
For example, when the Traveller is in the Morlockian Underworld, he laments, 
                                               
150 For Jill Matus, failures of memory due to shock in Victorian literature point to the way the body 
processes trauma but they are not, for her, challenges to the humanness of the narrator. 
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“Necessarily my memory is vague” (116). This failure of memory is accompanied by a 
lack of other prosthetic implements—or what the Traveller calls here “appliances,” which 
he expected to find in the future; he is disappointed to find he remains “without arms, 
without medicine, without anything to smoke […]—even without enough matches,” 
adding to this list the recording technology of the camera as he despairs, “If only I had 
thought of a Kodak! I could have flashed that glimpse of the Underworld in a second, and 
examined it at leisure” (117). This desire seems to foreshadow Stiegler’s point since the 
Traveller’s telling of this story—as a story—is as much a photograph as anything else, a 
narrative technology that infinitely repeats the event of the Underworld each time it is 
told, or read, or heard. The Traveller needs a camera at the very point that his memory 
functions as one, but only as narrative. That is, memory is a prosthetic technology that 
humans need to supplement forgetfulness. 
Again, when the Traveller recounts his and Weena’s exploration of the Palace of 
Green Porcelain, he explicitly denies his ability to create temporal order in his narrative: 
“I cannot tell you all the story of that long afternoon,” he explains, “It would require a 
great effort of memory to recall my long explorations in at all the proper order” (132). 
Instead, the Traveller offers an a-temporal list of things he remembers doing, including 
writing his “name upon the nose of a steatite monster” (132). We might call this list a 
syncopation—I remember this, and this, and this, in no particular order—that nonetheless 
produces a rhythmic form that expresses the very human forgetfulness of the Traveller. 
The technology of memory is underscored when the Traveller writes his name, which is 
never revealed to the reader. The nameless Traveller is not a human but a mechanical 
recording device, that nonetheless writes his human name as though he is programmed to 
do so, “yielding to an irresistible impulse” (132). In fact, naming itself is a prosthetic 
technology, a humanizing of the otherwise inhuman machine. Again, after the Traveller’s 
return, the time machine, the technology which allows the production of the entire 
narrative, is described by the Traveller as a prosthesis that supplements his own 
forgetfulness: “This room,” he tells his audience, “and you and the atmosphere of every 
day is too much for my memory. Did I ever make a Time Machine, or a model of a Time 
Machine? Or is it all only a dream? They say life is a dream…” (152). Human life, the 
Traveller suggests (anticipating Stiegler) is forgetfulness, and only technology can 
159 
produce it; “the pursuit of life by means other than life” (Stiegler 17). If recording the end 
of time is radically inhuman, the Traveller reveals himself to be most human in the way 
he immediately begins to forget it. 
As I have already noted, the narrative incorporates the physiological syncope of 
fainting by subsuming the gap in consciousness as the material break of the chapter form. 
This occurs following the Traveller’s swoons after visiting the Morlocks underground 
and after seeing the evolved life forms of extreme futurity. These instances of syncope 
are automatic in two senses: in the first, they are the result of the automatic (or non-
agential) functioning of physiology, and in the second, they are automatic because they 
repeat the programmed, or formulaic, structure of the novel. Yet, as with the affectively 
automatic and still evental or unique experience of the individual human, the 
autobiography of the Traveller is also unique, a description of an unrepeatable event, the 
event that makes up his memory. 
The human or evental character of the Traveller’s memory—its singularity or 
uniqueness—is also repeated through the syncopation of its narrative form in two 
editorial interruptions to the text. In the first, the Traveller is reflecting on the possible 
evolution of the Morlock-Eloi relationship following his visit to the Underworld. As he is 
describing the way Weena, who is unfamiliar with Victorian clothing, places flowers in 
his pocket, the frame narrator interrupts to tell us that “the Time Traveller paused, put his 
hand into his pocket, and silently placed two withered flowers, not unlike very large white 
mallows, upon the little table. Then he resumed his narrative” (121, original emphasis). 
The interruption is formally different than the rest of the text; although the punctuation of 
the Traveller’s multi-chapter speech features quotation marks at the beginning of each 
paragraph to indicate the continued speech, those marks seem to become naturalized as 
the speech takes the form of a continuous narrative. This break, however, is italicized, 
despite the fact that no other part of the frame narrator’s writing is, syncopating the 
narrative to both break and suture together its recording. Further, although the flowers 
may have ostensibly come from anywhere, their dramatic placing on the table serves as a 
kind of material proof of the Traveller’s narrative. In much the same way that the chapter 
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break aestheticizes the nonconscious, a-temporal, and materialist threat to subjectivity, 
the Traveller’s narrative depends on its syncopation or break for its very authenticity. 
In the second instance, the Traveller’s narrative contains a footnote. As he walks 
through the Palace of Green Porcelain searching for weapons, he notices that the floor is 
sloping towards the entrance of the Morlock underworld. The original text contains an 
editorial clarification: “It may be, of course, that the floor did not slope, but that the 
museum was built into the side of a hill. – ED” (129). Like the frame narrator’s 
interruption, this footnote draws attention to the narrative as a narrative, breaking its flow 
by introducing a history of production. The footnote otherwise serves no particular 
purpose in terms of the narrative; it makes no difference at all whether the floor slopes or 
not. Moreover, it is unaccountable and undecidable—what editor is this meant to be? 
Wells? The narrator? The narrator’s publisher? Wells’s publisher? The footnote activates 
the formalism of textuality itself, suggesting the repetitive and inscriptive forms of 
editing and publication, while simultaneously enacting this textuality as a singular 
event—this narrative moment, this question of architecture, this editor.  
The frame narrative of The Time Machine suggests that the Time Traveller’s 
entire journey is a syncope, a disappearance of himself from the frame narrative and then 
a breathless return to it. Catherine Clément describes the break in consciousness during a 
fainting spell in terms of space as well as time: “When she comes to, her first words will 
be ‘Where am I?’…The real question would be, rather, ‘Where was I?’” (1). Of course, 
unlike the crowd gathered around Clément’s imaginary swooning subject, everyone is 
desperate for the Time Traveller to narrate his absence, even offering a “shilling a line for 
a verbatim note” (Wells 73). Clément claims that syncope is necessary for the artist’s 
creative capacity: “the artist’s reality demands crossing through an essential syncope, a 
veritable mental collapse, resulting in new work…This eclipse that fractures 
consciousness is the very prerequisite for the creative act” (236). However, the syncope 
of the Time Traveller as an aesthete, as Hovanec calls him (475), also leads us to an 
ethical challenge in the frame narrative. Instead of accepting the determinism of the 
Traveller’s narrative, the frame narrator leaves the future “black and blank,” suggesting 
only that the white flowers produced by the Time Traveller mid-tale confirm that the 
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future will contain human gratitude and tenderness (Wells 155-156).151 The frame 
narrator’s reading of these flowers as indicators of compassion reproduces a humanist 
form of sympathy, but an alternate reading would recognize that they remain as 
unaccountable as the Traveller’s narrative. “It’s a curious thing,” the Medical Man at the 
Time Traveller’s dinner party says, “but I certainly don’t know the natural order of these 
flowers” (152).  
As the final image of the text, these flowers reproduce the same qualities of 
syncope that require ethical attention: they may be aesthetic objects, but they are also out-
of-time, silent, uncertain, and uncanny forms of life. They remind us that attending to the 
uncertainty of the text, in all its “thick description,” is itself an ethical act. Simon 
Critchley insists that deconstructive reading is an ethical demand (Critchley 1): attending 
to those dependent and slippery categories of difference, knowing that any ethical 
decision involves an ordeal of the undecidable that cannot be resolved (Derrida “Force” 
24). The very form of the Traveller’s autobiography, then, opens itself up to ethical 
possibility, as the Traveller tries again and again to narrate history, explicit about his 
uncertainty and attentive to alternate possibilities. While this is ultimately an ethical 
failure on the part of the Traveller in the blithe misrecognition of himself as the true 
historical form of the human—one who need not bother to let the rest of the Eloi know 
about the death of Weena since he sees her as bare life—he also supplies the unending 
slippages between human-animal-machine in moments of narrative syncope. These 
ontological uncertainties provide opportunities for readerly attention. Critchley reminds 
us that Derrida has said that deconstruction itself is ethical since it is an “openness 
towards the other” (in Critchley 28). 
In Without Alibi, Derrida uses the example of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
autobiographical Confessions in order to show how what is life-changing and special 
about Rousseau’s confession is also a mechanical or automatic production. While the 
Traveller’s first-person narrative is not a confessional autobiography, the frame through 
which Derrida proceeds can help us to think through the significance of the Traveller’s 
                                               
151 Caldwell argues that the narrator’s interpretation of these flowers, which have been given to the 
Traveller in a “typically vapid Eloi game,” is a “structured misreading” (133). 
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account of himself. As Derrida insists that philosophy begin to think together “an 
unheard-of conceptual form,” “the new figure of an event-machine,” he also suggests that 
“this thinking could belong only to the future—and even that it makes the future 
possible” (73). In the time travel narrative, the Traveller loses those aspects of 
subjectivity that make him seem transcendentally and uniquely human; his response is 
both a violence and a narrative resistance that attempts to affirm his human difference 
from these im-possible future forms of life. Yet, his autobiography itself reveals the im-
possible form of his own subjectivity, a singular, unique event that is nevertheless 
underwritten by the most mechanical, automaton-like behaviour. To be able to recognize 
this im-possible conceptual form—that it is the machine, the recording-device that allows 
the human to be autobiographical—suggests the political significance of the frame 
narrative: that another future is possible, one in which humans confront not the difference 
between humans and animals or humans and machines but the multiplicity of differences 
between forms of human-animal-machine life.  
4.5. Conclusion 
If some of Wells’s literary corpus represents an uncertainty about the guaranteed 
species status of humans in relation to animals, later in life he became interested in 
maintaining a hierarchy within the category of the human. As scholars like Greenberg 
and Hovanec note, the “Wells of the twentieth century was a eugenicist, an advocate of 
scientific planning, and a writer of technoutopias […], a figure bearing little resemblance 
to the skeptical author of The Time Machine” (Hovanec 479). As Hovanec suggests here, 
eugenicism—the desire to modify and improve the human race through selective 
reproductive practices—is understood to be a development in Wells’s thought after the 
publication of The Time Machine. Parrinder argues that Wells’s evolutionary narrative 
cannot be a form of eugenicist thought because cultural changes could not span such a 
vast temporal distance (39). However, I want to suggest that if we read The Time 
Machine forward into Wells’s belief that the future belongs to “the fit, the bounded, the 
healthy individual” (Diaz 23), we can see how narrative syncope may help us disrupt the 
eugenicist possibility of a masculinist, imperialist, white supremacist future.  
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In contrast to Parrinder, I believe that the novel could be read as a cautionary tale 
that suggests that social engineering might protect against a future of Eloian decadence 
and Morlockian cannibalism. However, the figure that ought to represent the fit, bounded, 
healthy individual is the Victorian man who is supposedly constituted differently to 
protect himself against the contagion of the disgusting Morlocks and to survive as the 
fittest. Yet this very man is vulnerable to syncope, to the vagaries of the body and its 
automatisms. This embodied vulnerability also resists the kind of transcendence that 
some posthumanist theories suggest may be possible as man merges with machine. The 
Time Machine therefore offers insight into the impossibility of classifying anyone as the 
fittest form of the (post)human, even if, for the Traveller, it is easier to close one’s eyes in 















 Feeling Other(s): Dracula and the 
Transfusion of Affect 
In a scene that occurs early in Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897), Jonathan Harker 
describes an encounter with three vampire women.152 After falling asleep in a room the 
Count has forbidden him to enter, he awakes to their approach, and, in a dreamlike state, 
he describes how they make him “uneasy,” with “some longing and at the same time 
some deadly fear” (42). As Harker feigns sleep, suspended in this mixture of terror and 
arousal, one woman kneels over him and brings her mouth to his neck, making his skin 
“tingle as one’s flesh does when the hand that is to tickle it approaches nearer—nearer” 
(42-3). The vampire pauses, pressing her teeth to his neck, but while Harker waits in 
eager anticipation, another feeling intrudes upon his desire, “another sensation” that 
“swept through [him] as quick as lightning” (43). “I was conscious of the presence of the 
Count,” Harker writes, “and of his being as if lapped in a storm of fury” (43). As 
Harker’s eyes open “involuntarily,” he witnesses Dracula berating and banishing the 
women before they fade through the window into the night. Finally overwhelmed by the 
intensity and strangeness of this encounter, Harker describes his own disappearance in 
the final line of the chapter: “Then the horror overcame me, and I sank down 
unconscious” (44). 
Harker’s description of his skin’s pre-contact knowledge of another body and his 
sudden embodied reception of the Count’s emotional state suggests the transmission of 
affect—the movement of feeling between bodies. Moreover, Harker’s faint emphasizes 
the physiological, nonconscious aspect of affective transmission, as the reaction of his 
body supersedes his consciousness in a moment of narrative syncope. In Dracula, Lucy 
Westenra and Mina Harker both lose consciousness when they are bitten by the vampire, 
but Jonathan’s body is powerfully affected by the Count even without that puncturing 
bite. Jonathan’s experience of syncope, read next to the many instances of fainting that 
                                               
152 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as “Feeling Other(s): Dracula and the Ethics of 
Unmanageable Affect” in Affect Theory and Literary Critical Practice: A Feel for the Text. Adapted by 
permission from Springer Nature: Palgrave Macmillan, Affect Theory and Literary Critical Practice: A 
Feel for the Text, edited by Stephen Ahern, 2019. 
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occur throughout the novel, suggests that affect in this novel is a physiological response 
to the powerful, material presence of otherness. The vampire embodies this otherness, 
but, as both syncope broadly and Jonathan’s encounter specifically show, affect is also 
the otherness or alterity of the body. The vampire hunters experience syncope—they are 
touched by alterity—both from the bite of the vampire and from simply being alive and 
in the world. Therefore, the vampire activates and represents not just the alterity of a 
world full of other bodies, species, cultures, objects, and feelings but the location of these 
alterities in the subject’s own body.  
As in The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time Machine, bodies in Dracula are 
subject to their nervous systems and behave automatically. Stoker references automatism 
when he writes about unconscious cerebration (the brain’s ability to figure out a problem 
below the level of consciousness) (69, 237) and mentions by name the physiologists Jean-
Martin Charcot, John Scott Burdon-Sanderson, and David Ferrier. Anne Stiles, too, notes 
Stoker’s references to these physiologists and argues that the vampire is a “stand-in for 
localizationists and automatists who argued that we were no more than the sum of our 
brain functions,” implying that “neurologists are monsters, and they create soulless 
monstrosities” (55). Similarly, Nancy Armstrong has argued for the otherness of vampiric 
desire, which causes the vampire’s victims to “automatically repeat its behaviour” (122). 
For David Glover, John Greenway, and Diane Long Hoeveler, unconscious cerebration 
and automatism represent an otherness or animality that lurks beneath consciousness and 
agency. For these scholars, we might say that vampiric automatism represents the fear of 
the animal within. My analysis of narrative syncope incorporates each of these arguments 
to a degree—that vampiric otherness is frightening or threatening, that humans are not in 
control of their behaviour, and that nineteenth-century physiological psychology 
describes an alienated and animal source of selfhood—to suggest the ways in which the 
affective body is already other to the subject. 
Being affected means being touched by otherness, and therefore, alterity is a 
necessary part of selfhood. For the humans of Dracula, the unknown other exists within 
their very bodies, and without it, they could not be subjects. On one hand, that unknown 
is found in the autonomous nervous systems, including the circulatory system—a strange 
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part of every self that is nonsubjective but makes subjectivity possible. On the other hand, 
the vampire is an exemplary external body that not only affects the nervous and 
circulatory system, but also represents the unknown world that is constantly touching and 
affecting the bodies within it. The intrusion of that world is also necessary to subjectivity. 
In Dracula, as in The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time Machine, affect need not be 
read as communicative, influential, or pathological, as scholars like Laura Otis, Jill 
Galvan, Stephanie Moss, and William Hughes have argued.153 Instead, affect is the touch 
of alterity—what theorists call heteroaffection—which undoes the very notion of internal 
and external, self and other. That is, affect creates an uncertainty between the subject (or 
the self) and the other, because the otherness (or alterity) of affect is necessary to 
subjectivity and selfhood.  
As in The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time Machine, the affective 
uncertainty between self and other opens bodies and texts to ethical readings. While The 
Picture of Dorian Gray explores the impossible ethics of responsibility, Dracula’s 
instances of narrative syncope connect an ethics of uncertainty similar to The Time 
Machine’s with an ethics of generosity. We owe our very affective being to otherness—
both the otherness of our own autonomous, automatic, affective systems, and the others 
of the world who touch us. Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Derrida, and Catherine Malabou 
(“Go”) all call the gift of affective alterity a generosity of being. There is a dual 
movement to this generosity: one aspect is that true giving or generosity comes from the 
other of the body, non-subjectivity or nonconsciousness; the other aspect is that affect is 
the gift of being itself. Following Malabou’s connection of this generosity with the 
neuroscience of affect, I argue that in Dracula, syncope and the nonconscious, 
automatist, affective body create the possibility for epistemological uncertainty and 
absolute generosity.  
Automatic, affective responses in the novel—instances of narrative syncope—
create uncertainty about the differences between humans and vampires, undermining the 
                                               
153 Laura Otis argues that the affective nervous systems of both the vampire and his hunters form 
communication networks, while Jill Galvan argues that the vampire communicates with automatist bodies 
through hypnotism. For their part, William Hughes and Stephanie Moss claim that the automatisms or 
affective performances in the text are evidence of hysteria. 
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certainty that the vampire ought to be destroyed. Many scholars read Dracula’s trajectory 
as a stamping out of dangerous and contagious alterity, as in Stephen Arata’s reading that 
Dracula’s threat is that of reverse colonization (Occidental) or Roberto Esposito’s claim 
that Dracula spreads degeneration through blood.154 However, just as many have pointed 
out that the vampire and his human hunters are neither morally nor behaviourally much 
different, as in Carol Senf’s suggestion that the supposed goodness of the vampire 
hunters resembles the alleged evil of the vampire (“Unseen”).155 However, moments of 
affective uncertainty, or narrative syncope, show how the unknown similarities and 
differences between human and vampire can be found at the very level of being. Jacques 
Derrida would call these unknown similarities and differences incalculable or 
undecidable, and therefore a necessary aspect of any ethical decision. Ethical behaviour 
in the novel is not underwritten by good versus evil but by the tension between affective 
intimacy and alterity. 
Affective alterity comprises the realm of ethics because bodies need to be affected 
by otherness in order to be subjects and in order to respond to others. Dracula represents 
this affective alterity as a dangerous gift received by bodies that are ethically open to 
others. Openness towards the blood-sucking Count offers one version of Derrida’s 
impossible ethics by suggesting that an openness towards others might include the body. 
As the novel represents affected bodies in their automatist responses and reflexes, it 
transforms generosity from something that a subject chooses into something automatic 
and unthinking. Few scholars have located ethics in the affective alterity represented by 
the vampire; one exception is Jamil Khader, who reads Dracula through trauma theory to 
suggest that an ethics of responsibility emerges in the novel through the identification of 
                                               
154 Charles Blinderman writes that the Count is both a representative of physiological psychology and a 
“parasitic degenerate” (428), and John Glendening argues that the vampire is “modernity’s devolutionary 
nightmare” (115). Scholars like Erik Butler and Nancy Armstrong also see Dracula’s influence as a 
reproductive threat. 
155 However, the seemingly happy ending of the novel does not quite eliminate the threat of the vampire, if 
indeed he was ever a threat at all. Not only do Nicholas Daly, Arata (Occidental), and Erik Butler note that 
the novel ends with the birth of a son to Jonathan who may likely be a vampire himself, but the idea that 
hunters are morally or behaviourally different from Dracula is challenged by many scholars along with 
Senf, including those who liken Dracula to a threat, like Arata (Occidental), Erik Butler, Glendening, and 
Otis. 
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the self with the other.156 While Khader focuses on witnessing, I turn instead to affect, 
locating ethics in the uncertainty and generosity of affect’s alterity. In Dracula, scenes of 
affective encounter and alterity are also scenes of ethical plenitude. 
An ethics of uncertainty and generosity also emerges in the form of the novel’s 
narrative syncopation, a mirror for the moments of syncope that characters experience. 
Many forms of writing in the text are autobiographical in the sense that characters 
attempt to write about themselves and their feelings in response to unsettling and 
disorienting events. These attempts are nonetheless syncopated, subject to gaps and 
temporal disjunctions. We have seen in The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time 
Machine that these syncopated narratives are nonhuman forms of writing that give rise to 
and challenge the human attributes of textuality. Like The Time Machine’s frame 
narrative, Dracula’s patchwork form of multiple genres and authors adds another layer to 
this syncopation. Some scholars have already identified the close relationship between 
textuality and the body in Dracula. Otis suggests that the vampire hunters form a nervous 
system “of paper and wire” with Mina as its “integrative centre” (200, 198), as writing 
becomes a substitute for memory that is no better or worse than its physiological 
counterpart (200-201). While the vampire hunters are connected through blood and media 
exchanges, their narratives represent their attempts to auto-graph or to write themselves 
that are disrupted by syncope. Even Otis acknowledges how “noisy, self-propagating, and 
highly flawed” language is in the novel (246 n.14). Against scholars who argue that 
alterity emerges through technology or the intrusion of the vampire,157 I argue that 
heteroaffection interrupts or syncopates narrative expressions of conscious self-
awareness. Narrative syncope does not occur only because Count Dracula shows up—it 
is already the state of the autobiographical human. As in the other novels in this 
                                               
156 The other scholars that read a possible ethics in Dracula include Otis’, who suggests that the networked 
neurological system of the hunters could be interpreted as a collective good and a weapon against the 
vampire (although she is not convinced of this reading), and Nancy Armstrong, who claims that the 
sameness of vampiric desire might lead to a conflict-free utopia. 
157 For example, Friedrich Kittler notes that the novel’s narrative takes the form of an information system 
(and weapon); Brundan argues that Dracula locates a power struggle between organic and technological 
forms of translation; Jennifer Wicke that the narrative can only emerge through mass cultural technological 
mediation; and Erik Butler that vampirism makes writing impersonal and humans into non-subjects. 
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dissertation, syncopated bodies and narratives not only undercut human superiority, they 
offer forms of ethical openness towards others. 
Each instance of syncope in Dracula develops our understanding of affective 
alterity and the ethical questions and possibilities that surround it. In the first section, I 
concentrate on Jonathan’s experience of fainting and narrative syncope, comparing it 
with Lucy’s and Mina’s swoons at the hands (or fangs) of the vampire to demonstrate 
how the circulatory system and the narrative are heteroaffective. The second section 
looks to the wide variety of narrative syncope that occur for both men and women in the 
novel, exploring the way affective responses complicate gender, prompt unthinking 
generosity, and reveal that affect itself is a generous gift from the other. In the final 
section, I look to vampiric touching as an extreme version of dangerous generosity that 
pushes boundaries and limits to show us the ethics of embodied and textual syncope. In 
the conclusion, I turn briefly to clinical narratives of neurologically atypical patients, 
suggesting that Dracula might offer an ethical challenge to current medical narrative 
practices.  
5.1. Circulatory Heteroaffection: Fainting and Narrative 
The scene with which I have begun this chapter, Jonathan’s encounter with the 
Count and the women during a state of affective suspension, is exemplary of affective 
response. Other scholars see this scene as pivotal for its sexual suggestiveness, and they 
read the affective intensity of the scene as sexual desire between Jonathan, the vampire 
women, and Dracula. In a well-cited example, Christopher Craft writes that Jonathan is 
femininely passive as he “awaits a delicious penetration from a woman whose demonism 
is figured as the power to penetrate,” but that this desire is interrupted by the even more 
transgressive possibility of Jonathan’s penetration by Dracula (109-111).158 However, the 
                                               
158 See also Marjorie Howes’ repetition of this reading; Stephanie Moss on Jonathan’s “harem desires” 
(140); John Allen Stevenson on the vampire women as representative of a frightening and foreign sexuality 
(143-145); Dejan Kuzmanovic on the release of Jonathan’s repressed desire that will upend his identity 
before it is again consolidated (416-417); Senf on the scene’s representation of the “total irrationality” of 
sexual desire (“Unseen” 167); Glover on the novel’s use of the blonde vampire as an “enemy within” to 
corrupt Jonathan and “cut him off forever from respectable domesticity” (70); and Hughes’ reading that the 
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critical certainty that Dracula is a novel about repressed sexuality is a modern one—early 
contemporary reviewers of the novel rarely included sexuality in their assessment of its 
“bad taste” (Hughes, Reader’s 85). While I agree with Elizabeth Miller that “it would be 
folly to deny any erotic potential in Dracula (it is, after all, a novel about biting and 
sucking)” (para. 8),159 I see it as a critical omission that few scholars have been interested 
in the final line that breaks the tension of this scene, in which Harker describes his own 
absence from the narrative as he falls unconscious in a faint.160 Connecting this loss of 
consciousness with both the sexual and non-sexual responses of Harker’s receptive body 
in this scene reveals that the automatic and nonsubjective responsiveness of the body 
exceeds sexual desire.   
That is, Jonathan’s response in this scene is about the pleasure of syncope as 
much as it is about the pleasure of sex. Writing about Nancy’s work on the gap opened up 
in autoaffection (the self’s feeling of itself), Derrida explains that Nancy describes “a 
syncope of contact, a quasi-masturbatory auto-affection,” that “comes down to 
autoerotism lost in pleasure, sinking in syncopated laughter” (38). These lines, it seems to 
me, could be equally applicable to Jonathan’s heady recognition that not only does he 
desire the touch of the women, but he enjoys the feeling of syncope, giving himself over 
to this moment of self-absence. To lose or let go of oneself can also be sensually 
pleasurable. For instance Catherine Clément writes of the euphoric pleasures of syncope, 
including but not limited to orgasm; following her lead, I see sexual desire in Dracula as 
just one example—and not even necessarily the most interesting one—of embodied, 
nonconscious, and othering feeling.161 As Craft explains, “Harker awaits an erotic 
                                               
scene “suggests the dissolution of customary and accepted gender boundaries as much as it does the 
presence of sexual taboos ranging from premarital sexuality to oral-genital contact” (Reader’s 48). 
159 Miller offers a rigorous account of the wide variety of sexual readings of Dracula available as of her 
publication in 2006, suggesting that “it is possible to go too far” (para. 8) to contort both readings of the 
text and its author’s life to fit a narrative of sexuality. 
160 Those who do note it, Katy Brundan and Dejan Kuzmanovic, read this swoon in the framework of 
Jonathan’s gender and sexuality, here feminized (Kuzmanovic) and homoerotic (Brundan). While Craft 
does not explicitly mention Jonathan’s syncope, he does note that Jonathan enacts a “swooning desire for 
an overwhelming penetration,” using fainting metonymically to suggest femininity (109). 
161 Clément writes that it “would be easy to collect all the accidents of thought, language, and deed in 
Freud’s work, and to include syncope with them as a psychosomatic phenomenon, with hysterical origins, 
rehearsing a forever unknowable primal scene…I do not exclude meeting Freud, even less encountering 
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fulfillment that entails both the dissolution of the boundaries of the self and the thorough 
subversion of conventional Victorian gender codes” (108, my emphasis). While Craft 
does not follow up on his remark about the dissolution of the subject’s boundaries, 
choosing instead to turn the focus of any crisis of identity towards homosexuality, I open 
this inquiry up towards the feeling of being touched itself—a feeling that is syncopal, that 
evacuates subjectivity, and that activates the other in the self.  
Losing consciousness and being bitten by the vampire both result in a gap in the 
subject’s self-touching or autoaffection. In her study of brain science in Dracula, Stiles 
has recently noted that Stoker uses the signs of fainting to represent Lucy Westenra’s 
encounter with the vampire. Rather than a description of “blood, fangs, crucifixes, and 
other items of vampire iconography,” the vampire’s bite prompts a slow sinking out of 
consciousness (Stiles 50). Mina records Lucy’s description of her encounter with the 
vampire as a “vague memory of something long and dark with red eyes” (Stoker 94). 
Lucy says, “I seemed to be sinking into deep green water, and there was a singing in my 
ears, as I have heard there is to drowning men” as “my soul seemed to go out from my 
body and float about the air” (94). Lucy describes a kind of out-of-body experience, in 
which she claims to have watched Mina shake her awake before she returns to 
consciousness (94). However, Stiles is correct to point out that this moment is also one of 
a loss of consciousness, a loss of individuality, and a loss of “bodily control” (50). 
Arguing that the vampire represents brain science’s rejection of the soul or free will, 
Stiles claims that as Lucy is vamped by Dracula, she “becomes a mere body that goes 
through the motions of survival without the guiding force of a soul or free will” (50). For 
Stiles, the vampire’s ability to strip a subject of their soul and agency represents the threat 
of automatism and of physiological psychology’s soullessness (73).162 However, 
Jonathan’s encounter with the vampires and his subsequent swoon, along with the rest of 
                                               
Lacan, but that is not enough—or rather, it is no longer enough for me” (19). In other words, we might say, 
sex is great, but have you ever been undead? 
162 While Stiles does admit that Dracula “cannot entirely reassure us that we are more than the sum of our 
brain functions” (80), the thrust of her argument is that the novel upholds a “traditional, religious 
worldview…in which human souls, willpower, and intellect ultimately triumph over vampiric automata” 
(69). Hoeveler argues similarly that if Dracula depicts a brain science of automatism and hypnotism that 
others the subject via the “reptilian residue at the base of the human brain” (para. 23), it does so firmly 
through the figure of the vampire. 
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his initial journal entries, demonstrate how he is subject to the vicissitudes and 
automatisms of his nervous system without ever having been bitten. The vampire is 
simply representative of what is already alien and other—what is already vampiric—
within humans. If the human body is already like the vampire’s, then the body produces 
an uncertainty over what is particularly human and subjective. 
As in The Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time Machine, we find in Dracula a 
representation of conscious automatism, in characters that are conscious in the sense that 
they may be aware of what is happening but have no control over it. As I have discussed 
throughout this dissertation, Thomas Huxley theorized that both humans and animals 
were conscious automata, sensitive machines whose “affections of their sensory nerves 
give rise to molecular changes in the brain, which again give rise to, or evolve, the 
corresponding states of consciousness” (575). For Stiles, the vampires are these 
automatons, but Jonathan, too, is subject to this automatic action, not only when he faints, 
but also, for example, when his eyes open “involuntarily.” Furthermore, these 
automatisms are aligned closely with the circulatory system. Jonathan records that when 
the first vampire woman leans over him and touches her mouth to his throat, he closed his 
eyes and “waited—waited with beating heart” (43). As the touch of the other affects him, 
Jonathan is suddenly aware of a part of his nervous system that normally works 
unnoticed, the blood pumping from his heart through his veins. Blood is responsive to the 
other. Dracula therefore engages what Kristie Blair has called the Victorian culture of the 
heart, as it draws on the inseparable materiality and metaphoricity of an organ that many 
would have understood to be “the most intimate part of an individual yet the most 
detached, in the sense that its actions cannot necessarily be controlled” (4). As Blair 
describes it, the heart was already a fraught literary object, suggesting the possibilities of 
connection and sympathy but also vulnerability and alienation (6-7).  
Physiological psychologists also connected syncope with the heart and with blood 
flow. William Benjamin Carpenter, the physiological psychologist famous for the 
concept of unconscious cerebration with which Stoker was familiar, categorizes fainting 
as an affective and involuntary response that can be caused by the circulatory system. In 
The Principles of Mental Physiology (1874), Carpenter describes the ability of emotion to 
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affect the sympathetic system, claiming that “we continually see the action of the heart 
quickened by emotional excitement; whilst a violent ‘shock’ to the feelings may seriously 
reduce it, or may even paralyse it (as in fainting)” (127). According to Carpenter’s 
theory, fainting is a physiological affective response literally involving the heart. In 
Jonathan’s case, his circulatory system is affected by the vampire, an affection that will 
become obvious as blood becomes the central mechanism of the vampire’s touching. 
That is, blood is implicitly a part of the novel even before it is explicitly so. 
Indeed, C. M. Tidy, “[l]ate-Victorian Britain’s leading forensic physician,” 
connects syncope specifically to the heart (Behlmer 219-220).163 While Tidy refers to 
syncope as a cause of death “beginning at the heart,” either by deficiency or blood 
circulation (250-251), the connection is still relevant. While the causes of death by 
syncope that Tidy enumerates are largely physiological (like hemorrhages or starvation), 
he also connects emotional shocks to syncope:  
Sudden death from what is called shock (including mental emotion, joy, 
grief, terror, etc, fatal concussion, blows on the epigastrium, lightning and 
electricity, and some suddenly fatal forms of apoplexy) is probably the 
result of syncope. Such causes as those enumerated act through the nervous 
system, either on the cardiac ganglia of the sympathetic or on some other 
portions of that system, or upon certain definite tracts in the medulla 
oblongata or brain. (251) 
Tidy explains here that a broad spectrum of shock, including emotional shock, can cause 
death by acting on the nervous system, stopping the heart.  
Another late-Victorian work on forensic pathology also uses syncope to refer to 
the heart’s inability to circulate blood resulting in losses of consciousness and possible 
death. David Ferrier is mentioned by name in Dracula, a reference Stiles reads as largely 
negative since Ferrier practiced vivisection on animals to work on brain localization and 
famously stood trial for it. However, in 1888, Ferrier took over authorship of William A. 
Guy’s Principles of Forensic Medicine, a text written to help medical examiners and 
doctors in ascertaining death and determining its cause. In the section on “Death from 
                                               
163 For the possibility that Stoker’s novel is a response to what Behlmer calls Victorian moral panic over the 
possibility of premature burial, see Natalia Wójcicka.  
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Failure of the Circulation,” Ferrier and Guy write that syncope occurs due to “diminished 
blood pressure in the cerebral centres” and is closely connected to the “sudden cessation 
of the heart” (232). The shock that stops the heart is broadly attributed to the nervous 
system: “[t]he heart may be inhibited temporarily, or finally and for ever, by central 
nervous influence, as by emotion or blows on the head” (232). Ferrier and Guy’s text 
does not distinguish between the physiological and the emotional when it comes to the 
power to affect and even to cause death. Either to the “nervous irritation” of a physical 
blow or an emotional one, the body is vulnerable to the world, and at any time this world 
might violently touch the body and cause a loss of consciousness or even death. Like a 
physical blow to the head, emotion is connected with the circulatory system in such a 
way that it is powerful enough to arrest the body’s most fundamental and automatic 
process—its heartbeat. 
The idea that emotion affects the heart, even to the point of death, is not 
necessarily a radical one in the context of Victorian literature. As Dinah Birch notes, 
“[m]any readers have noticed how often George Eliot’s more emotionally damaged 
characters die of heart failure” (43). Taking fainting into consideration adds texture to 
this statement, however, because fainting suggests that just having emotions is already 
damaging to the heart. Reading Tidy alongside Ferrier and Guy here emphasizes that 
being affected means being touched, materially. As such, as we see not just in Jonathan’s 
swoon but throughout the novel, blood is a privileged substance for thinking about the 
kind of affective alterity that syncope represents.  
Two physiological psychologists, William James and Alexander Bain, 
demonstrate in their work not only Birch’s truism that “[f]eelings run in the blood” (43), 
but that those feelings are strange and other to the subject. Their psychological examples 
complement the previous medical ones to offer an important context for Dracula: that the 
source of feeling is located in the body but may be hidden to the self and not coincide 
with the self. James’s now-famous essay “What is an Emotion?,” published in 1884, was 
written as a supplement to Ferrier’s work on the localization of mental and physical 
action in the brain. James had previously engaged in the debate over human automatism, 
responding to Huxley’s automaton theory by, for the most part, disagreeing with Huxley 
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and insisting on the importance of choice as indicative of the ethical capacity of humans 
(“Automata”). In his later attention to emotion, however, James seems to implicitly offer 
a version of automatic behaviour when he describes the non-cognitive level of 
physiological response. In this essay, James is keen to show that emotion is embodied, 
stating that if we subtract physiological response from emotion, we are left with nothing. 
He notes that the circulation of blood can be measured to indicate an affective state; he 
refers to the Italian physiologist Angelo Mosso and his plethysmograph, an early blood 
pressure machine that allowed the Victorians to recognize how varied and nuanced 
physical expressions of emotion were. James writes that the plethysmograph had “shown 
that not only the heart, but the entire circulatory system, forms a sort of sounding-board, 
which every change of our consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate … That 
the heart-beats and the rhythm of breathing play a leading part in all emotions 
whatsoever, is a matter too notorious for proof” (“Emotion” 191-192).164 
James’s mention of the plethysmograph gestures toward a field in Victorian 
science that was focused on the objective measurement of the body and its capacities, as I 
discuss in relation to The Time Machine. However, James follows this more general 
point—that the circulatory system is an integral part of the expression of feeling—with 
an anecdote about his own youthful and mysterious response to the appearance of blood. 
As proof that emotion is physiological, James offers a discussion of affective states that 
do not properly correspond to named emotions such as anger or fear. He notes the 
“cutaneous shiver” we experience when listening to music, the breathless arrest of the 
heart when caught off-guard, a feeling of “all-overishness” when we watch a friend 
wander too close to a precipice, and, significantly, his own swoon at the sight of a horse 
being bled (“Emotion” 196). Speaking in the third person, James insists that nothing in 
his cognitive knowledge could have produced this response:  
He had never heard of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, 
and he had so little repugnance to it, and so little apprehension of any other 
sort of danger from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, 
                                               
164 He continues: “Hardly a sensation comes to us without sending waves of alternate constriction and 
dilatation down the arteries of our arms. The blood-vessels of the abdomen act reciprocally with those of 
the more outward parts” (191-192). 
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he could not help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of 
crimson fluid could occasion him such formidable bodily effects. (196) 
Blood also mysteriously causes fainting in Bain’s work on physiological psychology in 
The Senses and the Intellect. Like James, Bain also believed in the “agency of the body” 
(Dixon 144), and here he seems to suggest that there may be inexplicable social and 
personal reasons one might faint at the sight of blood. He writes: 
There are many of our strong likings on the one hand, and strong antipathies 
on the other, that come under the class of reflected influences. The sight of 
blood affects some persons to fainting, which cannot be owing to anything 
in the mere appearance of it; apart from association, the rich scarlet hue 
would make this a really agreeable object to the eye. (409) 
Bain is ostensibly discussing moral approbation and disapprobation, the moral training of 
children by the association of actions with feelings of approval or disapproval. His 
reference to fainting at the sight of blood, however, seems to be only tangentially related 
to the question of moral aversion. Instead, like James, he seems to be suggesting that the 
automaticity of the body is also its strange otherness.  
Blood may be a privileged subject to demonstrate alterity because of what it 
represents—the sight of blood is the vision of that which is never seen, the hidden source 
of the animacy of creaturely life, the interiority of the self suddenly external to the self. 
To see blood is to be confronted by the bare (or biological) life that makes sovereignty 
(or subjectivity) possible. Perhaps this is why Jonathan is so suddenly convinced that, 
following his vampiric encounter and fainting spell, the vampires are “waiting to suck my 
blood” (44), since that is part of the affective body that they have already been touching.  
Brian Massumi’s definition of affect is broadly applicable to Dracula, as it is to 
the other novels in this dissertation: a nonconscious intensity that acts at the level of the 
body, virtually. Massumi’s model of affect draws heavily on the work of James, in 
particular through the idea “that relationality is already in the world and that it registers 
materially in the activity of the body before it registers consciously” (Parables 231). 
While I will return to Massumi, I want to supplement this model of affect with that of 
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Catherine Malabou, in order to explore the idea that affect is other to the self.165 In “Go 
Wonder: Subjectivity and Affects in Neurobiological Times,” Malabou turns to 
neurobiology to ask if the autonomy of affect—the physiology of emotion and the 
processes of the body—“challenges the vision of a self-affecting subjectivity 
[autoaffection] in favor of an originary deserted subject, a subject that is definitely not 
present to itself [heteroaffection]” (4).166 In describing different theories of autoaffection, 
Malabou draws on some of the same Continental philosophers and neuroscientists that 
are referred to in this dissertation, like Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Antonio Damasio, and 
Baruch Spinoza, to describe affect as the feeling of existence or self-difference, and 
autoaffection as the perception of this feeling.167 Malabou writes that “the ‘I’ who feels 
itself is the dominant structure of all affective modification” and “[t]he very structure of 
subjectivity, within the metaphysical tradition, was one and the same with the structure of 
autoaffection, that is, as this kind of self-touching through which the subject is feeling its 
singular presence” (6). For theorists who critique the concept, like Derrida and Deleuze, 
autoaffection implies a subject who exists prior to being affected and becomes present to 
itself through affect. 
Malabou is primarily interested in how brain injuries and pathologies challenge 
the metaphysical version of subjectivity (autoaffection). For Malabou, the disaffection 
displayed by neurologically traumatized subjects challenges psychoanalysis and 
autoaffection because the subject stops feeling things at all, becoming an entirely 
different person who cannot be healed through therapy and is no longer in touch with 
their affects. This disaffected, traumatized subject was also of interest to Victorian 
physiologists such as Huxley, who used the automatic, unfeeling behaviour of brain-
injured patients to theorize the essentially automatic nature of human behaviour. As I 
                                               
165 That the affective life of the body, or bare life, is the nonsubjective or other part of the self is implicit in 
Massumi’s work in the sense that the self does not know its own affective responses. 
166 Malabou writes: “The problem is knowing whether emotions and affects are still considered rooted in an 
originary process of autoaffection of the subject—where the subject has to touch itself in order to be moved 
or touched by objects—or if the study of the emotional brain precisely challenges the vision of a self-
affecting subjectivity in favor of an originary deserted subject, a subject that is definitely not present to 
itself” (“Go” 4). 
167 While Malabou does not draw on Massumi, we can connect the idea of autoaffection to what he calls 
one’s “sense of aliveness” (36). 
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have noted above, Stiles makes the connection between these disaffected patients and the 
vampires of Dracula, but I want to take this thinking in a different direction in order to 
consider the ways in which the fainting subjects of the novel are neither self-present to 
themselves nor entirely disaffected or changed. When Jonathan faints, he experiences an 
affective response that does not involve his subjective self. When he awakes again, he is 
still himself (more or less), but he is uncertain about what has happened and cannot quite 
trust the line between his conscious and nonconscious self. He cannot decide if the events 
of the night before have occurred or if he has dreamed them, writing, “I tried to satisfy 
myself on the subject, but could not arrive at any unquestionable result,” and noting 
“small evidences” like his oddly folded clothes that point to either his being unconscious 
while the Count has folded them or his doing so while his “mind was not as usual” (44). 
Harker is uncertain about whether the strange self or the stranger has performed the act. 
Ultimately, Malabou is interested in theorizing the entirely disaffected subject as 
hetero-heteroaffected; that is, utterly alienated from their own affects and no longer 
themselves, as with patients of brain injury. In order to do so, she explains how cognitive 
science suggests that subjects are primarily heteroaffected, that is, other to themselves. 
Drawing again on Derrida, Malabou writes that heteroaffection offers two important 
caveats for subjectivity: 
(1) the one who is affected in me is always the other in me, the unknown 
“me” in me, a dimension of my subjectivity that I don’t know and don’t 
perceive, and that (2) what affects me is always somebody other than 
myself, something else than the feeling of my ownness. (20) 
Moreover, Malabou makes syncope a key example of physiological heteroaffection 
(through Jean-Luc Nancy’s work), because it is an absolute interruption of subjectivity. 
For Nancy, Malabou explains, the “subject’s self-touching is always discontinuous—
absent to itself as it were—as if it were the touching of an other” (23). Syncope occurs 
when “an affect touches me but I don’t know what ‘me’ means” (24), but Malabou is 
further clear that “because the primordial affect (the affect of the self for itself) is always 
interrupted by the intrusion of alterity, all particular affects (love, hatred, joy, sadness, 
wonder, or generosity) are also constantly syncoped, interrupted, and discontinuous” 
(24). Heteroaffection—and thus the vampire—reveals that selfhood or subjectivity is 
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only made possible by something that is not the self. In other words, the subject is 
touched by something other, but in this moment, as Malabou clarifies, the subject is not 
his- or herself; the other of the world touches the other of the self. In this crucial early 
scene from Dracula, the other is the vampire—in all his extended alterity to which I will 
return—that touches the circulatory system of his guest.  
The autobiographical narrative that Jonathan writes in his journal underlines his 
uncertainty about what he is feeling and from where his feelings originate.168 While Senf 
is right to identify Jonathan as a “parochial Englishman” who is not particularly 
concerned with understanding the other (“Unseen” 164), his account of his progress from 
uncertainty to fear to aggression can help us think through the respect for alterity that 
heteroaffection can prompt. Jonathan’s experience in Transylvania and with Dracula 
“snowballs,” the term Massumi uses to describe James’s affect theory (Parables 213). 
Traveling to Castle Dracula and exposed to new ways of being, foods, train schedules, 
sounds, temporalities, and people, Harker does his best to manage his feelings because he 
has “business to do” and he can “allow nothing to interfere with it” (Stoker 13). 
However, he begins to feel uneasy as his landlady becomes increasingly agitated by his 
destination. After she offers him a rosary, he admits his nervousness while being unable 
to pinpoint its source; it could be “the old lady’s fear, or the many ghostly traditions of 
this place, or the crucifix itself” (13). Harker’s perception of others’ fear increases the 
closer he gets to his destination, as when his companions scream at the arrival of his 
driver (who we will later realize is Dracula) (17). Later, he discovers that the time is 
midnight and gets “a sort of shock,” recognizing that “the general superstition about 
midnight was increased by [his] recent experiences” as he waits “with a sick feeling of 
suspense” (18).  
Jonathan’s journal is punctuated by these physiological syncopations, 
nonconscious states that interrupt his ability to write himself. Therefore, underneath his 
autobiographical narrative exists the record-keeping of embodied responses that have 
uncertain causes and affinities with the bare lives of affected animals. For example, 
                                               
168 Germane to this discussion is William Reddy’s argument that the self is a disaggregation of thoughts 
and feelings; Reddy claims that cultural codes help to translate thoughts and feelings into legible emotions.  
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Jonathan’s fear and nervousness seems to extend, or to be shared, across species lines on 
his journey to the castle, as dogs and wolves begin to howl and the horses in their shared 
fear “strain and rear” and “shiver and sweat” (18-19). While Harker expresses his fear, 
his uncertainty produces a kind of syncopated narrative, a dysrhythmia of self that is 
touched by otherness. By the same token, as Jonathan and Dracula make their way to the 
castle, Harker cannot accurately report what occurs both because he is not sure what he 
feels and because he is not sure if he is even conscious. As Dracula repeatedly stops the 
calèche to “disappear into the darkness,” Jonathan writes that he “must have fallen asleep 
and kept dreaming of the incident” (19). Later, as they approach Castle Dracula, Jonathan 
may be conscious but not in control of himself; he repeatedly declares himself paralyzed 
with fear as he witnesses first “a ring of wolves” gather and then Dracula’s powerful 
dispersal of them. As the others of this new place affect Jonathan, his journal registers 
this heteroaffection as the other in him, as Malabou would put it, an other he does not 
know (as in the causes of his feelings) and cannot perceive (as in his moments of sleep or 
paralysis).  
Harker is primed to be afraid of Dracula and the women he meets at the castle by 
everything that occurs on his way to it. Both Massumi and Lisa Blackman offer priming 
as an explanation for the automatic behaviour of the body that either seems subjective 
(but is not) or conforms to certain expectations. Blackman writes that priming “relates to 
a variety of techniques used to modulate thought, action, belief and feeling” (377); 
similarly, Massumi writes that “[p]riming addresses threshold postures (presuppositions) 
orienting a participant’s entry into the situation, plus the associated tendencies that carry 
the orientation forward through the encounter” (Power 29). In other words, priming 
opens up a space in theories of automaticity for the significance of social, cultural, and 
political expectations, intersections, and entanglements. When the Count “lean[s] over” 
Harker and touches him, Harker “cannot repress a shudder,” which at first seems to 
indicate knowledge that the Count is a particular kind of being, inhuman, disgusting, or 
repulsive (24). Clasen, for example, reads this scene in exactly this way, drawing on 
theories that frame disgust as evolutionarily beneficial. While Clasen admits disgust is 
culturally constructed to a certain degree, he argues that it “rests on an evolutionary 
substrate” (389), a claim that could be used to fix the Count as an object in which disgust 
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inheres.169 In contrast, Harker also notes that although he is struck with “a horrible feeling 
of nausea,” this could be due to nothing more than the Count’s bad breath (24). Priming, 
therefore, challenges the idea that affect is ideologically empty,170 but it also challenges 
the possibility that affect reveals some kind of natural or a-political ideology. This first 
section of Jonathan’s journal reveals that his physical reactions do not necessarily signify 
anything either about himself or about the ontology of the other that has touched him. 
Even as Jonathan grows increasingly suspicious of the Count, his writing remains 
ethically uncertain about why that might be. 
Some chapter breaks in Jonathan’s journal attempt to absorb the loss of time that 
occurs during syncope and the break in autobiographical narrative, as they do in The 
Time Machine. For example, after Jonathan “[sinks] down unconscious” in a faint, the 
chapter ends, beginning again as he wakes the next morning in his bed, uncertain whether 
the previous night’s events had occurred or whether they had been a dream. However, 
because chapter breaks are interspersed throughout Jonathan’s record-keeping, seemingly 
without any particular pattern in relation to the change of day or time, they are also 
disruptive, causing a syncopation of temporality and flow within his autobiography.  
The first chapter break occurs as Jonathan and Dracula approach the castle, and 
while Jonathan expresses concern over whether he has been awake or asleep, as I note 
above, the break occurs after he has “suddenly became conscious” of their arrival, cutting 
off and then beginning anew his awakening and description of Castle Dracula (20). In 
addition, breaks occur within different entry dates, with entries for May 3rd, 4th, and part 
of the 5th making up the first chapter, and May 5th continuing into the second chapter, 
along with May 7th and 8th. The form of dividing the journal into both dates and chapters 
is temporally disorienting, as a reader wishing to ascertain the dates of events is 
                                               
169 Sara Ahmed explains that people use disgust to other the unknown. Writing about Charles Darwin’s 
description of his feeling of disgust for an inhabitant of Tierra del Fuego, Ahmed argues, “The question of 
what ‘tastes bad’ [or is disgusting] is bound up with questions of familiarity and strangeness: here, the 
proximity of the bodies of others is read as the cause of ‘our sickness’ precisely insofar as the other is 
seeable and knowable as stranger-than-me and stranger-to-us in the first place” (83). 
170 Ruth Leys in particular articulates this as a concern about affect theorists like Brian Massumi who are 
interested in the “non-intential” aspects of affect. I address Leys’s argument in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
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confronted with trying to decipher the event dates backwards from the recording dates, all 
the while ignoring the chapter breaks as markers of temporal significance. These 
disjunctive breaks also, as in The Time Machine, makes the editorial process of novel 
hyper-visible. Who has decided to end and begin the chapters in this way? Further, when 
Chapter II breaks the May 5th entry, the date is repeated at the beginning of the chapter; 
when Chapter III breaks the May 8th entry, the date is not repeated. Attending to these 
irregularities reminds us that the text is not, in fact the self-aware and conscious 
rendering—the transparent autoaffection—of Jonathan, but rather is the process of 
remediation, or subjectivity by heteroaffection; after all, it is another—Mina—who has 
put this text together (161).  
Jonathan claims that writing in his diary, “entering accurately,” helps to “soothe” 
him (41). When Mina repeats this belief, she invokes the structure of autoaffection: 
expressing herself in her journal “is like whispering to one’s self and listening at the same 
time,” she records (72).171 However, the strange and nonhuman syncopates even this 
intimate and gentle attempt to write the self. The nonconscious and the animal appears in 
the emergence of a subjectivity that can speak and hear itself. Even Mina immediately 
clarifies her statement by reminding the reader that she is not, in fact, writing in the 
traditional human sense because there is “something about the shorthand symbols that 
makes it different from writing” (72).172 If, autobiographically, Jonathan strives for the 
accuracy of his records and Mina the self-touching of subjectivity, both reveal the 
underlying alterity of textuality. Writing mirrors heteroaffection, where moments of 
syncope affect the body (of the text) precisely where the self (of the text) is not. Both 
fainting and journaling reveal the nonhuman other that disrupts subjectivity. 
                                               
171 Otis argues that writing is soothing for the hunters because it provides “an illusory support network, 
reassuring one—falsely—that one is not alone in one’s thoughts” (197). 
172 Wicke argues that the novel is replete with examples of modern mass-mediated culture, and offers 
shorthand as one example, an “invisible […] translated […] submerged […] cryptogram” (471). 
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5.2. Gender and Generosity 
In my analysis of The Time Machine, where both the Traveller and Weena faint, I 
focus on the Traveller’s posthumanist similarity to Weena. Dracula’s narrative offers 
multiple instances of syncope from the perspective of both men and women, which can 
help us to more fully address the relationship between fainting and gender. Fainting, and 
the resulting narrative syncope, is not a representation of femininity or non-
heteronormative sexuality in this novel, although there are some points at which this 
reading could hold. For example, Lucy, and later Mina, could embody the consumptive 
exhaustion or the “anemic and anorexic” (Khader 75) womanhood of the Victorian 
heroine. Jonathan, too, can be read as feminized in his faint, as mentioned above. The 
connection of fainting with hysteria, as in Moss’s work, suggests a particularly feminine 
pathology. Moss reads hysterical episodes in Dracula, including fainting, as analogous to 
hypnosis and the vampiric trance. She argues that the novel presents proto-Freudian 
models of gender and sexuality that become hysterical, hypnotic, or vampiric as the 
characters who perform them chafe against rigid social boundaries and their repressed 
natures begin to emerge. However, scholars have produced so many readings of gender 
and sexuality in relation to the novel that their binary terms cease to adhere to any stable 
markers. Gender—and gender as a marker of sexuality—is in fact far more fluid in this 
novel than any connection between fainting or hysteria and femininity suggests.173 
When the novel actually deploys the term hysteria, it describes not a sexualized or 
gendered pathology, but a surfeit of sudden, uncontrollable intensity, an excessive 
expression of feeling. For example, the distressed landlady who begs Jonathan not to 
travel to Castle Dracula is described by him as “hysterical” and “excited” (12); Mina calls 
herself “hysterical” when she desperately begs Van Helsing to help Jonathan recover 
from his time at the Castle (165); she also calls Arthur Holmwood hysterical as he cries 
and “beat his palms together in a perfect agony of grief (203); and Van Helsing calls 
Seward’s neurologically atypical patient Renfield hysterical when he begs to be set free 
from the institution (218). On the one hand, a body is a body—there is nothing 
                                               
173 Drawing on French medical discourses on hysteria at the end of the nineteenth century, Mark Micale 
writes that homosexuality was often connected to effeminacy (199-201). 
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particularly gendered about any of these episodes, which are better understood as 
moments of syncope. As Malabou points out, all emotions are also “constantly syncoped, 
interrupted, and discontinuous” because subjects are primarily heteroaffected; beyond 
this, these moments are breaks in selfhood, “threat[s] to self-possession and governance,” 
as Jill Matus has described (3) and as I discuss in Chapter Two.  
On the other hand, gender’s social construction means that fainting (or any other 
emotional response) can be politically captured as a symptom of gender. Many late-
nineteenth-century subjects would indeed consider it feminine to have no control over 
one’s emotions; as Glover points out, “by that period ideals of manliness had largely been 
purged of any open expression of feeling in favor of a self-confident physical robustness 
that regarded any undue sensitivity with suspicion” (46). Besides the fact that, as Glover 
points out, Stoker writes emotionally expressive male characters—by Glover’s argument, 
“in vindication of the feminized Irish” (47)—, the focus of this chapter is how Dracula 
demonstrates that being a subject means being primarily heteroaffected and that the ethics 
that emerge out of heteroaffection are not rooted in self-aware, conscious subjectivity. 
Hysteria in Dracula is neither a gendered pathology nor a definitively extra-emotional 
response. That is, fainting is linked to the physiological as much as, or in these cases, 
even more so, than it is to the emotional. While this has also been the case with both The 
Picture of Dorian Gray and The Time Machine, the overt context of blood and the 
circulatory system in Dracula amplify the physiological aspects of syncope. The 
physiological basis of syncope, coupled with the fact that fainting is not limited to any 
particular gender in the novel, represents an instability in gender categories at the end of 
the nineteenth century.174 Both male and female bodies behave generously, expressing an 
ethics of generosity that exceeds total capture by either gender category. 
                                               
174 Micale notes the general deconstruction of gender occurring at the end of the century, as “Charcot-era 
science and medicine simultaneously bore a critical, deconstructive relation to the sex/gender system of its 
day. The new knowledges accomplished this work principally by probing gender differentiation—and with 
it the biology, psychology, and ontology of masculinity and femininity—in original and provocative ways 
that reflected back obliquely on Victorian/Wilhelminian sexual culture. Within avant-garde European 
medical circles during these years, questions of gender, sexual behavior, and sexual identity were 
intensively argued, investigated, problematized, theorized, and reconceptualized in ways that would have 
been unthinkable at the beginning of Victoria’s reign fifty or so years earlier” (174-175). Examples of this 
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Lucy’s own struggle with the way the vampire affects her circulatory system 
demonstrates the relationship of syncope to physiology in a way that makes gender as 
open and uncertain as selfhood is. As with Jonathan, Lucy already behaves in ways that 
suggest she is heteroaffected before the bite of the vampire. She begins sleepwalking 
after Mina’s arrival in Whitby and before she meets Dracula; as William Hughes 
suggests, drawing on Carpenter’s work, somnambulism was understood in the nineteenth 
century to be an automatism (Beyond 146). Mina writes in her journal that when she finds 
Lucy, she is able to undress her and lead her back to bed because “as soon as her will is 
thwarted in any physical way, her intention, if there be any, disappears, and she yields 
herself almost exactly to the routine of her life” (84). This description of Lucy as 
seemingly volitional but in fact easily guided into performing tasks automatically sounds 
very much like the brain-injured patients that Huxley describes as automatons and 
Malabou describes as hetero-heteroaffected, “an originary deserted subject, a subject that 
is definitely not present to itself” (Malabou “Go” 4, original emphasis).  In the case of 
Sergeant F—, for example, Huxley writes of a brain-injured soldier who experienced 
periods of seeming nonconscious behaviour, where he would go about his usual business 
but without truly engaging in the world around him. He can be stuck with pins, Huxley 
explains, or given a glass of vinegar, without seeming to notice; he “offers no resistance 
to any change of direction which may be impressed upon him, or to the forcible 
acceleration, or retardation, of his movements” (569). Like Lucy, Sergeant F— seems to 
be sleepwalking. 
Thus, when Lucy sleepwalks, when she experiences this syncopation of 
consciousness, she reveals that there is an originary, automatist affect at work at the 
centre of every self that is not known by the self at all. Hughes argues against critics like 
Burton Hatlen that this sleepwalking might be a “response to a summons issued by the 
vampire” (Hughes, Beyond 146) to suggest instead that hysteria may be the cause of her 
somnambulism, a susceptibility symptomatic of her gender that makes it difficult for 
Seward to identify vampirism as the cause of her eventual illness. However interesting 
this reading may be, Stoker’s inclusion of the hereditary aspect of somnambulism 
                                               
science that Micale notes include Darwin’s and Huxley’s evolutionary theories, and Richard von Krafft-
Ebing’s and Havelock Ellis’s sexological theories (175-176). 
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suggests it is unnecessary—its reading as gendered says more about gender’s social 
construction (and Hughes’ repetition of it) than it does about whether sleepwalking is 
feminine or not. In fact, the text suggests that Lucy’s sleepwalking is not a symptom of 
her gender and it is not a product of vampirism; it is a “congenital and hereditary 
complaint” (Hughes Beyond 144) inherited from her father, who “had the same habit” 
(Stoker 72). We can understand Lucy’s sleepwalking as an automatism that crosses 
gender lines, one activated by an alienated part of herself.  
As she is vamped by Dracula, Lucy is subject to episodes of syncope that are 
congruent with blood loss, as the text encourages us to connect the vampire’s visits with 
her fainting episodes, her “bloodless” appearance (105), and her partial recovery by blood 
transfusions (to which I will later return). I have already noted the example, also 
discussed by Stiles, of Lucy’s recollection to Mina of her loss of consciousness. Later, 
too, Seward and Van Helsing find Lucy lying unconscious beside her dead mother, 
apparently having been victimized by the vampire who leaves the “little wounds” on her 
neck “looking horribly white and mangled” (134). Fortunately, Lucy leaves a 
memorandum describing the moments just prior to Seward and Van Helsing’s 
appearance, when her mother, having come to check on her, sees a wolf at the window 
and panics. As Lucy’s mother succumbs to her fear, her own syncope leading to death 
beginning at the heart (131, 151), she falls against her daughter. Lucy writes, “her head 
hit my forehead and made me dizzy for a moment or two. The room and all around 
seemed to spin round” (131). As the room fills with dust motes, Lucy reports that she 
“tried to stir, but there was some spell upon me, and dear mother’s poor body…and I 
remembered no more for a while” (131). While the implication here is that it is the 
vampire (or his emissaries) who paralyze Lucy, her fainting spell also has a very 
physiological explanation, since she is concussed by her mother and then trapped beneath 
her body. Lucy’s syncope is an example of heteroaffection since she experiences 
syncope, or an absence of selfhood, when her body is touched by the very material 
weight of one of the most significant others in her life—her mother. 
Other male and female characters beyond Jonathan and Lucy also experience 
syncope by fainting or coming close to fainting. These syncopated narrative moments 
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consistently emphasize the close relationship between heteroaffection—being touched by 
otherness—and the nervous system, including the circulatory system. While Lucy is the 
most traditionally feminine figure, Mina is described by Van Helsing as a “combination” 
of genders, with a “man’s brain…and a woman’s heart” (207). Scholars, too, have 
perceived Mina’s gender—or her performance of it—as dual. They debate whether or not 
she is representative of the late-Victorian New Woman, a polarizing description of 
women who threatened patriarchal and heterosexual norms by working, eschewing 
marriage, expressing themselves, enjoying embodied pleasures like food and sex, and 
otherwise generally demanding more than they were socially and politically afforded.175 
However, Mina’s experiences with syncope, like Lucy’s, emphasize the alterity of the 
autonomic nervous system, and assigning gender to those experiences relies on and 
reifies assumptions about gender expression and context. Mina twice comes close to 
fainting. The first time, she is bringing Lucy home from a sleepwalking episode, during 
which Lucy has wandered out to the churchyard of Whitby Abbey and has been visited 
by Dracula. As they must make their way back through the town in the middle of the 
night, Mina is anxious about both Lucy’s health and the possible tarnishing of her 
reputation. “My heart beat so loud all the time,” Mina recounts, “that sometimes I 
thought I should faint” (89). Mina’s own inner narration connects the hyper-present 
sound of her heartbeat—the sound of the circulation of her blood—with fainting, making 
it impossible to separate her noisy heartbeat from both her midnight exercise and her 
anxiety. What is crucial here in terms of the automatism of the body is the possibility that 
Mina’s accelerated heartbeat is unrelated to her conscious awareness. What is crucial in 
terms of gender is that Mina’s nervous system responds to social expectation, and not as a 
symptom of femininity. 
                                               
175 Moss, for example, notes that before Mina marries, she displays feminist tendencies, like a desire to 
write like “lady journalists do” (Stoker 56); after her marriage though, “in place of the New Woman, the 
Victorian hysteric begins to emerge” (Moss 137). However, in “Dracula: Stoker’s Response to the New 
Woman,” Senf only partially agrees with Moss, noting that Mina possesses some qualities of the New 
Woman but resists the epithet as a whole (48), while Lucy, in her overt desire and vampiric sexuality, is the 
New Woman who must be destroyed (42-45). See Sally Ledger for a foundational analysis of the New 
Woman, “as sexually transgressive, as heavily implicated in socialist politics, and as a force for change” 
(6). 
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Mina’s second episode of near-fainting connects the internal other of her body 
with the external others of story, sound, and media when she receives a shock and is 
overcome, rendered “powerless” in her chair, as Dr. Seward allows her to listen to his 
phonograph recording recounting the staking of the vampire Lucy (198). External and 
internal alterity collide here, as Mina is powerfully affected and does not know yet what 
she is feeling or thinking, noting that her “brain was all in a whirl,” with both the 
“multitude of horrors” of the staking and the possibility that “Lucy was at last at peace,” 
and that she “didn’t know what to believe” (198). The subjective and physiological 
collide again, as Mina’s shock seems to arise directly from hearing of Lucy’s horrific 
death and suspends her conscious agency for a moment. She is then revived 
physiologically by Seward’s brandy, which works its action on the body. These near-
fainting episodes of physiological intensity at its most nonconscious or homeostatic level 
punctuate the narrative. When Mina writes, “It is all so wild, and mysterious, and 
strange,” she is referring to the story of Lucy’s vampirism, but her assessment is equally 
applicable to the workings of affect (198). In this moment, Mina seems to pride herself 
on her stoicism and emotional strength, writing that “fortunately,” she was “not of a 
fainting disposition” (198). If fainting is read as feminine here, Mina is insistent that she 
is not. However, since she does faint later in the novel, we can read her own belief as 
resistant to the idea that femininity is a disposition, or that fainting is an expression of 
biological constitution.176   
 These moments reflect Malabou’s definition of syncope as an instance when “an 
affect touches me but I don’t know what ‘me’ means” (24). Individually, this lack of 
knowledge is reflected in Mina’s narrative, her first-person journal entries, as a 
disjuncture between cause and effect—a gap or syncope in first-person narrative—or an 
uncertainty about “what ‘me’ means.” In the first example, as in some moments in 
Jonathan’s journal, neither we nor she can be precisely sure what causes Mina’s near-
syncope. In the second, as the “forked metal” of the phonograph affects Mina, along with 
Seward’s voice, the contents of the diary, Mina’s expectations and memories, the surface 
                                               
176 See Wicke for a reading of this scene that points to the ways in which technology mediates the body 
through the voice, as when Dr. Seward’s recorded voice transmits “latent emotional power” to Mina (470). 
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of the chair, and the heat of the brandy (198), Mina does not know how to reconcile her 
body’s behaviour with her image of her self. There is a gap in her consciousness and self-
awareness, along with an uncertainty about the kind of person she is. That uncertainty 
over her selfhood doubles the instability of fainting as a marker of gender. 
In reading these moments of syncope as nonconscious and nonhuman, automatic 
and strange, we might borrow also from another twentieth-century theory of affect. Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, whose work influenced Massumi’s, claim that affect joins 
bodies and subjectivities and beings and objects. They suggest that bodies can be 
assemblages, parts in a combination of animal and machine that make something happen 
or produce affect, labour, identity, movement, and so on.177 Here, the affective 
assemblage emerges where Mina is not. As she is suspended in the breathless discovery 
of Lucy’s tragic death, Mina is not a woman and wife and individual whose boundaries 
end at her skin, but becomes part of a body-ears-phonograph-sound assemblage, joined 
together through the overwhelming affective interruption of her syncope. For Armstrong, 
the vampire embodies a frightening Deleuzian figure of collectivity that can and must be 
destroyed because it is not individual (How 121), but the automaticity and assemblage of 
Mina’s body here reveals that she is already not an organic individual but as much a 
machine as the phonograph. However, this assemblage is not productive. She is 
intimately responsive to or ready to join in assemblage with a world of organism and 
technologies; her body is always open to the other. 
Harker is also not the only man in the novel to faint. Renfield, an institutionalized 
patient of Dr. Seward and a victim of Dracula, faints (or nearly does so) after Van 
Helsing’s brain surgery briefly prolongs his life. Renfield, jealous of Dracula’s attention 
towards Mina, angers the Count and receives a head injury from him. When Seward finds 
him, he is lying in “a glittering pool of blood” (241), and Van Helsing has a few moments 
to relieve the pressure on his brain through a procedure the doctor refers to as trephine. 
As Stiles notes, Stoker had medical knowledge of the trephine procedure from his 
                                               
177 Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the mythological Amazon woman, who cuts off her breast to 
become a “fearsome woman-bow-steppe assemblage” to describe how “an assemblage is necessary for 
organisms to be caught within and permeated by a social field that utilizes them” (71). 
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brother, Sir William Thornley Stoker (Stiles 62), who wrote a memo to Stoker explaining 
that removing “the depressed bone” or the blood clot “might give instant relief” (Stoker, 
Notes 179-183). Although there is no “biting or sucking” in this scene, there is nothing 
but blood. As the patient struggles for life, presumably still lying in the puddle of his own 
blood, Van Helsing decides he must wait to see how death progresses to “fix the best spot 
for trephining” (242). Van Helsing, Seward, Arthur, and Quincey Morris wait and watch, 
and Seward records the responsiveness of his own circulatory system, one he is sure 
mirrors the embodied agony of his companions: “Inured as I was to sick beds and death, 
this suspense grew, and grew upon me. I could almost hear the beating of my own heart; 
and the blood surging through my temples sounded like blows from a hammer” (243). 
Blood is identified here as the substance that is responsible for Renfield’s absence of 
subjectivity as well as the part of Seward’s body that responds to and creates a gap in his 
own sense of self.    
After Van Helsing performs the procedure, Renfield regains consciousness for a 
moment and attempts to narrate what Dracula has done to him. He begins describing his 
fatal encounter with the Count by offering the same caveat that Jonathan has earlier, “I 
have had a terrible dream” (243). As he stops and “seemed fainting,” Quincey finds 
brandy to revive him, and his story begins with a new certainty that “it was no dream, but 
all a grim reality” (243). Seward again mentions unconscious cerebration, the idea that 
even in the interim while Renfield is not consciously aware or thinking, “his poor injured 
brain had been working” for itself (243). Subjectivity and knowledge are both 
physiological here, intimately related to the brain and blood, and moreover, only possible 
through the alterity of the body. Renfield’s (near) faint seems less associated with his 
status as a “insane”—an identity associated with bodily automatism and compromised 
will and agency (R. Smith 42-44)—and more with the medical consequences of blood 
loss.  
When Van Helsing brings Renfield back to consciousness, the patient’s value 
seems overwhelmingly to be in the information about Dracula with which he can provide 
the hunters. However, his extended monologue also serves another purpose as 
autobiography, in its explanation of the patient whose subjectivity and behaviour have 
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eluded the doctor’s grasp. Renfield describes being enchanted by Dracula, who enters his 
room as “a red cloud, like the colour of blood” (245); he explains that his interest in 
consuming animals like birds and rats is because they are full of “red blood, with years of 
life in it” (244). Yet, Renfield can only be “sane” enough (244) to explain himself 
autobiographically through an almost total absence of self. His gap in selfhood begins 
with his unconscious state and ends in the material gap Van Helsing creates in his body 
by way of the trephine. In this way, the most rational, Cartesian, human speech that 
Renfield can produce is also the most physiological and automatist. As Renfield comes 
closer to death and his explanation slows down, his conscious speech is broken but a kind 
of automatic speech continues. “[I]t seemed as though his memory had gone on working 
in the interval” of Renfield’s pause, Seward records, noting that Van Helsing exhorts him 
not to interrupt the dying man, since Renfield “cannot go back, and maybe could not 
proceed at all if once he lost the thread of his thought” (245). Like a machine, Renfield’s 
brain continues to produce a narrative of self even as, or only because, he experiences a 
syncope of consciousness. 
Arthur Holmwood, Lucy’s fiancé, is another man in this novel who has a tenuous 
hold on consciousness. When Arthur arrives to find Lucy seriously ill (although he does 
not yet know she is a victim of the vampire), Van Helsing’s caution that Lucy is “bad, 
very, very bad” is so distressing that Arthur becomes pale and must sit down as he is 
“almost fainting” (113). In fact, after staking the vampire Lucy, he collapses in a way 
described similarly to fainting. As Lord Godalming, Arthur might fill the role of 
overwrought member of the leisure class, but other than being an ardent if unwilling 
expresser of emotions, Arthur is not feminized in other ways or described as decadent or 
an aesthete. As scholars like Senf (“Unseen”), Wicke, Erik Butler, and Craft have noted, 
the language of Arthur’s staking is penetrative and easily read as sexual, as his 
“untrembling arm rose and fell, driving deeper and deeper the mercy-bearing stake, 
whilst the blood from the pierced heart welled and spurted up around it” (Stoker 192).178 
Not only does the act of staking mimic heterosexual penetration, the reference to Arthur’s 
“untrembling” arm is an echo of earlier language in the passage, the repetition suggesting 
                                               
178 See also C. F. Bentley, Burton Hatlen, and Eric Kwan-Wai Yu. 
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a complete (and, if gendered, masculine) physiological composure. However, 
immediately after Lucy has ceased “writhing and quivering,” Arthur “reeled and would 
have fallen had not [the vampire hunters] caught him,” as “great drops of sweat sprang 
out on his forehead, and his breath came in broken gasps” (192). Arthur is as capable of 
violent, heterosexual masculinity as he is of nervousness and swooning, suggesting that 
gender categories are not adequate to capture the logic of the novel’s instances of 
syncope.  
Arthur’s syncope can also help us see how gender categories were themselves 
becoming inadequate at the end of the nineteenth century. Craft, for example, has noted 
that sexual desire in Dracula puts gender into question as homosexual desire between the 
men of the novel (including the vampire) is displaced onto women’s bodies. In the scene 
above, Craft claims that Arthur’s penetration of Lucy is an effort to reaffirm 
heterosexuality and penetrative masculinity. However, if we continue to read sexuality in 
Dracula as only one example of embodied response, we begin to see that episodes of 
syncope refuse any particular definition of masculinity or femininity. In Arthur’s case, 
what does it mean to masculine? Does it mean being violent and penetrating, or 
reasonable and capable? Or being Lucy’s fiancé? Or does it mean being sensitive and 
swooning, or emotional and unsure? Or being Seward’s dear friend? Syncope, and 
therefore, affect itself, reveals the fluidity of gender categories and represents the fact that 
binary ideals of gender were under pressure at the end of the century. Micale argues that 
late-nineteenth-century scientific writing challenged previously accepted markers of 
gender and sex, with even the most stridently misogynistic, homophobic, and racist 
writing struggling to define gender and sex through “biology, psychology, and ontology” 
(174). For Micale, male hysteria represents one area in which traditional categories of 
gender and sex refuse to inhere, prompting writers to perform diagnostic calisthenics to 
avoid admitting the nervous system’s “socially subversive” possibilities (207-208). If we 
resist diagnosing fainting as a gendered symptom of hysteria, and instead read it as an 
expression of the structural form of affect (as Malabou has suggested), we can locate a 
challenge to binary gender in the feeling body and in the subjectivity that emerges from 
it.   
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As in The Picture of Dorian Gray, what might be culturally coded as feminine or 
hysterical are instead markers of the one thing the novel suggests is biologically “true”—
that bodies are heteroaffected, vulnerable to the alterity of their blood and nerves as well 
as the alterity of the world. And, just as Malabou has theorized, the heteroaffected body is 
also the site of affective ethics. Drawing on Derrida’s work, Malabou summarizes that 
heteroaffection, realized physiologically as syncope, leads to a theory of generosity “that 
is a pure gift, unconscious of itself, unable to feel itself give” (24). Nancy and Derrida 
call this a “generosity of being,” and Malabou calls it “ontological generosity” (24-25). In 
their own brief moments of syncopated action, as they respond without conscious 
thinking or consideration, characters respond to another’s syncope with affective 
generosity. When Mina is overcome listening to the phonographic diary, Seward does not 
just give her brandy, he “jump[s] up with a horrified exclamation, and hurriedly tak[es] a 
case-bottle from a cupboard” (198). Seward does the same at Van Helsing’s insistence for 
the swooning Lucy (118), and Quincey “flies” for a decanter equally quickly for the 
patient Renfield (243). Harker is “just in time” to catch Mina in her faint, suggesting a 
reflex action (273), like the group when Arthur begins to collapse following his staking 
of Lucy (192). When Arthur grieves openly about the death of his fiancée, Mina responds 
to this hysteria, or the syncope of excessive emotion, by “opening [her] arms 
unthinkingly” and allowing the man to cry on her shoulder (203). These moments are 
generous in that they are prompted by alterity—both from the other and in the 
automaticity of the self.  
Massumi, too, has written about a kind of unthinking generosity that occurs 
automatically. In The Power at the End of the Economy, he argues against the idea that 
individuals make rational choices in their own economic self-interest, claiming that the 
free market is not a product of rational, self-interested actors, but rather made up of and 
dependent on affect. For economic subjects, rationality and feeling are inseparable and 
intertwined, “interlocked and mutually intensifying” (9). Based on this claim, Massumi 
goes on to theorize how subjects make affective choices that are neither individual nor 
rational, calling this kind of so-called decision-making a “doing done through me.” 
Drawing on the philosophy of David Hume, Massumi claims that actions occur based on 
the sympathetic transmission of affect that intersects with feelings, desires, and 
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contexts—in other words, some actions occur as an affective combination of self and 
other. There is no particular reason, he therefore suggests, why a subject should act in 
their own self-interest rather than against it (58-65). For example, Massumi writes of the 
figure of the “ordinary hero” who acts against their own self-interest to save others, as in, 
for example, running into a burning building. He writes that these subjects act “in the 
heat of the event, launched instantaneously into action by the sign of the life-threatening 
affection of the other,” as, unthinkingly, a “nonconscious decision has been 
made…through her” (80). I would not necessarily characterize the moments I have 
outlined here, the nonconscious responses to a perceived syncope of consciousness or 
self-control, as against self-interest, but neither are they self-interested in the usual sense 
of the term. Instead, these nonconscious responses are fully about the other.  
These nonconscious responses also offer a counterpoint to moments when the 
group of hunters move “with a single impulse” to attack the Count (and to greet a 
telegram from Mina) (Stoker 266, 264). Laura Otis’ reads this as behaviour that indicates 
that the hunters belong to a “unified body, informed by a communal nervous system,” 
one that reflects the Count’s own organic network of blood and hypnosis (206). All of 
these impulsive, unthinking, nonconscious movements, both generous and violent, are 
forms of what Massumi calls “bare activity”—the affective, nonconscious level of the 
body that is ready to make its next “decision” through the subject (Power 20-21). One 
way to understand why a subject(’s body) would “choose” these nonconscious actions is 
through priming. We could say that the hunters are primed—or affectively made ready—
to move impulsively together in violence towards Dracula because they expect he is a 
dangerous threat, they have received Mina’s warning telegram, and they are being 
affected by each other.  
Mina offers another example of generosity in relation to the comfort she offers 
Arthur. Her reaction, she claims, is because “[w]e women have something of the mother 
in us” (203). Rather than think of this as a biological truism, Mina’s explanation can just 
as easily suggest that her expectation as a woman is to offer comfort to men—an 
expectation Quincey Morris repeats to her just moments later when he says that “[n]o one 
but a woman can help a man when he is in trouble of the heart” (204). However, in 
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response to Quincey’s grief, Mina “impulsively…bent over and kissed him” (204), a 
nonconscious action that might be motherly or might be more intimate and transgressive. 
The moment of syncope cannot disentangle generosity from gender, but it can help to 
underline its instability. Perhaps Mina is generous regardless of gender and her statement 
is a rhetorical capture of affect through gender, or perhaps she is primed to be physically 
generous to Quincey because she has grown up as a woman. Generosity’s uncertain 
connection to gender here is not just ethically but also politically significant for late-
Victorian theories of affect. William James, for example, does not imply that women are 
more emotional than men, but he does use affect to reproduce gender norms. While “[t]he 
egg fails to fascinate the hound, [and] the bird does not fear the precipice,” he writes, 
similarly “[n]o woman can see a handsome little naked baby without delight, no man in 
the wilderness see a human form in the distance without excitement and curiosity” 
(“Emotion” 191). While James’s reference to fainting seems radically uncertain and 
disconnected from identity altogether, his affirmation about maternal feeling serves to 
reproduce a dangerous and oppressive narrative about female biology. Understanding 
affect as absolute alterity can help us to see how these responses are not biologically but 
autobiographically or discursively gendered. 
Small moments of unthinking generosity are important, then, because they reveal 
the heteroaffected self and the possibility that heteroaffection might prompt an ethics of 
generosity that does not rely on an individual subject who chooses. Massumi underlines 
the ethical significance of what the nineteenth century was calling conscious automatism 
by claiming that any unthinking generosity is a “contrary tendency” to the economic 
system (and, I argue, the social, political, and ethical systems) that insist on subjective, 
rational individualism (Power 82).179 Furthermore, Massumi extends this sense of 
automaticity or heteroaffection to include nonhuman being. He writes that un-self-
interested generosity “is a nonpersonal and nonhuman virtue of the relational event. 
However recuperated, it is a sign of the potential for feral becomings, done through me, 
beyond the human capital pale, churning out from the inmost end of the relational field of 
                                               
179 Massumi calls unthinking moments of generosity “ontopower”—being-power or affect power (Power 
82). 
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life” (Power 83, original emphasis). This un-self-interested generosity can be as small, he 
suggests, as the moments in Dracula when bodies are caught, cradled, kissed, and 
revived: “anywhere a gratuitous act of generosity or kindness or feral connection comes 
about, without the vehicle it moves through even pausing to think about it, a minievent 
has sympathetically decided itself, cutting modestly into the flow of everyday life” 
(Power 83). That is, Mina can “recuperate” her comfort under the sign of maternal 
instinct and we can still read her moment of generosity as connected to the nonhuman, 
bare life of the animal, affective body.   
Heteroaffection does not just prompt an un-self-interested gift of generosity 
towards others, but it is a gift in and of itself, given from the alterity of the world and the 
alterity of the subject. It is the gift that makes subjectivity possible. Drawing on Nancy, 
Malabou writes that an “affect is a gift that comes from the absolute outside of being” 
(“Go” 25). The original text reads: “[t]he generosity of being offers nothing other than 
existence, and the offering, as such, is kept in freedom” (Nancy Experience 147). In his 
extended response to Nancy’s work on autoaffection, Derrida also responds to this theory 
of ontological generosity, writing, “[t]his generosity is no longer simply the virtue of a 
subject, or what Descartes might have grasped by this word” (Derrida 21). In their 
combined thinking, these three philosophers suggest that there is a mutual coincidence of 
generosity, in giving and receiving the freedom of existence. Of course, existence is 
rarely free, and far less so for those subjects who do not enjoy political or social freedom. 
The body is a politically significant site because, as Derrida says, “giv[ing] out of 
generosity or because one can give (what one has) is no longer to give. Giving is possible 
only where it remains im-possible” (23, original emphasis). Derrida’s insistence prompts 
us to look at where freedom and generosity collide, where the body and the subject are 
open to the gift of being and whatever it may bring.  
Affect is represented as this gift that comes from the outside of being when Van 
Helsing experiences syncope in the form of a fit of laughter. The vampire hunter is 
discussing the mingling of the group’s blood in Lucy, and his acknowledgement of the 
alterity of this intrusion is telling: “King Laugh,” as he calls it (158), “come[s] when and 
how he likes” (157). Seward calls this fit of laughter “hysterics,” and likens Van 
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Helsing’s behaviour to a woman’s (157). However, Glover claims that this moment also 
represents both the way “the male unconscious seems to possess a self-regulating 
capacity to return the psyche to a state of balance or equilibrium” and the way “its 
workings remain mysterious, as unfathomable as they are uncertain” (80). While Glover 
makes cogent and important points about the function of overwhelming emotion here, 
there is more to say about this moment. Van Helsing accepts this subjective interruption 
without aggression, he recognizes his powerlessness before it, and he refuses to 
pathologize it. These are all ethical responses, including his openness to the healing 
power that laughter’s release of tension offers—King Laugh is “good to come, and kind” 
(158)—and his demands that Seward be understanding and patient with him. In terms of 
heteroaffection, laughter is the form of syncope that Nancy identifies as a gap in 
philosophical discourse through which life is made possible, “the trembling in which it 
can feel its life” (Discourse 133): “health,” Nancy writes, “or more specifically, the 
feeling of being alive, consciousness—is only acquired or secured by a moment of 
syncope,” through laughter (Discourse 134). But King Laugh allows Van Helsing to 
return to subjectivity without any uncertainty about what has occurred, without any 
feeling for the other, and with an easy ability to gloss the moment as autobiography. As a 
gift, this moment of laughter over the violated body of a woman closes Van Helsing off 
again to the world, ready to decide Lucy’s fate and help Arthur maim and dismember her 
dead body. Van Helsing’s recuperation of syncope into a form of power means we could 
consider him a new version of what Ann Cvetkovitch has called the “sensitive man” of 
sensational novels, whose affective vulnerability (in her examples, “affective attraction” 
to emotional female characters) underwrites and obscures their domination and control 
(8). 
Lucy, however, experiences heteroaffection as an unequivocal gift of being. 
When she receives a blood transfusion from Arthur to counteract the vampire’s bite, she 
writes upon recovery that she feels happy again, and that  
[s]omehow Arthur feels very, very close to me. I seem to feel his presence 
warm about me. I suppose it is that sickness and weakness are selfish things 
and turn our inner eyes and sympathy on ourselves, whilst health and 
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strength give Love rein, and in thought and feeling he can wander where he 
wills. (Stoker 117) 
Otis notes that this moment can be read as though a part of Arthur’s mind has entered 
into Lucy’s along with his blood (216), but I want to offer another reading that suggests 
that what Arthur gives Lucy is the capacity to feel, revealing the external source of the 
self that makes feeling and subjectivity possible. This example is, like the faint, an 
extreme form of a quotidian and primary alterity, grounded not only in the sense of being 
affected by the other, but of having one’s very liveliness dependent on the alien (and 
normally largely unnoticed) feeling of being alive itself. To be heteroaffected not only 
makes selfhood possible here, but makes it healthful and, perhaps, ethical.180  
However, this touching is not just physiological, it is surgical. Both the hunters 
and the vampire affect subjectivity by puncturing the body, with a tube for blood 
transfusion or with pointed teeth. Because of the way it moves between bodies and 
because of Van Helsing’s claim that receiving transfusions from four of the hunters 
makes Lucy a “polyandrist” (158), blood in Dracula has been consistently 
“overdetermined as a psychoanalytical substitute for semen” (Hughes, “Sanguine” 4) or 
given an otherwise broad sexual interpretation.181 Otis reads blood as an overdetermined 
marker of “family, nation, or race” (Hughes, “Sanguine” 4), as a means of 
communication, and as a symbol of money.182 Putatively, blood ought to be related 
somehow to souls in the novel, as Hughes points out, but it also has a materialist, vitalist 
                                               
180 George Eliot’s The Lifted Veil also deals with a blood transfusion that momentarily revives a character 
after death. In this novella, a young man is cursed with the psychic intrusion of the feeling of others, a plot 
that suggests the interruption of subjectivity and the alienation of the self by the transmission of affect, 
although ultimately, for Matus, “Latimer’s reactions to his brother, his father and Bertha are therefore 
revelations not so much about them as about himself and his emotional orientation to the world around 
him” (132). While Matus reads the transfusion scene as indicating the physiological basis for life and soul, 
she emphasizes the importance of the unknown and mysterious nature of life itself. Kate Flint agrees, while 
claiming that The Lifted Veil’s transfusion scene is related to Dracula’s through its suggestion that blood is 
a gendered fluid.  
181 For blood as semen, see also Craft, Stevenson, Apasia Stephanou, Blinderman, and Jack Halberstam; for 
the sexual nature of blood, see Kuzmanovic, Wicke, Yu, and Khader. 
182 For the racial aspects of blood, see Patrick Brantlinger, Arata (Occidental), Blinderman, Stevenson, 
Otis, and Halberstam; for its communicative potential see Nancy Armstrong, and Brundan; and for its 
monetary connections, see Halberstam, and J. Jeffrey Franklin. See also Mathias Clasen, whose 
“biocultural” reading of Dracula rejects symbolic readings (379), and Elizabeth Miller, who writes, 
“[i]magine a Dracula in which…blood is merely blood” (para. 1). 
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aspect (“Sanguine”), which many of these very critics acknowledge through Renfield’s 
suggestion that he wants to consume blood because “the blood is the life” (Stoker 130).183 
Through the notion of affect as a gift, the heteroaffective gift of being that Lucy receives, 
blood is in this case a materially affective substance. The responsiveness of the 
circulatory system, therefore, stands in for the broader potential of being affected or 
touched by alterity—generously.  
5.3. Vampiric Touching, Vampiric Feeling 
Touch and its place in the nineteenth century are being recovered by scholars 
redressing a long-held focus on Victorian technologies of vision. In the recent collection 
Media, Technology, and Literature in the Nineteenth Century: Image, Sound, Touch, 
David P. Parisi explains that the late-nineteenth century ushered in a modernity in which 
the sense of touch was an object of scientific rationality and experimentation. In this 
volume, Christopher Keep also discusses touch’s importance by illuminating the ways in 
which touch was central to both understandings of and embodied integrations with the 
electric telegraph, which seemed to mimic the body’s forms of affective communication 
(241); Margaret Linley uses Frankenstein as a model for new media’s potential to touch, 
as media “activates the bodily senses and feelings, and thereby moves or mobilizes 
audiences” (258). Keep’s and Linley’s arguments offer important context to the way the 
narrative form of Dracula touches the bodies within it.184 Receiving Seward’s letter about 
Lucy’s failing condition and consequently hurrying to her side, Arthur declares to 
Seward, “I read between the lines of your letter, and have been in an agony” (Stoker 
113). However, the vampire’s touch is also the intrusion of pure alterity. As the narrators 
and compiler of the text seek to identify the vampire as a monster, Dracula’s touch is 
                                               
183 This list is certainly not meant to be exhaustive, but a representative sample of readings of the 
multivalence of blood in the novel. 
184 The focus of this chapter is the affective touching of the characters within the novel. As I mention in the 
Chapter Two, much scholarly analysis of affect in Victorian literature turns to the affective touching of the 
reader by the novel. Moretti offers one such reading of Dracula, in a foundational analysis that divides its 
interpretative framework between Marxism and psychoanalysis. Moretti writes that the novel’s withholding 
of knowledge from its readers “generates suspense” in order to touch them so materially that “[t]hey are 
dragged forcibly into the text; the characters’ fear is also theirs” (107, original emphasis). 
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recognized not as a technique so much as it is an ontological necessity. As Hughes writes, 
for Dracula, blood “can be regarded only as food, a secular substance” (“Sanguine” 8). 
The vampire offers a limit case for thinking about heteroaffective ethics, not only 
because his touch violates the boundary of the skin, and because that touch is a part of the 
very being of the Count, but also because his mode of heteroaffection in most cases 
seems to create hetero-heteroaffected subjects—or at the very least, non-autobiographical 
subjects. Touch has an ethics of its own, an ethics of otherness or alterity that is prompted 
by the boundary of skin that separates subjects. Sarah Sorial describes one way that these 
ethics appear in Nancy’s work on touch and the body. For Nancy, bodies signal their 
uniqueness and singularity, and that singularity affects others and prompts connection 
(n.pg.). Touch reveals this singularity because it occurs at the boundaries of bodies: 
“because [the figure of the touch] opens me up to the strangeness of the other, her alterity 
or singularity, [it] also creates a space for ethical obligation” (n.pg.). Sorial explains that 
“the moment I physically touch the body of the other, I am made aware of its 
separateness, its uniqueness, and the limit it presents to what I can know. The attempt to 
conquer this space that the touch creates is also the attempt to conquer the alterity of the 
other” (n. pg.). The ethics of touch arise in the respect for the singularity and uniqueness 
of the other, prompted by the reminder of the boundary of the body. What ethics, what 
generosity of ethos, can we imagine from a puncturing of this boundary, a puncturing that 
seems nothing like a gift?  
I proceed with caution here, because I do not want to erase the cogent reading that 
those touched by the vampire are violated and victims of trauma, as in Khader’s reading. 
But the mythical nature of the vampire lends itself to metaphoricity, and I want to lean on 
that as I explore the way in which the vampire activates and reflects the alterity already 
present within the bare life of the body. The vampire’s touch seems like far less of a gift 
than Arthur’s generous blood donation, to say the least. And while Lucy’s autobiography 
ends when she becomes a vampire, it is certainly possible to interpret her change in 
behaviour as an injury, a hetero-heteroaffection or disaffection that prevents her from 
being affected, or being affected in the usual ways, or expressing affection, or even from 
being a human subject. To be touched by alterity can result in just such an injury, and to 
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be open to that injury is the condition of being an embodied subject. That is, it is 
important to understand the underlying ethics that surround touching as it relates to the 
vampire because affect already assumes the porousness of bodies.  
Dracula suggests that Sorial’s summary of a philosophical ethics of touch can 
help us to consider the ethical import of syncope, when an affect touches me and I do not 
know what me means. To be touched and broken open, gapped, syncopated, and made 
other to ourselves, full of terrified desire, drained of life, and overwhelmed by possibility, 
is to become open to unnarratable alterity, or what Massumi calls the “pure potential” and 
virtuality of affect (Parables 98). Dracula himself is this pure potential: his body is 
wildly mutable and he has no voice in this text, “the anthropocentric narrative of the 
members of the ‘Crew of Light’ and their almost hysterical representation of the 
vampire’s radical Otherness (cultural, sexual, racial, colonial, and economic) as a wholly 
different species” (Khader 87).185 As I point out in other chapters of this dissertation, a 
significant aspect that marks the lineage of affect theory from Baruch Spinoza, through 
Deleuze and Guattari, to Massumi and Thrift, is summed up in Spinoza’s dictum, “no one 
has yet determined what the body can do” (155). With specific reference to Deleuze’s 
resistance to identity politics and biological essentialism, Thrift glosses the significance 
of Spinoza to the potential of the uncertain or indeterminate in affect theory, saying that 
“we really have no idea either what affects human bodies or minds might be capable of in 
a given encounter ahead of time…” (62-3). Since the vampire is not any one particular 
form of life, changing from human-like to animal and even to particulate, his fluidity of 
identity is exemplary of affect’s open-ended potential in this regard.186 Deleuze and 
Guattari note this about the figure of the vampire in popular culture, which, for them, 
represents a positively- and ethically-charged loss of self as a figure of affective 
“becoming,” exemplifying the instability and mutability of the self in its encounters with 
bodies, objects, environments, or temporalities (275). As they put it, affect is “the 
                                               
185 Senf, too, notes Dracula’s lack of narrative voice in the novel (“Unseen” 162). 
186 Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s theory of bare life and the camp (as in Holocaust), Khader interprets 
Lucy’s conversion to vampirism as a form of bare life, “collaps[ing] the distinctions between the human 
and the inhuman,” and losing the power of narrative in the novel (84-86). Khader does not completely 
extend this analysis to Dracula, who occupies the position of victimizer rather than bare life in Khader’s 
reading.  
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incredible feeling of an unknown Nature,” and it is the very sense of being unknown that 
might prompt a feeling of responsibility; it “is not a personal feeling, nor is it a 
characteristic; it is an effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into 
upheaval and makes it reel” (240). Dracula has been accused of being Other by scholars, 
as in Halberstam’s reading that the monster of this novel is a technology that produces 
Otherness as monstrous. The affective vampire, however, embodies an otherness that 
opens the subject towards the potential of the body itself. 
Unsurprisingly (I will point this out at the risk of sounding obvious), Dracula 
behaves without respect for the singularity and alterity of others. As he touches the 
bodies of others, he is not reminded of their difference and their distance but instead 
transgresses the boundary of the body and, sucking the blood of his victims, he takes 
others in and makes them his own. He becomes a potent figure for thinking through the 
materiality of affective touching because alterity is not alterity at all for Dracula; it is 
selfhood. There is no real difference between selves and others, between autoaffection 
and heteroaffection, between consciousness and nonconsciousness, between temporality 
and syncope, for the vampire. He speaks in the voice of the other, trying to learn the 
“English intonation” of speech, and he dresses in Harker’s clothes (Stoker 26, 47). Unlike 
the heteroaffected subjects of everyday heroism that Massumi writes about, Dracula’s 
alterity is never contrary to his own self-interest—indeed, his very affective blood runs 
gold (Stoker 266; Otis 218; Halberstam 104). It is Dracula’s ability to capitalize on that 
which seems utterly unmanageable—heteroaffection—that is monstrous and compelling. 
Dracula’s ability to capitalize on the ethically-charged gift of affect includes the 
management of feeling. That is, Dracula does not just control his own feeling, an 
important signifier of morality in the nineteenth century (Glover 77), but he controls the 
feeling bodies of others through touching. He is able to control the wolves that disturb 
him and Jonathan on their journey to the castle, raising his voice “in a tone of imperious 
command” and sweeping “his long arms, as though brushing aside some impalpable 
obstacle” (Stoker 20, my emphasis); as a manager of alterity, the Count touches the 
untouchable. As to the horses who become so disturbed by these wolves, Harker notes 
that the Count quiets them with touch: “He petted and soothed them, and whispered 
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something in their ears, as I have heard of horse-tamers doing, and with extraordinary 
effect, for under his caresses they became quite manageable again, though they still 
trembled” (18-19). The Count repeats his attempts to soothe and direct through touch 
when he greets Harker one morning, placing his hand on Jonathan’s shoulder; while the 
vampire is barely able to control his anger at seeing a rosary, and throws Jonathan’s 
mirror out the window, the solicitor seems barely perturbed, remarking only that the 
Count’s actions are “very annoying” (31). Later, when Dracula wants Harker to write to 
his employer to let him know the solicitor will remain at the castle for the next month, 
Dracula lays “a heavy hand on [his] shoulder” (37). Suffice it to say, the vampire gets 
what he wants. While there are certainly other reasons for Harker’s acquiescence, like his 
fear and his belief that he is the Count’s prisoner, these moments of touching are 
nonetheless significant for their potential to create intimacy and to comfort, even—and 
especially damagingly—while they are yoked to the Count’s desire to force another to do 
something he or she is resisting.  
Dracula touches without regard to uniqueness, alterity, or the boundaries of the 
other. Yet, so do the vampire hunters. Many scholars have pointed out that the vampire 
hunters behave like the vampire: Senf explains that their apparent goodness is very like 
Dracula’s supposed evil (“Unseen”); Otis that their communication networks are similar 
and that the “lunatic and the monster differ from the hunters neither in their desires, nor 
in their methods, nor in their gory deeds” (208); and Butler accurately points out that Van 
Helsing is actually Dracula’s competitor for violating the boundaries of the other.187 In 
fact, Butler offers a strong critique of Van Helsing, declaring he “stands apart from the 
rest of his cohorts, calls the shots from behind the scenes, manipulates others like puppets 
on a string, and makes them carry out his will” (23). Like the Count, he uses touch to 
manage the feelings of others and direct their behaviour. About to convince Arthur to 
give blood to Lucy, “Van Helsing slapped him on the shoulder,” saying, “Come!...You 
are a man, and it is a man we want” (113). The text makes the unethical potential of this 
touching apparent because, like the vampire’s, it is so potently intimate. Van Helsing uses 
                                               
187 See also Kuzmanovic, who writes that “Van Helsing, in spite of his allegedly ‘open mind,’ is the one 
whose need to diagnose (and thus destroy) Dracula is the strongest” (423-424, n. 9). 
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touch as a connection between two embodied boundaries and as an affective transmission 
through that boundary to convince the other hunters that vampires should be killed. As 
Seward resists what he explicitly calls the need to “mutilate her poor body,” Van Helsing 
yokes touch to trust: “For answer he put his hand on my shoulder, and said, with infinite 
tenderness:—‘Friend John, I pity your poor bleeding heart; and I love you the more 
because it does so bleed…But there are things that you know not…and bless me for 
knowing’” (149). The tenderness that Seward connects here with Van Helsing’s touch is 
deployed to secure Seward’s faith in the older man’s knowledge of vampire ritual. 
Van Helsing continues to use touch to gain the hunters’ trust in his direction to 
kill. He “laid a hand on [Arthur’s] shoulder” to convince him to violate Lucy’s body, 
saying “Brave lad! A moment’s courage, and it is done. This stake must be driven 
through her” (191). As Arthur’s swoon in this scene already syncopates gender, that same 
syncopation can be read as a form of resistance to the staking. In an effort to mitigate this 
resistance, Van Helsing again lays a hand on Arthur’s shoulder to implore, “Arthur, my 
friend, dear lad, am I not forgiven?” (192). The combination of intimate touching and the 
language of friendship works in concert to manage Arthur’s feelings. Van Helsing 
continues this behaviour when he reassures and convinces the hunters, as when Seward 
seems uncertain whether he is behaving ethically with Renfield. Van Helsing comforts 
Seward by laying his hand on Seward’s shoulder, saying “in his grave, kindly way:—
‘Friend John, have no fear” (219). Or when he tries to explain to Jonathan the ways in 
which Dracula is slowly gaining power, Van Helsing “laid his hand tenderly on his 
shoulder as he spoke:—“Ah, my child, I will be plain. Do you not see how, of late, this 
monster has been creeping into knowledge experimentally” (264). Touch, here, confuses 
comfort and kindness with political expediency, an almost literal velvet glove covering 
the violence Van Helsing wields. Touch acts to manage the affective animality of the 
body, offering a new form of what Elsie B. Michie has identified as a need to manage 
“unruly” post-Darwinian animals who threatened to upend hierarchies of power (145). 
In the same way Van Helsing mimics Dracula’s use of touch to manage the other 
hunters, he and his hunters also act without respect for the singularity of the other. Sorial 
explains that in Nancy’s work, there is another way in which we violate this singularity—
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by speaking for the other, by claiming to know them. “To speak on her behalf,” Sorial 
writes of the other, “would constitute an ethical closure or would be an injustice to the 
other because I would have to subsume the other into my own categories in an attempt to 
understand her” (n. pg.). In language that seems utterly appropriate to Dracula, Sorial 
describes to what this ethical closure might lead:  
In abolishing the limit that the other’s body represents, we transform the 
‘other’ into an ‘Other,’ and fix the other as either divine, worthy of 
glorification, or as evil, an Other that must be excluded or 
exterminated…We are able to inflict cruelty on the Other because it no 
longer constitutes a point of origin, or a uniqueness” (n.pg.).  
Is this not exactly what the hunters do to the Count? After Harker decides the women he 
meets at Castle Dracula are trying to suck his blood, he attempts to make an escape, 
searching the Count’s coffin for a key and finding his sleeping body. As Harker touches 
the Count and is affected by the contact at the boundary of the body, he shudders and, 
looking at the Count’s “mocking smile,” interprets the kind of threat that Dracula poses 
not just to himself but ontologically, as “perhaps, for centuries to come he might, 
amongst [London’s] teeming millions, satiate his lust for blood, and create a new and 
ever-widening circle of semi-demons to batten on the helpless” (Stoker 53-54). Just as 
Nancy and Sorial suggest that the discourse of the other can allow for violence, Harker’s 
certainty about the Count’s body and what its contact means leads him to decide that the 
Count is an “Other,” is evil and in need of extermination, and so he “seized a 
shovel…and lifting it high, struck, with the edge downward, at the hateful face” (Stoker 
54). Harker’s desire for violence and his belief in Dracula’s threat is an affective closure 
and an appropriation of alterity. However, the touch of Dracula’s eyes—the affective 
touch of the other—seemingly “paralyse” Harker, who experiences a syncope or 
suspension and cannot complete his murder of the Count (54).  
Van Helsing is even more intent on producing a discourse of the other. While he 
may respect the gift of syncope that King Laugh brings him, Van Helsing is truly a 
biographer in the most literal sense—a narrator of the biological being, of the ontology of 
the other. He is the one who describes the divided gender of Mina’s body, her man’s 
brain and woman’s heart, a narrative about her biological being. In an earlier instance, 
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when Arthur arrives to his weak and ill fiancée’s bedside, he is upset to the point of near 
fainting (113). However, needing his blood for a transfusion, Van Helsing tells Arthur, 
“Our nerves are not so calm and our blood not so bright than yours!”, and moments later 
insisting that Arthur’s blood is “so pure that we need not defibrinate it” (114). While Van 
Helsing makes a judgement about the relationship between Mina’s behaviour and her 
biological being—her man’s brain is logical and intelligent while her woman’s heart is 
caring and compassionate—he also creates a biological narrative about Arthur that has no 
apparent relationship to their interaction. He has never met Arthur before, and knows 
nothing about his medical history. He simply decides, despite material evidence to the 
contrary, that Arthur has a well-managed nervous system and, with doing no medical 
testing whatsoever, that his blood is “pure” enough to be immediately injected into 
Lucy.188  
More dangerously, however, he is also the teller of the vampire biography, a story 
about bodies and their threats to so-called healthful life that justifies his violence towards 
them. Without being able to hear Lucy’s story from her own lips or her own pen he opens 
her coffin and touches her, “raising the eyelids and looking at the eyes, and once more 
opening the lips and examining the teeth” to prove that her body is vampiric and 
inhuman, declaring that he must “cut off her head and fill her mouth with garlic, 
and…drive a stake through her body” (179). Not only does this suggestion make Seward 
shudder, he notably describes the ostensible cure for vampirism as a mutilation (179). 
This is an incredible leap to make—how certain must one be, how watertight the 
discursive proof, to be able to justify mutilation? Van Helsing himself offers alternative 
explanations for Lucy’s death as Arthur may see it: “some more mistaken idea that this 
woman was buried alive; and that in most mistake of all we have killed her” (180). As 
Natalia Wójcicka has pointed out, Stoker attributed the myth of the vampire to the 
possibility of mistaking the signs of death and burying someone alive, referencing this 
                                               
188 In Transfusion: Its History, Indications, and Modes of Application (1883), Charles Egerton Jennings 
notes that men are often preferable blood donors for transfusion because their blood is “less prone to 
coagulate” (57); Van Helsing’s pronouncement regarding the purity of Arthur’s blood echoes this 
deployment of science to prop up essentialist beliefs. Jennings also notes that “[i]t is notorious that the 
donor is most prone to faint” (35), and while none of the men in the novel swoon while offering their blood 
to Lucy, they each lie down to rest after.  
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contemporary concern in his novel. Although Wójcicka does not refer to it, Guy and 
Ferrier’s text affirms syncope, or fainting, was a state that could look very close to death. 
All of this is to say that the hunters must take Van Helsing’s vampire biography at his 
word, and that they do so with violent consequences. 
Van Helsing discursively produces the vampire body and then decides who 
amongst them is vampire. So much of what Van Helsing ascribes to the vampire as 
“cunning,” “brute,” and “devil” is physiological: he is “so strong in person as twenty 
men,” he can “direct the elements” and “command all the meaner things,” he can “grow 
and become small; and he can at times vanish and come unknown” (209); his only 
sustenance is blood, he “throws no shadow; he make in the mirror no reflect,” “he can 
transform himself to wolf” and bat and “elemental dust,” he can move through any 
material and “see in the dark,” (211). The vampire has a “mighty brain” and “iron 
resolution” (212), an assessment Van Helsing will later change for no apparent reason to 
declare that some of Dracula’s faculties are underdeveloped—that he has a “big child-
brain” (264). Senf has already demonstrated the narrative techniques that Stoker uses to 
undermine the hunters’ righteous mission to destroy the Count. She points out that he 
omits a narrator’s voice in order to “stress the subjective nature of the story which his 
narrators relate” and even that they “themselves occasionally question the validity of their 
perceptions,” an uncertainty that I have been arguing is an ethical acknowledgement of 
the distance between self and other (“Unseen” 161). However, it is important to note not 
just the subjective nature of the hunters’ decision-making, but the fact that Van Helsing’s 
decision-making about who may live and who may die and who may be disinterred and 
brutally mutilated is based on a discourse about the vampire body that suggests in many 
ways that the vampire might be anyone – might be big or small, look like an animal or a 
human or a dust mote, might be willful and smart or erratic and childlike. 
The idea that the transmission of affect is the gift of being, a gift that comes from 
outside (or does not coincide with the self) and is strange and unknown, a gift of a 
moment of syncope that disrupts subjectivity, is the grounds for an ethics that does not 
come from subjectivity. Syncope is a gift because it allows for being and feeling; because 
it holds open the possibilities of the body in its responses to other bodies and objects and 
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moods and stories and ideas; and because its alterity embodies the tension between the 
self and the other. It is politically crucial that, as embodied subjects, we are first and 
foremost never quite sure what a body can do. As a character, Dracula is a limit case for 
affective ethics because his heteroaffective alterity is so completely unknown and 
because his disruption of subjectivity holds open the possibility of never returning to that 
subjectivity. Therefore, we can read an ethics of heteroaffection in Dracula as an ethos of 
generosity towards the possible forms, becomings, expressions, and responses of 
unknown beings and collectives, made especially clear when characters express 
uncertainty or attempt to discern the assemblages in which they are caught rather than 
resorting to a violence prompted by the transgression of affective and physical 
boundaries. 
My use of the term “discern” comes from another theory of the material alterity of 
affect that is highly relevant for Dracula. In The Transmission of Affect, Teresa Brennan 
follows James’s theory of embodied emotions to argue that affects are material, that they 
circulate in the blood and between people as hormones, and that they appear in 
nineteenth-century discourse as hypnosis, mesmerism, and crowd theory. For Brennan, 
the idea that feeling might originate outside of the self is a departure from Freudian 
analysis that, by her interpretation, locates feeling within the individual subject and 
therefore available for therapy (12-15).189 By contrast, affect’s transmission, which might 
include transformation, requires discernment. Brennan suggests that what subjects can do 
with the knowledge of affective transmission is account for the forces, bodies, and 
histories that have shaped the intensity of the moment and influenced its interpretation as 
a particular emotion, without using that feeling to judge the other from which it is 
presumed to come, and thus without directing violence or aggression on them. 
Discernment, we might say, is the narrative expression of an ethos of generosity. For 
example, while Jonathan’s recording of his own embodied responses and their 
transmissive context at Castle Dracula in the first section of the novel does not quite 
                                               
189 For challenges to Brennan’s reading of Freud, see “Perspectives on Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission 
of Affect,” where Amber Jacobs points out this is a mischaracterization of psychoanalysis (113). In the 
same article, Kate Flint points to the significance of Brennan’s work for nineteenth-century literature and 
psychology, including George Eliot’s and George Lewes’s theorizations of the ethical effects of affective 
transmission.  
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reach the transformative or utopian level offered by Brennan, his very uncertainty in 
discernment is generous. We might say that for a while, Jonathan is committed 
(generously) to giving the Count the benefit of the doubt.  
This ethos of generosity is found at its most pure in moments of syncope, in 
moments where subjectivity is absent. However, we also find an individual representative 
of this ethos partially in Mina. Despite Mina’s insistence that she is not of a fainting 
disposition, she does indeed faint twice. The first occurs when she is visited by Dracula, 
who comes to her as a “pillar of cloud” with “two red eyes” (227-228). When his “livid 
white face” bends over her, Mina is unsure of whether she is asleep or awake, and 
decides that “in my dream I must have fainted, for all became black darkness” (228). 
Like Lucy, Mina experiences vampiric heteroaffection as a total break with 
consciousness and subjectivity, through the alterity of the vampire and her own 
circulatory system. She faints for the second time in response to Van Helsing’s insistence 
that they must continue to pursue Dracula and find him as soon as possible, despite the 
fact that the vampire has seemingly lost interest in the group. He delivers his explanation 
dramatically, seemingly shocking Mina into a faint as he warns her, “Time is now to be 
dreaded—since once he put that mark upon your throat” (273). Mina collapses as Van 
Helsing seems to be reminding her that she has a limited amount of time before she 
irreversibly becomes a vampire. However, by all accounts, Mina already knows this 
about herself, to the extent that she suggests killing herself before she can harm any one 
of them as a vampire (254). But when Mina is reminded that because of the violent 
exchange of blood they will have to hunt down and do violence to the vampire, she loses 
consciousness. The vampire is no longer a direct threat, but he will be killed because of 
the frightening heteroaffection he produces through his touch. Mina’s faint is a mirror 
image of the one she experiences at the fangs of the vampire, as though her syncope 
resists Van Helsing’s attempts to decide Dracula’s identity and decide it is worthy of 
death. Mina experiences syncope, and is touched by the absolute alterity of being, at the 
very moment the lead hunter declares his sovereignty over both her being and the 
vampire’s.  
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Khader also finds Mina to be an ethical model when she protests the hunters’ 
pursual of Dracula after she drinks the vampires’ blood. This scene, in which Dracula is 
caught “forcing her face down on his bosom” (Stoker 247), has been read alternately by 
scholars as rape (including forced fellatio) or seduction (Khader 90). Khader argues that 
their intimacy in this moment includes a slippage between the Self and Other, during 
which “her willingness to introject the Other” means “Mina becomes open to the radical 
alterity of the Other” (89). For Khader, Mina’s submission to and identification with the 
vampire means that “[r]ecognizing her intimate connections with the radical Other and 
the slippages between Self and Other becomes the precondition for bearing an ethical 
responsibility for the persecutory Other” (90). This responsibility, Khader points out, 
appears in Mina’s uncertainty over why the vampire hunters would continue to pursue 
Dracula once he has fled. However, if we read the vampire here as ontologically other 
(rather than a singular, identifiable Other), we can update Khader’s ethics of radical 
alterity to include the ethos of generosity inherent in heteroaffection. That is, Mina does 
not necessarily need to be willing to “introject the Other” in order for us to understand 
why she is open to the radical alterity of the other. As Malabou and Brennan suggest, 
affect already injects, whether subjects are willing or not. That this moment is followed 
not only by Mina’s resistance to violence but also her faint, which attempts to avoid both 
narrating the other and participating in violence, further solidifies the relationship 
between subjective interruption and ethics.  
Khader also reads gaps in consciousness and narrative through an ethics of 
alterity. For Khader, victims of the vampire do not have direct individual access to their 
moments of trauma, but, in compiling their stories, they do have access “at the collective 
level” (78). Khader claims that “such a collective project is necessary for working 
through the trauma” but he cautions that  
the novel portrays the risks involved in any collective project that imagines 
or constructs a community on the basis of trauma, full identification, and 
the transference process, for such a project may ultimately be founded on 
the violent obliteration of the victims and their memories, as well as on the 
violent and xenophobic disavowal of the Other. (78) 
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Khader makes an ethical case here for preserving narrative syncope, moments that escape 
narrative while nevertheless allowing for it to proceed. This is indeed what attendance to 
alterity through heteroaffection allows us to do. We can therefore extend this cogent 
ethical reading to the context of affective otherness in the scene, an openness to the 
possibilities of the unknown and the other, including the alterity of the self. When Mina 
recounts her encounter with Dracula, narrative syncope allows her to remain open to the 
mystery of her embodied subjectivity in her encounter with the vampire, underscoring the 
significance of affective strangeness and uncertainty. Affective alterity for Mina includes 
her circulatory system, as she notes that her “heart sank” when she sees the vampire, and 
immediately following that her “heart stood still” and she could not scream because she 
“was paralysed” (251). Trying to describe her affective state, she does not exactly say she 
is scared, but rather appalled and bewildered, and finally, “strangely enough, [that she] 
did not want to hinder him” (Stoker 251). As in Jonathan’s narrative, the gaps or 
syncopations in Mina’s narrative and in her body show how the ethical model of alterity 
in the novel is not limited to an intimacy with the Other, but also to an attention to one’s 
own strange feelings and feelings of strangeness, and an uncertainty about one’s own 
being and the form of the other that has affected it.  
Vampiric touching through hypnosis also helps us to determine what an ethos of 
generosity might mean. After Mina has taken in the blood of the vampire to become 
heteroaffected in the most material way, drinking the other in, she urges Van Helsing to 
hypnotize her so she can tell the hunters where Dracula is. Van Helsing understands his 
hypnotic power to be a form of influence following Charcot’s work (Stoker 171), a belief 
repeated by Seward (299). Scholars, too, have understood hypnosis be a form of 
influence, control, or communication; for example, Otis reads hypnosis as a counterpart 
to Dracula’s vampiric influence and communication.190 But, as with readings of influence 
in The Picture of Dorian Gray, these interpretations are not quite accurate—or at least, 
                                               
190 Other examples include Galvan, who points to Mina as an unconscious communication machine in the 
manner of Victorian beliefs that woman are natural automatons because they are “short on will” (62). 
Khader calls hypnosis “coerced identification” (90); Thurschwell claims that through hypnosis Dracula 
“take[s] over the minds as well as the bodies of [his] entranced victims” (37); Moss argues that hypnosis 
suggests that the self is “shaped by outside forces” (132); and Glover agrees by referring to Carpenter’s 
reading of hypnotism as control that “bypasses the conscious decision of the mesmerized subject” (78). 
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they are not the whole story. Mina’s hypnosis represents a syncope that opens up her own 
alterity and her body’s part in the vampiric assemblage. She cannot read Dracula’s 
thoughts, as is popularly suggested (for example, by Hilary Grimes [149] and Khader 
[90]), but is rather open to his affective physiology. She can see what he sees: “nothing; it 
is all dark”; can hear what he hears: “the lapping of water,” “the sound of men stamping 
overhead,” and “the creaking of a chain”; and do what he does: nothing, it is “still,” “like 
death” (Stoker 272). Mina’s narrative syncope in her unconscious hypnotic state creates a 
description of the body that may help the hunters determine that Dracula is on an 
anchoring ship, but it does not resolve itself into knowledge about the thoughts of the 
other. Further, there is no epistemological clarity about Dracula’s ontological being 
through Mina’s affective connection with him—she is simply touched by the feeling of 
otherness. 
If narrative syncope forms the basis for an ethos of generosity in this novel, then it 
also eliminates the need for sympathy as it is traditionally understood to form the basis 
for ethics (as in The Time Machine). Indeed, when Mina instructs Jonathan to feel pity for 
the Count, she herself points out how toothless sympathy is—as compassionate, 
imaginative feeling for another—in the face of a politics that identifies threatening 
otherness as worthy of death: “That poor soul who has wrought all this misery is the 
saddest case of all…You must be pitiful to him, too, though it may not hold your hands 
from his destruction” (269). Feeling sympathy for the vampire need not stop Jonathan 
from killing him. In addition, while Seward’s testimony to Van Helsing’s “all-embracing 
sympathy” (Stoker 106) could secure the hunter as a moral authority, Otis points out that 
“if sympathy means the ability to enter another person’s mind, then the most sympathetic 
figure in the novel is the Count” (Otis 205). An ethos of generosity in this novel is far 
more difficult than even feeling what another feels or feeling pity for a monster; it is 
giving when it is impossible to give and being open to (even strange and terrible) others. 
Finally, Mina’s implication in a heteroaffective ethos of generosity emerges in her 
position as compiler of the full narrative of the novel. Khader notes that the narratives of 
the individual victims contain gaps around the traumatic event of vampiric encounter, one 
that is supplemented by combining narratives to create a more complete memory. Mina’s 
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desire to give Jonathan back this memory in the form of a complete narrative to explain 
what has happened to him seems on the surface to be an ethical one (Stoker 198-199). 
Jonathan’s syncopated memory from his time with the Count is described by others as 
brain fever and himself as an “injury to the brain” (156); Malabou writes that for 
neurologically disaffected patients, “[n]arrative work is a clinical gesture” (New 54). 
However, a biographical narrative risks speaking for Jonathan in an eagerness to heal 
him. Malabou argues that writing narratives for patients involves discovering “what 
rhetoric could possibly account for the breakdown of connections, for destructive 
metamorphosis? And who would write the aphasic’s novel [that is, who will write for 
someone whose brain injury means they cannot]? Who would write the story of losing all 
affect? What mirror could reflect a brain?” (55). Dracula’s answer is the preservation of 
the vampire’s absence in the mirror—heteroaffection exists simply as narrative syncope, 
and ethically so. In keeping with this ethics, the novel is nothing but syncopation, an 
absence of temporal rhythm and authorial consistency. If the text is “a mass of type-
writing,” containing no “proofs of so wild a story” (Stoker 326-327), it is because writing 
any autobiography that explains heteroaffection would be to auto-graph not only the self 
but also the other. As Kuzmanovic notes briefly, “there are signs that Van Helsing wants 
to turn Jonathan’s experience into a ‘case,’ which needs explaining out and transferential 
emotion in order to be cured” (424 n.9). Not only would this case be Van Helsing 
speaking for Jonathan, it also functions as an extended attempt to speak for the vampire. 
Generosity as narrative syncope means accepting that the gift of heteroaffection is other 
and unknown, and therefore outside of writing, allowing narrative syncope to be not 
reflective but rather overfull with potential.  
5.4. Conclusion 
Stiles describes the patchwork form of Dracula’s narrative—full of anecdotes, 
letters, journal entries, newspapers clippings, and other media, along with the hunters’ 
commitment to objective and truthful recording—as evidence of a kind of scientific 
“veracity” (78-79). The very quality that makes the narrative syncopated, that creates 
nonconscious gaps in the narrative, is also what makes it scientific in Stiles’ measure. In 
the twentieth and twenty-first century, as Malabou points out, cognitive scientists strive 
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to create a coherent narrative out of their neurologically atypical patients’ disaffection. 
Malabou identifies this narrative style as best exemplified by Oliver Sacks, who 
“weave[s] the patient’s coolness, indifference, and the disintegration of emotion into a 
narrative intrigue that must not be disaffected itself” (54). Yet, even Sacks’ evident 
compassion for his patients is underwritten by a worrying concern with their so-called 
soulfulness. Writing about his patient, William, who attempts to “bridge” “abysses of 
amnesia” with “fluent confabulations and fictions of all kinds” (109), Sacks laments that 
“if only he could be quiet, one feels, for an instant,” then “reality might seep in” and 
“something genuine, something deep, something true, something felt, could enter his 
soul” (114). William is, for Sacks, the disaffected patient that Malabou has written about, 
whose “chatter[ing]” hides his lack of affect, his inability to feel (114); even more 
upsetting, Sacks asks whether the nursing sisters looking after William believe he even 
“has a soul” (113, original emphasis). For Sacks, William’s own narrative, syncopated in 
the sense that his constant talk bridges a gap that would otherwise exist, is not enough to 
qualify him unconditionally as human, or as human as Sacks himself. 
Antonio Damasio, another contemporary cognitive scientist, writer of case studies 
and believer in the idea that ethics underlies neurobiology, similarly attempts to write a 
dangerous biography for his patient “S”. Damasio and his fellow clinicians determine that 
S experiences disaffection around the emotion fear; that is, she has trouble feeling it and 
recognizing it (65-67). However, when Damasio attempts to narrate her case, he notes 
that she is a “tall, slender, and extremely pleasant young woman,” with such a 
“predominantly pleasant attitude” that “[o]thers would say that her approach was 
excessively and inappropriately forthcoming” (64). Damasio’s implicit sexualization of 
S, with his hint of predatory interest in her inappropriate behaviour—“[m]ake no 
mistake,” he writes, “her behaviour caused no discomfort to anyone” (64)—creates a 
discourse of otherness that does not vilify S or make her monstrous, but does make her 
vulnerable as it provides a subjective interpretation of her affective body. Arguing for the 
significance of social and cultural factors to emotion, Daniel M. Gross points out that not 
only does Damasio’s experiment on S assume a baseline of “normal” judgment without a 
“statistically valid sample that can be reliably purged of race, gender, age, cultural bias, 
and so on” (31), “the supposedly generic man” of scientific inquiry “now becomes a 
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slender woman with boundary issues” (30). “It is as if,” Gross continues, “the racist and 
anti-Semitic blunders of nineteenth-century physiognomy had never happened” (31-32).  
While Massumi eagerly embraces scientific examples as the basis or support for 
his theories of affect, he also notes the danger of science’s apparent desire to define the 
monstrous—the process of responding to the affective “surprise” of the unknown world 
by confirming its monstrosity as recognizable and predictable (Parables 233). Dracula 
offers a challenge to science through a surprising alterity that does not respect the limits 
of the body, and through the representation of violence against the vampires, whose 
becomings and mutabilities as birds, wolves, or dust particles (to name a few forms) 
enchant, shock, and interrupt subjectivity, although they are reduced to recognizable 
sameness and subjected to the most unethical violent touching, staked and beheaded. 
However, Dracula also offers a narrative challenge to cognitive science, making visible 
the danger of writing for the other, of turning their forms of syncope, their gaps and 
bridges and interruptions, into a fully affective narrative. Stoker’s novel suggests, if only 
in its own gaps, that an ethical narrative needs to be uncertain in order to be generous; 
that a truly ethical narrative, dangerous though it may be, embraces this uncertainty not as 




In George Du Maurier’s Trilby (1894), the young washerwoman and nude model 
Trilby becomes a renowned singer under the tutelage and mesmerism of the musician 
Svengali. Before this happens, she is ardently pursued by Little Billee, one of three 
British artists living in Paris. After nineteen refusals, Trilby finally accepts Billee’s 
twentieth marriage proposal, but his joy is short-lived as his mother arrives from England 
as passionate to halt the marriage as Billee has been to secure it. Mrs. Bagot is horrified 
that her respectable son might marry a working-class woman who once modeled for 
artists, and she convinces Trilby to break the engagement and leave Paris. Little Billee 
protests this injustice vehemently to Taffy and the Laird (the other two Englishmen) in 
what the novel’s narrator describes as a “rampage,” during which the “poor boy” goes 
“tearing and raving about [their Parisian apartment], knocking over chairs and easels, 
stammering and shrieking, mad with excitement” (196). Although his two friends try to 
calm him, Billee refuses to be placated, finally, “gasp[ing] and scream[ing]” as he falls 
“down in a fit on the floor” (197). This loss of consciousness is diagnosed as an epileptic 
seizure, and its aftermath is brain-fever and a lengthy convalescence. As he recovers, 
Billee discovers that his illness has created a loss of emotion towards others, as “his 
power of loving had not come back with his wandering wits…not even his love for his 
mother and sister, not even his love for Trilby—where all that had once been there was a 
void, a gap, a blankness” (200). 
Little Billee’s fit, while not exactly a faint, represents an instance of narrative 
syncope, a transient loss of consciousness that mirrors those I have described in this 
dissertation. Billee is not usually a focus of scholarly interest in Trilby, despite the fact 
that an entire part of the eight-part novel is devoted almost entirely to him. Attending to 
his syncope shows us how integral his narrative is to the novel as a whole and, in turn, 
helps to texture, challenge, and expand our readings of the gendered and racialized body 
in Victorian culture, and its relationship to sympathy and ethics. 
Like many other fainting men, Billee fits Mark Micale’s description of the 
subversively feminine hysterical man; he is a sensitive artist and is repeatedly referred to 
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as feminine, both in his physical and mental characteristics: he is “small and slender,” 
“delicate” and “graceful,” with a “girlish purity of mind” (Du Maurier 6, 9). However, 
these markers of femininity intersect with (rather than cause) the neurology of his 
syncopal fit. Billee’s loss of consciousness is pathologized as a seizure and he 
understands his loss of emotion to be a highly material brain injury:  
It was as though some part of his brain where his affections were seated had 
been paralysed, while all the rest of it was as keen and active as ever. He 
felt like some poor live bird or beast or reptile, a part of whose cerebrum (or 
cerebellum, or whatever it is) had been dug out by the vivisector for 
experimental purposes, and the strongest emotional feeling he seemed 
capable of was his anxiety and alarm about this curious symptom, and his 
concern as to whether he ought to mention it or not. (212)  
The problem of Billee’s lack of emotional attachment here is a physiological one, the 
implication being that his brain has been materially affected as much as if someone had 
taken a scalpel to it.  
Moreover, Little Billee compares himself to the vivisected “bird or beast or 
reptile” of neurological studies, both tacitly acknowledging the animal alterity of his 
affective brain and placing himself in the company of case studies published by 
nineteenth-century physiologists like Thomas Huxley. That is, this reference suggests that 
Billee, like the other fainting men in this dissertation, is an automaton. Fiona Coll and 
others have already established that Du Maurier is exploring and complicating theories of 
automatism in this novel, but these scholars argue that he does so through Trilby, the 
“singing-machine” (Du Maurier 441). This approach genders the automaton’s failures of 
humanness, such as lack of agency and weakness of will.191 While gender is most 
certainly an important aspect of the novel, it is insufficient as an explanation for 
automatism. The problem with Billee’s emotions is “a little clot of blood at the root of a 
nerve” as he puts it (Du Maurier 261). The source of his feelings is, therefore, a 
malfunction of the organ of the brain, and there is no version here of a masculine, self-
                                               
191 See also Rosanna Nunan, Phyllis Weliver, and Jill Galvan. 
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possessed, volitional, transcendental subjectivity against which to compare Trilby’s 
automatic behaviour.  
Along with the “numbness of his affections” (211) and diminished “moral 
existence” (213), Little Billee experiences an enlarged capacity for generosity to others. 
Like other fainting men and women in this dissertation, Billee behaves ethically towards 
others when he is absent to himself. The narrator calls Billee’s ethical behaviour “quick, 
wide, universal sympathy” (230), and it partially mirrors the ethics of ontological 
generosity that we have seen in Dracula. Billee spoils his mother and sister with gifts 
because “there was never a more generous son or brother than Little Billee of the clouded 
heart” (227). His “clouded” generosity is supplemental, emerging in the gap between 
himself and his emotions, and supplementing his autoaffection in order to make him more 
human. Billee’s generosity is that of an automaton who behaves compulsively (in some 
ways like Lydgate or like the vampire hunters): “He could be as easily demonstrative to 
his mother and sister as though nothing had ever happened to him—from the mere force 
of a sweet old habit—even more so, out of sheer gratitude and compunction” (211). To 
others, too, Billee “became more considerate…in thought and manner, word, and deed 
than he had ever been before, as though by constantly assuming the virtue he had no 
longer he would gradually coax it back again” (212). At the same time, one admirer of 
Billee’s admits that “he seemed heartless and capricious; as ready to drop you as he had 
been to take you up” (232). The text implies there is a difference between being generous 
and being an individual with the kinds of self-interest and particular feelings towards 
other individuals that we traditionally associate with generosity (like love), and the 
second is not needed—in fact, it is a hindrance to the first. 
Little Billee’s generosity is also excessive and grows beyond his social class, as in 
his game participation in singing at those “humble gatherings” (230) of the “free and 
easies” (228) that the working classes frequent; or in the “genial caressing love of his 
kind,” the “warm contact of his fellow-man at either shoulder and at his back,” whether 
“on a penny steamer” or “on the yacht of a millionaire” (232). As he travels in a second-
class carriage, Billee “sympathetically tak[es] stock of his fellow-passengers, and mildly 
env[ies] them, one after another, indiscriminately!” (254). This sympathetic stock-taking 
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sounds in one way like imaginative sympathy for the good of the social—indeed, Billee 
is reading George Eliot’s realist novel Silas Marner on the train. In between reading, he 
gives up his corner seat so a wife can better care for her husband, and he generally 
“ma[kes] himself useful and pleasant to his fellow travellers in many ways” (254), so that 
they come almost to “love him as an old friend” (254). However, calling Billee’s 
sympathy indiscriminate gives the lie to the idea that it is properly imaginative, an 
attempt to know the other and their relationship to the self. Instead, Billee’s sympathy is 
impersonal; it is simply the result of existence. 
Billee’s generosity and his extended absence from his self-interest and emotions 
make visible the gift of heteroaffection. His subjectivity originates in otherness, both in 
the otherness of a brain with which he feels frustrated (261), and in the generous alterity 
that will recover his emotions, through the eyes and the voice of sympathetic Trilby (309-
310). His experience suggests, too, just how radical this heteroaffected version of 
generosity might be. Not only does Billee have a lack of “vanity” (212), he is un-self-
interested to the point of danger, musing to a canine companion that the best thing of all 
to do in the ocean is “to lie asleep at the bottom” (261). Rosanna Nunan has already 
begun to explore Billee’s “deadening of consciousness” by linking it with Trilby’s 
mesmerized state and finding in both Billee and Trilby evidence of a “subliminal self” 
that was being theorized at the end of the century (n. pg.). However, Billee’s dangerous 
lack of self-interest belies the idea that generosity could belong to any sort of self-ness 
because its origin is in Billee’s brain and his total break with consciousness—when, as 
Malabou puts it, “an affect touches me but I don’t know what ‘me’ means” (24).  
The text’s suggestion that, for Billee, generosity originates in the affective, 
nonconscious, nonsubjective body has wider implications for the novel as a whole. For 
example, while Jill Galvan argues that Trilby is a sympathetic medium because her 
gender predisposes her to lack agency and to channel friendly feeling, Trilby’s syncopal 
absence of self and her generosity in giving and receiving affect are too alike to Billee’s 
to be easily explained as a consequence of gender. Moreover, the supposedly evil 
mesmerist Svengali is also a sensitive automaton, a “bundle of nerves” (Du Maurier 356) 
who faints at the sight of blood (358). Svengali, like Dracula and like the theater manager 
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in The Picture of Dorian Gray, is represented as Jewish, as animal-like, and as “unclean” 
(104), and the threat of his mesmeric control encapsulates white Victorians’ racist fears 
about the threat of Jewish people (Pick, Svengali’s). However, mesmerism is about the 
body and is in many aspects a representation of heightened affect. It therefore need not be 
(only) understood as a threatening form of mind control. As we have seen in other novels, 
affect always comes from the other (including the other of the nonconscious body) and all 
bodies in this novel are affected and affecting. Trilby affects people through her voice 
while, in an echo of Svengali’s mesmeric practice, she also affects Billee with a look and 
thereby cures his brain damage. The Laird, too, affects Trilby in a Svengali-like way, 
insisting on the villainous nature of mesmerism so forcefully that he produces “cold 
shivers” “down Trilby’s back” along with her “fear and repulsion” of Svengali (73). As 
Coll explains, “despite the theatrics surrounding Svengali’s mesmeric display, then, it is 
actually the Laird who does the most ‘impressing’ upon Trilby’s mind in this scene” 
(759). Finally, it is worth noting that Svengali’s mesmerism begins in generosity when he 
heals Trilby’s ocular neuralgia by “making passes and counterpasses” on her face and 
neck (Du Maurier 67-68).192   
Reading Trilby in light of Little Billee’s syncope reveals the nonconscious, 
affective body to be a space of ethical potential (in this case, generosity) in its orientation 
toward the other. The novel demonstrates that absolute generosity is an ideal that is 
ultimately (and quite literally) unlivable—Billee does not care whether he lives or dies 
and Trilby ends up unable to survive without Svengali. Trilby therefore suggests that 
subjectivity itself involves limiting generosity. On the one hand, the novel holds Trilby 
up as a cautionary tale to this truth, blighted because she was not able to close her 
embodied generosity off from the non-British Svengali. On the other hand, Trilby and 
Little Billee are both models of goodness in the novel. The generous body also gives us 
another way to see Svengali’s mesmerism as a potential affective gift. This reading in no 
way erases Du Maurier’s anti-Semitism, but it implies a certain factuality about the 
ethical potential of the affective, animal, automatic body—of all bodies. 
                                               
192 See Hilary Grimes and Fiona Coll for readings that challenge the traditional notion of Trilby as an 
empty vessel made into a singer by the controlling and evil Svengali. 
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In Trilby, as in The Picture of Dorian Gray, The Time Machine, and Dracula, 
syncope is terrifying and pleasurable. It demonstrates that the affective, nonconscious, 
and nonhuman body is at the heart of subjectivity, and it has an ethics of generosity, 
uncertainty, and responsibility that emerges in the deconstruction of the nonhuman-
human binary. Syncope also deconstructs the biological essentialism of late-nineteenth-
century hierarchies of gender and race, revealing the bodies of the Victorians’s ideal 
humans—non-racialized British men—to be as vulnerable, as nervous, as hysterical, as 
non-agential, and as other as women and racialized people. To be clear, this 
deconstruction does not undo the violent powers of human exceptionalism and its 
patriarchal and imperialist forms. Syncope can even be recuperated into that 
exceptionalism, as Van Helsing demonstrates so well. However, deconstructing the basis 
for that exceptionalism through syncope reveals counter-narratives that acknowledge and, 
at times, celebrate animality, alterity, wildness, uncertainty, and vulnerability. 
In 1899, The Cornhill Magazine published Stephen Gwynne’s “The Decay of 
Sensibility,” a screed against Jane Austen, the “mortally stupid, confined, narrow-minded 
society” in which she lived and set her novels, and the “poor creatures” of her books 
resigned to a life of sensibility—“the attribute which used to display itself by rapturous 
joy, by copious tears, by hysterics, and principally by fainting-fits” (18-19). Gwynne 
concedes that Austen (and other authors of hysterical female characters) could only write 
what she knew, and fainting was it. He explains, however, that sensibility was on the 
decline at the end of the century as women realized that they needed to employ other 
tactics to gain power over men. As they had fewer fainting fits and hysterical episodes, 
by 1899 women were “much less inconvenient” people (30). Gwynne, it seems, has 
missed the number of men who faint in Victorian novels. Moreover, he is wrong that 
sensibility is on the decline at the turn of the century—at least, when it comes to male 
characters. 
In fact, British (and Irish) modernist literature is home to many sensitive, 
responsive men and their feeling bodies. In Henry James’s 1908 ghost story “The Jolly 
Corner,” Spencer Brydon faints after an encounter with the apparition of the self he might 
have been, who turns out to be a complete stranger (188). In James Joyce’s The Portrait 
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of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), swooning represents both sexual and spiritual 
rapture for Stephen Dedalus (114, 174), who also has a “fit” of vomiting and near-
fainting after a vision of divine punishment for his sins (159). Similarly, D. H. Lawrence 
describes the intensity of (often sexual) feeling as swooning in Women In Love (1920), in 
which Rupert Birkin faints after a nude wrestling match with Gerald Crich (308). In E. 
M. Forster’s A Passage to India (1924), the Indian physician, Dr. Aziz, faints after being 
acquitted of sexual assault against a white British woman (231). Even Lord Peter 
Wimsey, the detective hero of Dorothy L. Sayers’s novels, faints after being rescued from 
a bog in Clouds of Witness (1927) (204). 
Fainting men also appear in American literature through the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, including in classics like Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Pit and the 
Pendulum” (1842), Charlotte Perkins Gillman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper” (1892), many 
of H. P. Lovecraft’s short stories, such as “The Call of Cthulu” (1928), and in the later 
post-war novel The Invisible Man (1952) by Ralph Ellison. Male swooners also appear in 
film; some notable examples from the early to mid-twentieth century include the tramp in 
Charlie Chaplin’s The Gold Rush (1924), Freder in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927),193 and 
Scottie Ferguson in Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958). All of these examples suggest 
that the male body remains a source of both distressing and pleasurable vulnerability 
beyond the temporal and geographic boundaries of late-Victorian literature. Late-
Victorian psychology may have identified and investigated the affective, animal, and 
automatic aspect of the body, but, as I hope these examples from Trilby to Vertigo 
suggest, that aspect deserves further political and ethical analyses through instances of 
syncope from Victorian literature and beyond. 
 
 
                                               
193 Tom Gunning argues that Freder’s fainting fits indicate his femininity and clash with his supposed role 
as hero (64, 67). 
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